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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL PRIVATE CURRENCIES
Girish Sreevatsan Nandakumar
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. Francis Adams

This dissertation examines regulatory responses to global private currencies (GPCs).
Through detailed analyses of the history and evolution of private digital currencies, and through
case studies of the United States, the European Union, and China, this dissertation identifies five
factors that condition regulatory responses: (1) compliance with anti-money laundering (AML)
laws, (2) compliance with systems built for fiat currencies, (3) degree of transparency in
operations, (4) culture of sovereignty within the nation, and (5) great power competition with other
nations. Throughout the dissertation, various political, economic, social, technological, legal, and
environmental (PESTLE) characteristics of GPCs are highlighted. This dissertation also proposes
a ‘game transformation framework’ (GTF) by combining these PESTLE factors with concepts
from game theory. A 2x2 game structure is used to analyze strategic interactions between
governments in the three case studies and GPCs on a spectrum between cooperation and conflict.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Money makes the world go around. Before cryptocurrencies were born, this common
saying referred exclusively to money in the form of government-issued fiat currencies, which can
be created out of thin air. In response to the COVID19 pandemic, most governments exercised this
power through their central banks. Meanwhile, Bitcoin, the decentralized, denationalized
cryptocurrency that operates without any borders went through the exact opposite, a cut in supply
through a process called ‘halvening.’ Bitcoin was born in 2009, immediately after the previous
economic crisis, as a response to the heavily centralized financial and monetary systems across the
world that are substantially influenced by political whims of those who hold power at the time.
The way Bitcoin and other private currencies work may seem complicated. J.K. Rowling,
the author of the Harry Potter series, once tweeted, “I don’t understand bitcoin. Please explain it
to me.” After Bitcoin advocates and other fans tried to explain the basics to her, she tweeted “People are now explaining Bitcoin to me, and honestly, it’s blah blah blah collectibles (My Little
Pony?) blah blah blah computers (got one of those) blah blah blah crypto (sounds creepy) blah
blah blah understand the risk (I don’t, though.)”. In response, Elon Musk, the multi-billionaire
serial entrepreneur, tweeted, “Pretty much, although massive currency issuance by govt central
banks is making Bitcoin Internet [ghost] money look solid by comparison.” This online dialogue
is an example of how people see cryptocurrencies: a not-so-well-understood phenomenon that gets
directly compared to traditional, government-issued fiat currencies. As one comedian once
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summed it up for his audience, cryptocurrencies involve ‘everything you don’t know about money
combined with everything you don’t know about computers.’1
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have been dismissed as volatile, speculative assets by
the media and many prominent individuals for many years. Warren Buffet, the legendary investor,
has referred to it as ‘rat poison.’ However, there are some prominent individuals and institutions
with strong positive viewpoints. Paul Todor, the billionaire hedge fund manager who predicted the
1987 crash, has praised Bitcoin as a good alternative to the ‘great monetary inflation’ risks posed
by the trillions of dollars pumped into the economy by governments. Bitcoin has been compared
to gold by many investors and even carries the nickname ‘digital gold’ by those who see it as a
good store of value, although it does not perform well as a good medium of transaction. Even the
US government treats Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies as commodities or securities and
not as currencies. Yet, there are many users of cryptocurrencies across the world who use them as
both stores of value and as mediums of transaction, two of the three main functions of money. The
third function, being a unit of account, has also been carried out by cryptocurrencies, but only in a
few niche circles.
Major corporations have been inspired by this new cryptocurrency phenomenon and have
been drawing up plans to launch their own. Facebook’s Diem (formerly known as Libra) was the
most popular one among them. Diem, which was announced in the Summer of 2019 and was
effectively shut down in January 2022,2 drew the attention of every major government on the
planet. At the time, Diem appeared to have an opportunity to become a worldwide dominant

John Oliver, “Cryptocurrencies,” Last Week Tonight With John Oliver, March 11, 2018, 25:20,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6iDZspbRMg&feature=youtu.be
2
Andrew Morse, “End of the Day for Meta's Diem Cryptocurrency: What You Need to Know.” CNET, February 2,
2022, https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/crypto/end-of-the-day-for-metas-diem-cryptocurrency-what-youneed- to-know/.
1

3
currency in a very short period of time. The potential effect of the new, global, private digital
currency could have been an unprecedented impact on national currencies across the world.
Inspired by these private sector initiatives, governments, through their central banks, have started
exploring the idea of issuing ‘central bank digital currencies’ that have some of the same features
as cryptocurrencies. This dissertation is a study on globally operating digital currencies such as
Bitcoin and the now-extinct Libra, which are not backed by governments. The focus is on how
governments have responded to this new phenomenon. Specifically, this study explores the
question: What are the factors that condition regulatory responses to global private currencies
(henceforth ‘GPCs’). Throughout this dissertation, the terms GPCs and cryptocurrencies are used
interchangeably.
A cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that relies on electronic cryptography for
security, making them difficult to counterfeit.3 One of the defining features of a cryptocurrency is
that it is a peer-to-peer system. This means that they cut out the entities in the middle, such as
banks, which are usually seen as being necessary for such transactions. Such “decentralization” is
made possible through blockchain technology, a distributed system of secure and immutable online
ledgers.4 Most private cryptocurrencies are not issued by any central authority and are therefore
theoretically shielded from governments.5 Given the highly technical nature of the topic, it is
necessary to understand the basic mechanisms and technologies that make cryptocurrencies work.
The blockchain technology was initially proposed as a research project in 1991. The idea later
formed the basis of Bitcoin, which was launched in 2009 through an open white paper.6 Since

Jake Frankenfield, “Cryptocurrency,” Investopedia, last modified January 11, 2022,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp.
4
Sloane Brakeville and Bhargav Perepa, “Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distributed Ledgers,” IBM Developer,
last modified May 31, 2019, https://developer.ibm.com/tutorials/cl-blockchain-basics-intro-bluemix-trs/
5
Frankenfield, “Cryptocurrency,” 2022.
6
Satoshi Nakamoto, "Bitcoin whitepaper," URL: https://Bitcoin. org/Bitcoin. pdf-(: 17.07. 2019) (2008).
3

4
2009, the use of blockchains has grown exponentially through several cryptocurrencies and related
applications such as decentralized finance (DeFi) applications, non-fungible tokens (NFTs), and
smartcontracts.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines a blockchain as
“tamper-evident and tamper-resistant digital ledgers implemented in a distributed fashion . . . and
usually without a central authority.”7 Blockchain technology is the backbone of modern
cryptocurrencies. The most important feature of a blockchain is that it allows digital information
to be recorded and distributed without allowing any changes. This makes blockchain an ideal
technology for creating immutable ledgers, which can power financial systems. On a blockchain,
records of transactions cannot be altered, deleted, or destroyed. Blockchains rely on every node
and are therefore ‘distributed’ in nature. Therefore, the technology is often referred to as also a
distributed ledger technology (DLT). With the power of a blockchain-powered network, two
strangers can safely and directly engage in business transactions without the need for any
intermediaries, thereby making lawyers, bankers, brokers, and governments potentially irrelevant.
To achieve this, blockchains rely on cryptographic puzzles that unlock ‘blocks’ while keeping the
network secure through a process known as ‘mining.’ Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have
been heavily criticized for the vast amounts of energy they consume in order to ‘mine’ the blocks
that enable their blockchains. Blockchain is a system that enables trust which is achieved through
its distributed design. The blockchain confirms the identity of participants, validates transactions,
and ensures that every participant is playing by the rules. Blockchains have enabled not just
cryptocurrencies but also other similar applications that involve currencies. The best example is a
smartcontract, a programmable contract that carries out the terms of the agreement established

Dylan Yaga et al., “Blockchain Technology Overview,” National Institutes of Standard and Technology, October
2018, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/nist.ir.8202.pdf.
7
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between buyer and seller as lines of code on a blockchain network. NIST defines smart contracts
as “software deployed on the blockchain and executed by computers running that blockchain.”
Blockchain has become a buzzword in several sectors—from governance to recycling.8
There has also been an overwhelming amount of research and funding for applications of this
technology.9 However, the finance and banking sector could potentially be directly affected in the
event that blockchain technology improves and grows to offer a viable alternative to centralized
institutions. Cryptocurrencies have been used as speculative investments,10 instruments for money
laundering, and as a payment system to send and receive money in developing countries.11 The
technology is being adopted by major corporations12 and governmental institutions13 and is also
predicted to have a major impact on global trade 14 if it gets adopted by businesses and financial
institutions on a global scale. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have already impacted the
international monetary system. Cryptocurrencies, just like fiat currencies, are not just monetary
instruments, they are also a tool of power. Cryptocurrencies have the ability to potentially change
global power dynamics by weakening the US dollar. For instance, El Salvador, which adopted the

Candice Teo, “From Diamonds to Recycling: How Blockchain Can Drive Responsible and Ethical Businesses,”
World Economic Forum, June 22, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/diamonds-recycling-blockchaintechnology-responsible-ethical-businesses/.
9
“Blockchain Trends In Review,” CB Insights, July 17, 2019,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/blockchain-trends-opportunities/.
10
Jay Adkisson, “The Cryptocurrency Paradox And Why Crypto Is Failing,” Forbes, November 28, 2018,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/11/28/the-cryptocurrency-paradox-and-why-crypto-isfailing/?sh=458c2afa7c9d.
11
Emilio Rivero Coello, “Are Cryptocurrencies Useful for Remittances?,” Coin Center, January 6, 2020,
https://www.coincenter.org/are-cryptocurrencies-useful-for-remittances/.
12
Michael Del Castillo, “Blockchain 50: Billion Dollar Babies,” Forbes, April 16, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/04/16/blockchain-50-billion-dollarbabies/?sh=26b488f857cc#1d4d32957ccb.
13
Cathy Mulligan, “Blockchain and Sustainable Growth,” United Nations, December 2018,
https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/blockchain-and-sustainable-growth.
14
Rachel F. Fefer, “Blockchain and International Trade,” Congressional Research Service, last modified June 25,
2019, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10810.pdf.
8
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US dollar as its legal tender in 2001, recently passed a bill to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender,
highlighting how significant the GPC has become in just a decade.
Although the primary purpose of a monetary system is to facilitate transactions in the ‘real’
economy, money has been used as a political tool in almost as many instances as it has been used
as an economic tool. Centralized control of the monetary system has been instrumental in creating
and maintaining power and hegemony. During the Renaissance, the Medici family controlled the
banking industry and the government for almost 400 years. This was not because the Medici’s
were excellent innovators, but because they effectively applied newly developed techniques, such
as double-entry bookkeeping, to their advantage. They were highly skilled at strategizing the usage
of these innovations. The best example is the central holding company they used to consolidate
their operations. They also found innovative ways to work around the rules of the Catholic Church,
the most powerful entity at that time. They used their bank branches to circumvent the Church's
ban on the charging of interest. The Medici bank lent foreign currency, or accepted a bill of
exchange, in one currency and collected debt in another, adding a hidden rate of interest into the
exchange rate. Today, global private currencies powered by blockchain technology, an innovation
that’s comparable to the double-entry bookkeeping, have started shaking up the established order
that was created by government-issued fiat currencies. Therefore, the political economy of
cryptocurrencies is a highly significant topic that warrants more attention.
In the future, decentralized systems powered by blockchains could play a major role in our
everyday lives. This could stem from the erosion of trust in governments and other centralized
systems. Blockchain networks that power GPCs such as Ethereum can also power other
applications, such as smartcontracts that can offer better alternatives to other areas of governance.
Smartcontracts often have the advantage of being a part of the same network and system that
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executes payments through cryptocurrencies. In a world where denationalized blockchain-based
financial systems are ubiquitous, smartcontracts are likely to be widely adopted. Smartcontracts
might be able to provide insurance and other legal services, making these networks highly
valuable.15 Clearly, this topic has important economic and sociological ramifications.
GPCs have risen to prominence at a time when nations across the world are attempting to
reduce their use of cash in order to have more efficient monetary systems. Such “cashless
societies”16 of the future could potentially be powered by private entities, marking a major shift in
power dynamics. The future of the global monetary system is likely to involve new digital
cryptocurrencies, some of which will not be issued by nation-states or regulated the same way
central banks and governments control monetary systems today. If large decentralized financial
systems get widely adopted, the international monetary system, which has thus far been dominated
by national currencies such as the US dollar, will be entirely disrupted. This could also remove the
US dollar as the de facto reserve currency of the world. Great power competition between nations
today is primarily based on economics and are fought through currencies. Therefore,
cryptocurrencies are more than just an economic phenomenon. This makes the topic significant
for governments across the world.
As reflected in the regulatory actions discussed in this dissertation, governments are slowly
but surely becoming aware of the potential opportunities and threats posed by decentralized
financial systems that can change global power dynamics. This has led to some initiatives by
nations that aim to harness the power of blockchain for currencies and other applications while
Stuart D Levi and Alex B Lipton, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, “An Introduction to Smart
Contracts and Their Potential and Inherent Limitations,” Harvard Law School Forum On Corporate Governance,
May 26, 2018, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-and-their-potentialand-inherent-limitations/.
16
Vishal Marria, “What A Cashless Society Could Mean For The Future,” Forbes, December 21, 2018,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/vishalmarria/2018/12/21/what-a-cashless-society-could-mean-for-thefuture/?sh=13c608943263.
15
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retaining centralized control. This has been the case with authoritarian governments such as the
one in China, making this a significant topic in the field of international studies. The digital Yuan,
the latest form of China’s national currency, is the first of its kind to have completed successful
trials and is being scaled-up and improved.17 Some reports suggest that China has also tested the
application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 18 and blockchain19 in their internet courts. In combination
with China’s social credit system, such applications of blockchain might further strengthen
Beijing’s authoritarian model. This makes the topic significant for the field of political science.
Other authoritarian countries and client states that rely on China will also be able to buy
blockchain-based financial and legal services. This would lead to China gaining unparalleled
access to political, economic, social, and other types of data from these countries, leading to
increased influence over them, changing the current balance of power.
Money, as a topic of research, has been of great interest to scholars, as evident from the
number of scholarly articles one can find on the topic. GPCs are a new form of money with some
similarities to the previous system but there are also enough differences, which warrant a more
detailed understanding of what the phenomenon is and how states are responding to it. It is obvious
that regulations will follow but the key question is: What are the factors that condition these
regulatory responses? This dissertation’s purpose is to explore this significant question by
analyzing scholarly literature and other relevant sources of information. The dissertation identifies
and explains the five key factors that condition regulatory responses to globally operational digital

Arjun Kharpal, “China Is Pushing for Broader Use of Its Digital Currency,” CNBC, January 10, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/11/china-digital-Yuan-pboc-to-expand-e-cny-use-but-challenges-remain.html.
18
Ana Alexandre, “Chinese Internet Court Employs AI and Blockchain to Render Judgement,” Coin Telegraph,
April 25, 2019, https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinese-internet-court-employs-ai-and-blockchain-to-renderjudgement.
19
Adrian Zmudzinski, “Chinese Internet Court Uses Blockchain to Protect Online Writer’s Intellectual Property,”
Coin Telegraph, December 8, 2018, https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinese-internet-court-uses-blockchain-toprotect-online-writers-intellectual-property.
17
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currencies that are not backed by governments. These five factors are (1) compliance with AntiMoney Laundering (AML) laws, (2) compliance with systems built for fiat currencies, (3) degree
of transparency in operations, (4) culture of sovereignty within the nation, and (5) great power
competition with other nations. These factors also show how varied the impacts of GPCs are. In
combination, GPCs present political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental
(PESTLE) impacts and risks.
Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws is the primary factor that concerns
regulators across the world. There are two main reasons: (1) GPCs, because of the decentralized
and semi-transparent nature of their operation, can enable money laundering and tax evasion,
which lead to loss of revenue for governments, and (2) GPCs can enable crime and terrorism
because they can be used to finance bad actors through money-laundering. The second most
important factor is compliance with systems that exist to support nation-backed fiat currencies.
This is because GPCs are seen by governments as direct competitors to fiat currencies, which have
a monopoly. Some cryptocurrencies, known as stablecoins, tether their value to a nation-backed
fiat currency. Stablecoins are seen more favorably by regulators because they do not affect
monetary policy the way other cryptocurrencies do. However, most GPCs are not stablecoins and
therefore do not easily comply with existing systems. Thirdly, the degree of transparency is a key
technical factor related to the first two factors. Most blockchains are pseudonymous while some
are more anonymous. The degree of transparency varies for each cryptocurrency. The ones that
are easier to analyze and trace are seen more favorably by regulators. The fourth factor, the culture
of sovereignty within a nation refers to how a nation’s population and leadership sees the national
currency vis-a-vis private currencies. In some nations, there is a strong sense of pride and
patriotism that can make governments and populations blind to the relative advantages of GPCs.
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In some domains, efficiency and other performance-based metrics are superior to traditions. GPCs
thrive in such environments due to widespread market adoption and cooperative regulations. In
most cases, a middle ground between these two extremes exists. The final factor involves great
power competition between superpowers, which. affects majority of nations due to the need for
good relations with superpowers. Although this is an indirect factor, it is relevant in the play for
power in the world’s economic landscape. The three major powers that currently dominate the
global monetary system are the US, EU, and China.
These factors reflect risks posed by GPCs. In the context of this dissertation, the term ‘risk’
refers to threats posed towards a government’s ability to influence or control political, economic,
social, technological, legal, and environmental (PESTLE) aspects. The PESTLE framework,20 can
be used in analysis and scenario planning in the context of GPCs. From a government’s
perspective, regulations are intended to prevent or mitigate such risks. The ultimate goal is to retain
power. Ensuring compliance with AML laws allow governments to reduce risks related to
terrorism, crime, and tax evasion. Ensuring compliance with existing systems built for fiat
currencies help governments mitigate risks related to loss of control over the economy, especially
through monetary policies. Ensuring transparency in operations help governments minimize
uncertainty by ensuring compliance while enhancing its ability to prevent external entities from
meddling in the economy. Asserting sovereignty helps governments maintain legitimacy.
Protecting spheres of influence across the world allow governments to maintain their respective
nations’ standing in the world, whether they’re engaged in great power competition or not.
The academic field of political economy refers to interdisciplinary studies drawing upon
economics, sociology, and political science in explaining how political institutions, the political

20

Donald C Hambrick, "Environmental scanning and organizational strategy," Strategic management journal 3, no.
2 (1982): 159-174.
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environment, and the economic system influence each other. In the case of cryptocurrencies, which
is slowly but surely becoming an integral part of the economic system, the political environment
and the way political institutions have reacted to the new phenomenon have taken different forms
across the world. For example, while El Salvador passed a law that recognized Bitcoin, the premier
cryptocurrency, as legal tender, on the other side of the planet, China virtually prohibited
cryptocurrencies by banning financial institutions and payment companies from providing services
involving cryptocurrencies.
This dissertation analyzes three cases with the goal of understanding the factors that
condition such regulatory moves. ‘The political economy of money’ is an important topic that’s
taught as a course in some universities and has been the subject of several books by prominent
academics. This dissertation contributes to this direction of inquiry, with a focus on the newest
form of money i.e., digital currencies that operate beyond national borders and are not controlled
or operated by the State.
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature related to the topic of this dissertation with the goal
of understanding gaps and identifying relevant determinants. This includes reviews of academic
works on governmental monopoly on money, private money, substitutes to fiat currencies, and
monetary policy as well as other monetary regulations. The chapter concludes with an overview
of several gaps and a list of factors that are likely to be relevant in the case of GPCs. The third and
fourth chapters detail the history and evolution of the concepts of money and GPCs respectively
while identifying factors and patterns.
Chapter 3 chronicles the birth and growth of the concept of money. The chapter aims to
highlight how money evolved from being a simple economic tool meant to facilitate transactions,
to becoming a political tool that could let small groups of people determine future trajectories of
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large societies through legal systems. The role of technology is also discussed in the context of the
evolution of money from stones to metal, and later paper. The chapter also highlights how money
is multidimensional in nature i.e., it is affected by and also affects political, economic, social,
technological, legal, and environmental attributes.
Chapter 4 explains the birth and growth of global private currencies with a focus on Bitcoin,
the first cryptocurrency, and Libra, the cryptocurrency that was feared the most by governments
across the world. Libra’s journey is explained in detail because it is the only major cryptocurrency
concept that garnered significant attention from both the press and lawmakers since its inception.
The chapter also discusses the birth and growth of Coinbase, the cryptocurrency exchange that,
unlike Libra, survived regulatory scrutiny.
Chapter 5 explains how game theoretical concepts can be applied in the context of GPCs.
The chapter presents three sets of frameworks. The first set of frameworks establishes the basic
structure of the game and demonstrates how strategic interactions between regulatory authorities
and global private currencies can be analyzed with the help of game theory. The second set of
frameworks build on the first set and presents a more elaborate approach by connecting political,
economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental (PESTLE) aspects to payoffs. The third
set of frameworks demonstrate how game-theoretical frameworks can be useful in analyzing
taxation-related issues in the context of GPCs.
The game setup and narrative discussed in chapter 5 is used to explain the regulatory game
between the regulators and GPCs in the contexts of United States, European Union, and China. A
2x2 game structure is used to analyze strategic interactions between governments in the three case
studies and GPCs on a spectrum between cooperation and conflict. These analyses are presented
in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
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Chapter 6 presents detailed analyses of regulatory responses to GPCs in the United States
of America. This includes both federal and state levels. There is a lack of unified regulatory
response at the federal level. However, the overall response has been favorable to GPCs and
exchanges. The case of the USA v. GPCs is a cooperation game. All five factors are seen to be
relevant, but the most important factors are compliance with AML laws, and compliance with
systems built for fiat currencies, and transparency in operations.
Chapter 7 details regulatory responses by the European Union and its constituent nations.
In contrast to the US, there is unified response at the highest level. The case of the EU v.
Cryptocurrencies is a cooperation game, although some EU member nations are involved in a
game of conflict. All five factors are seen to be relevant, but the most important factors are
transparency in operations, and the culture of sovereignty.
Chapter 8 explains regulatory response to GPCs in China. The case of China v. GPCs is
clearly a game of conflict. There is a clear, unified response at the highest levels. China’s ban on
cryptocurrencies has been driven by its geopolitical ambitions. All five factors are seen to be
relevant, but the most important factor is great power competition. The chapter also explains how
China’s Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is designed to counter GPCs and enable
geopolitical dominance.
The final chapter concludes the dissertation by reiterating the central contribution: the five
key factors that condition the regulation of GPCs across the world.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews academic literature related to regulation of money and GPCs.
Literature from the fields of international political economy, political science, economics, and
other relevant sub-fields such as computational social science was reviewed. The following
questions were used to review literature and synthesize findings: (1) What are the gaps? and (2)
How can this dissertation make a significant contribution? The remainder of this section presents
a synthesis of literature on fiat money and private money, and how governments regulated these
different types of money in the past i.e., which factors played the most important roles. Academic
works on the topics of government’s monopoly on money, the dynamics of substitutes to fiat
money, monetary policy. and regulation of currencies are discussed. Relevant subtopics such as
economic viability of private money, competition and coexistence between fiat and private money
are also discussed. Topics that emerge as being relevant to money are money laundering, taxation,
roles of partner institutions, legal tender status, economic and political stability, and sovereignty.
These topics also highlight how money influences and is influenced by political, economic, social,
technological, legal, and environmental (PESTLE) dimensions.
Governments’ monopoly over money is the most relevant topic from political economy
literature in the context of regulatory responses to GPCs. This is because GPCs are seen as a
disruptor in this context given their adoption as alternatives to fiat currencies. One of the most
debated questions under this topic has been whether governments have a ‘natural’ monopoly on
money i.e., whether this governments have overwhelming advantages that can make this monopoly
last in any situation. This is an important question that sets the stage for discussions on how and
why governments regulate private currencies because this monopoly is an integral part of the

15
concept of sovereignty, just like government’s monopolies over violence (through law
enforcement units and armed forces) and death, whereas only governments can lawfully carry out
death sentences ascribed by the courts. Natural monopolies typically exist if there are high fixed
costs, and unique raw materials, technology, or similar factors are to operate. These conditions
existed when national currencies arose. Today, especially with technologies like blockchain, it has
been argued that there are no longer any such ‘natural monopoly’ advantages that the state enjoys,
other than the ability to coerce.
Scholars are split on the topic of whether the government's monopoly on money is natural
or not. Several researchers have explored this topic over time. Vaubel 21 lists seven reasons from
literature that favor governments’ monopoly over money: (1) Competitive production would make
price levels indeterminate, (2) Private supply is inflationary and the equilibrium may be infinite,
(3) The banking system is inherently unstable, (4) The private sector’s stability hinges on a stable
monetary policy by the government, (5) The government needs monopoly over money for revenue
flow, (6) Advantages from economies of scale give the government a natural monopoly, and (7)
Money may qualify as a public good, given its external effects. While some of these arguments,
especially the sixth point, are no longer valid, some still are. The points on external effects, price
levels, and confidence are still relevant. Vaubel is right in describing money as being more like a
club good. He explores the concept of economies of scale as a reason for ‘natural monopoly,’
providing empirical evidence to prove that this is not a valid argument.
In order to understand how governmental monopoly over money survived, it is important
to understand the dynamics of currencies within the monetary and financial system. Scholars have
also looked at factors such as network effects i.e., the growth in value as a network grows. The

21

Roland Vaubel, "The government's money monopoly: Externalities or natural monopoly?," Kyklos 37, no. 1
(1984): 27-58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1984.tb00739.x.
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best example of network effects can be seen in today’s social media companies. David Glasner 22
posits that network effects of currencies can lead to the tendency to converge towards a single
standard, which is not the same as monopoly. He tries to differentiate between network
externalities and natural monopoly. Glasner does not foresee the monopoly of the government, or
the dominance of state-backed money will remain for long. Other scholars such as Dowd 23 have
explored the topics of economies of scale and competitive equilibrium, along with other common
reasons: hyperinflation, economies of standardization, and public confidence. There is no
consensus among scholars on the question of governments' natural monopoly on money.
Private forms of money have existed for a very long time. Any object can become a form
of private money or currency within a small group of individuals as long as those individuals agree
to treat the object as a form of payment and as a store of value. However, this cannot be scaled
easily without repercussions. Therefore, before Bitcoin, the idea that a private currency could
function globally for extended periods of time was not accepted within or outside the scholarly
community. Numerous scholars from various fields have explored whether private money is a
viable idea, but very few saw this coming. King 24 explored the nature of market-generated banking
and monetary institutions with the help of historical examples from the period before the National
Banking Act of 1863 was passed, with a focus on New York. He concluded that relatively
unregulated private systems do not completely fall apart, and that there are no tendencies toward
monopoly in such conditions. He explored the case of New York in detail, observing that it was
akin to the English joint stock system and the Scottish free banking system, which proved to be
untenable. He provides an overview of issues that need to be encountered in the construction of
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theoretical models of private monetary economies but does not rule out the idea of private money
as a viable idea. Shambaugh 25 also explored the details of the period before the National Banking
Act of 1863 was passed (between 1838 and 1860), with a focus on how different states within the
United States dealt with the situation, particularly looking at whether states had the ability to
undertake state-level monetary policy, and whether they used it. He found that many states did not
even consider the monetary impacts of this system.
This is not possible in today’s world, but the most advanced economies have governments
that favor free market competition, and must therefore, at least in theory, consider the idea of a
better monetary system through competition. This can be seen in the case of the United States
today, both at the federal level and the state level, in regard to GPCs. Some states even allow the
payment of taxes in Bitcoin. Weber,26 further exploring the details of the banking system that
existed prior to 1863 in New York, shows that there are a number of similarities to electronic
money in that the old system made transactions easier. However, there were a lot of issues such as
counterfeiting, safety, not exchanging at par, and volatility. While some of these issues still exist
with cryptocurrencies, today’s technologies, and the competitive ecosystem within private
industry, have provided solutions that negate or solve these problems. Counterfeiting is a nonissue, thanks to the nature of blockchain technology.
In traditional forms of money, counterfeiting has been a major issue. Counterfeiting has
also led to several legal challenges for both governments and citizens. Authenticity of the tender
has been the primary issue. If there are concerns about whether a coin really is coin made of pure
silver or gold, or whether the coin has the right amount of valuable metal, or whether a bank note
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is genuine, the economy is bound to get hurt. Since everyday users are not usually capable of
ascertaining these aspects, the political entity has always been in charge of ensuring consumer
confidence in money by preventing counterfeiting. Fake currencies affect the value of real
currencies by increasing the overall monetary supply. The impacts of fake money on the economy
have been highlighted by scholars like Nussbaum27 and von Reden.28 Authenticity in paper
currency has been communicated in the form of special banknote paper, engraved images,
microprinting, signatures, watermarks, security threads, and holograms. 29 The authentication
problem gets more pronounced when several currencies and several forms are involved. This also
makes cross-border trading more difficult. The primary reason is that, in such cases, there is no
single well-established template that can be used to verify the authenticity. This topic has been
discussed by scholars like Mihm30 and Smoak.31 Now that the majority of money is digital,
counterfeiting is no longer a major problem. However, other issues like safety and volatility issues
are rampant with GPCs.
According to scholarly literature and the elites of the finance world, on the topic of private
currencies and their viability, have more detractors than supporters. Lawrence Summers,32 who is
also a former US Secretary of the Treasury, has expressed skepticism about the stability of private
banking and monetary systems. Summers rightly argues that scenarios such as bank-runs need to
be taken into account. In addition, he argues that losses from restrictions cannot be large enough
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to hurt the economy and therefore society, but the cost of not regulating would be enormous.
Summers also argues that governments have a natural monopoly due to their existence as on the
basis of economies of scale. Scholars like Fischer 33 have referred to claims on the benefits of
denationalized currencies as being ‘messianic, not analytical.’ Scholars like Hayek34 have argued
in favor of private currencies on the basis that they can lead to a more efficient system with the
least possible inflation. In response, Fischer and other detractors argue that a system with low
percentages of inflation is not necessarily the advantageous, and that it is equally important to
worry about expensive fluctuations, pointing out examples from the 19th century have proved that
free banking and currency systems create nothing but instability. However, Bitcoin, despite its
volatility and fluctuations, has survived and grown for more than a decade and is responsible for
creating a new field called ‘cryptoeconomics’ which investigates the dynamics of cryptocurrencies
and their economic impacts. This dissertation adds to this new field while also contributing to the
scholarly discourse on private money.
While the idea of private money as a replacement has been the most prominent topic, there
has been some work regarding markets that can sustain a scenario where private and public money
can co-exist. Scholars like William Woolsey 35 have argued that private money can be introduced
without abolishing monetary policy and lays out a plan for the same. Woolsey highlights
differences and assumed inconveniences such as counterfeiting, and some of the benefits of having
private money in the system. He highlights the importance of making sure the system cannot cause
a reverse gain, a decrease in money supply, or macroeconomic contractions. A few other scholars
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including Yeager 36 have raised questions on the international implications of privatized money.
Yeager discusses the idea of having a nominal anchor within a decentralized system. He discusses
two main aspects that need attention (1) control, whether it be explicit or indirect, over the supply
of money, and (2) the definition of the dollar based on one or more goods or services. He discusses
the components of a stable price level, ways to cope with price stickiness and information delays,
and the quantity theory. He also points out that the government has a moral obligation to stabilize
the money market, since the market is an inanimate entity devoid of critical thinking.
Scholars have also focused on the aspect of competition from a perspective that would
benefit fiat currencies. For instance, Scott Sumner 37 explored historical examples of private money
and argued that, unless there are efficient ways to pay interest on currency or provide services to
currency holders, a free banking system will result in a wasteful form of non-price competition.
He also points to estimates from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to show that
switching the production of one-dollar bills to the private sector would save the government $318
million a year without affecting the Fed's hold on monetary policy while bolstering efficiency.
This approach is moot in today’s digital world. However, there seems to be room to create
successful public-private partnerships. Although monetary and financial systems have previously
been monopolized by governments it has been proven that some GPCs, especially stablecoins,
have the potential to thrive in this space. This is a subtopic that warrants more scholarly research.
There is also some scholarly work on the dynamics of private money within small systems
such as store value cards (SVCs) and points used exclusively within a company or a retail outlet.
This is relevant because such examples give a rare glimpse into how quasi private monetary
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systems have worked in the past. Scholars such as Deprince and Ford 38 have made such
comparisons between store value cards and private money. Deprince and Ford explored potential
impacts of scaled SVCs on monetary policy. They analyzed store value cards (SVCs) and their
economic and fiscal effects. By extrapolating results, they argue that (1) transmission mechanisms
within an economy will be affected due to the trend movement being altered, and (2) the role of
deposit insurance and reserve requirement need to be clarified.
SVCs are just one of several proxies seen in literature as guinea pigs for substitutes to fiat
money. In their paper titled ‘Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons from History for the Regulation
of Virtual Currencies,’39 Middlebrook and Hughes describe the history of objects that have been
used as substitutes for legal tender in the United States. They highlight every significant example
from wampum, which had a recognized exchange value as early as 1631, to the more popular state
bank notes. They point out that governments tended to view such substitutes with suspicion and
often initiated criminal prosecutions to cease their issuance and applications. They also detail how
certain substitutes for legal tender gained acceptance from authorities. Middlebrook and Hughes 40
also studied the regulation of virtual currencies in the United States. This included early digital
currencies, e-gold, and Bitcoin. Today, GPCs are being used across the world and have impacted
trends within national and international monetary systems, although there is a lack of
understanding due to the opaque nature of cryptocurrencies. This highlights the need for higher
levels of transparency in operations. In turn, this will lead to increased understanding and more
data on how regulators can respond to GPCs.
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While most scholars have expressed either concern or skepticism on allowing private
currencies, there are some scholars who have strongly advocated in favor of more competition
from private alternatives. For example, Selgin 41 argued that currency privatization is just as good
as dollarization at preserving a fixed exchange rate, and that privatization is better than currency
boards at disposing of money creation surpluses in a way that benefits the domestic economy. He
used the imaginary country Ruritania to make his argument. He argued that dollarization, which
refers to adoption of the US dollar as the legal tender by foreign countries, takes away domestic
wealth and deprives domestic users of access to savings. Some scholars have used real case studies
to gain more reliable insights than those from hypothetical cases. Mandeng42 gives a detailed
picture of 19th century Germany when private currencies existed. Germany embraced innovation
at that time. Later, however, just like other parts of the world, Germany also gravitated towards a
centralized system. The paper explores the impact of cryptocurrencies on macroeconomic stability
with a specific focus on aggregate demand shock and monetary policy efficiency. The paper also
discusses “cryptonization” a la dollarization, which was seen in El Salvador. Scholars have also
studied of the case of Somalia during the time it was stateless and barraged by counterfeit money.
In stateless Somalia, unregulated private supply raised prices, destabilized markets, eroded market
value, and reduced the currency to pure commodity money. Some scholars have drawn parallels
between the privatization of money and the privatization of the Postal Service. Government
monopoly over money is shown to further increase the government’s tendency to intervene in the
financial sector and that, according to these scholars, is the most important reason to privatize
money.
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Some scholars have used proxy approaches to prove their point of the value of allowing
private money to circulate. For example, Cavalcant and Nosal43 used counterfeit money as a proxy
to claim that complete elimination of counterfeiting activity actually leads to inefficiency.
Cavalcant and Nosal used modeling and simulation techniques involving an amendment of basic
random matching of money. Their model allowed a welfare analysis of currency competition and
led them to infer that currency privatization would be beneficial to the system. Although the
comparison between a private supply of money and counterfeit money is a stretch, the paper
provides some useful insights and highlights the value of using modeling and simulation
approaches. While imaginary nations and other simulated approaches can add value by enabling
several iterations and scenarios, it’s necessary to integrate these approaches to the real world. There
is a lack of highly detailed modeling and simulation approaches that allow analysis of accurate
data on the impacts of private currencies. Game theoretical approaches could provide some
solutions to bridge this gap.
The past few years have seen some research on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies from
several disciplines such as computer science, economics, law, public policy, finance, and
accounting. However, there is no research that explicitly identifies factors that affect
cryptocurrencies and other GPCs based on literature review and legislative texts. Existing works
touch upon some key points such as the ability of regulatory systems to respond to cryptocurrencies
and other cryptoassets. Scholars like Bollen44 have explored the legal aspects of Bitcoin, promptly
noting that most regulatory regimes are not well designed to cater to this type of innovation. Holub
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and Jackson45 carried out a comprehensive search of the literature and arrived at a final sample of
1,206 papers on Bitcoin from across six disciplines. Most of the work has been about the
phenomenon itself and not about regulatory responses. Some researchers like Hicham Sadok and
Mohammed El Hadi El Maknouzi. 46 have made contributions to the topic of regulatory responses.
Naheem47 has pointed out some of the challenges in applying fiat currency laws to digital
technology services. Based on the Bit licensing rules released in New York in December 2015, his
paper examined the issue of virtual currency regulation from a banking perspective. Naheem 48 has
also highlighted, based on his analysis of a 2014 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) publication
and guidelines on virtual currency definitions and the overall impact of blockchain technology on
anti-money laundering (AML) compliance and regulation, that virtual currency technology has the
potential to support AML frameworks within banking when and if they are better understood.
Examples of stand-alone legal cases involving cryptocurrencies that are widely seen in legal
literature are not sufficient in understanding regulatory factors. It is also necessary to look at
literature from several fields to understand how and why governments have historically responded
to currencies, both fiat and private. The rest of this chapter discusses key topics that were identified
from literature as key factors that determined monetary policy and other regulatory actions related
to money, currencies, and payment systems: money laundering and taxation, legal tender status,
transparency of transactions, sovereignty, and great power competition.
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There are several scholarly works on the topics of money laundering and its impacts on
regulations that affect monetary systems. The Internal Revenue Services (IRS) website has a
webpage dedicated to famous quotes on taxation, which includes Albert Einstein’s quote: “The
hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.” If Einstein were alive today, he’d have
stood by that statement given how complicated IRS rules related to cryptocurrencies and crypto
assets are. This is due to two reasons: (1) there are still no clear federal laws or inter-agency
consensus on how to tax or regulate cryptocurrencies and cryptoassets, and (2) governments tend
to choose approaches that maximize tax revenue at the cost of others’ clarity and convenience. The
power to tax people and property is, after all, “essential to the very existence of government,'' as
the founding father and former American President James Madison once said. The next two
paragraphs review literature related to AML and taxation laws in the context of their effects on
money and currencies.
The term money laundering, which was coined by the American Mafia’s creative use of
cash-intensive laundromats, refers to the act of integrating ill-gotten money i.e., money generated
through illegal activities into legally allowed circulation.49 This definition is often expanded by
government agencies such as the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to imply any
financial transaction which generates an asset or a value as the result of an illegal act, which often
includes actions such as tax evasion or false accounting. Illegal activities, especially serious crimes
such as selling drugs, generate large amounts of cash. These proceeds are usually then transferred
to bank accounts, typically to banks located in tax havens and jurisdictions with lenient laws. Such
acts, which legally qualify as money laundering, can be performed much more easily with GPCs,
especially those designed for privacy.
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Money laundering, under most legal systems, is treated as a serious crime primarily
because it can to enable terrorism. However, when AML laws were first created in the 1980s in
the United States, they were designed to help law enforcement deal with the rise of drugs. The
Money Laundering Control Act was, in fact, born alongside the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986.50
After the September 11th attacks, AML laws in the United States were modified to counter
terrorism by empowering authorities to access more financial information on both individuals and
institutions.51 There were, however, several implementation issues with these expanded
applications of AML laws52 because the laws were designed to counter drugs, which usually
involves transactions after the crime and can be easily tracked. In the case of terrorism, financial
transactions tend to occur before an illegal act is committed.53 Scholars have noted that most of
the financial transactions that enable terrorism is transferred through legal methods.54 Schneider
& Windischbauer 55 have noted that most illegal transactions are processed by cash. This is simply
because using cash carries minimal risk of tracing. However, even back in 2008, when Bitcoin was
just born, Schneider & Windischbauer noted that there was a tendency to “misuse the internet” to
perform illicit transactions in the form of “online banking, cyber money and electronic purses.”
Money laundering can also be carried out within the formal banking system without raising any
red flags if cash is deposited in small amounts, a technique referred to as smurfing.56 One other
common technique used to launder money without raising suspicion is involved transferring
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money to personal accounts in other jurisdictions through legal mechanisms. This can be
performed using digital systems like SWIFT or through simpler methods like undeclared
transportation of cash. In some cases, money laundering has also been carried out through creative
methods involving insurance policies, securities, and shell corporations.57 International trade has
also been exploited as a method for money laundering58 in some cases, through creative uses of
under-invoicing or over-invoicing practices. GPCs are on regulators’ crosshairs across the world
because they can enable all these approaches by making them easier or by creating an entirely new
way of achieving the same objectives. AML laws are not easy to implement in contexts outside
those the laws were originally designed for. This is a key takeaway for scholars interested in
understanding how AML laws will affect GPCs. When a new phenomenon like privacy-focused
cryptocurrencies is being countered with the same laws that were designed decades ago,
governments are not likely to succeed in their objectives. Therefore, old AML laws can be useless
when GPCs are used by bad actors, but it is not clear how governments may respond to this. This
is an important gap that warrants attention.
It’s likely that GPC exchanges will play a crucial role as partners in implementing AML
laws and other compliance-related requirements. Governments have always relied on such support
from partner institutions in enforcing AML laws. Implementation of AML laws and taxation code
always requires compliance from professionals who manage financial institutions 59 because these
laws need to be interpreted differently based on context. The role of such partners is likely to
become a bigger problem when GPCs are involved because there are very few legal precedents to
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refer to. This is likely to increase the pressure on regulators to increase clarity. Compliance
professionals have a tendency to overreport issues,60 which leads to information overloads for
regulators. This overload usually results in inefficiency because regulatory agencies tend to be
understaffed. For such reasons, AML laws tend to be inefficient. Scholars have noted that there is
no strong evidence to prove the effectiveness of AML regulations.61 This creates the need for
regulators to create systems that force users of GPCs to self-regulate.
Implementation of AML laws differ across the world. Countries across the world are
strongarmed by international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to
adopt strict AML laws.62 The FATF is an independent inter-governmental body founded in 1989
by the G7, the group of 7 leading economies. FATF develops and promotes policies to protect the
global financial system against money laundering, terrorism, and financing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. FATF recommendations are generally recognized as the global antimoney laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard. The FATF also
publishes best-practices for AML laws and blacklists countries that have not been cooperative in
enforcing these laws and practices. AML laws have grown in the past 30 years in two ways: (1)
expansion of acts criminalized as money laundering, and (2) diffusion of AML laws to new
countries in order to ensure international cooperation given the rise in globalization. 63 By 2008,
170 countries had highly similar AML regulations.64 These AML regulations generally include
three key requirements: (1) know-your-customer (KYC) protocols, (2) record keeping, and (3)
suspicious activity reporting. These requirements have been imposed on banks, insurance
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companies, law firms, exchange bureaus, check-cashing offices, and casinos.65 This highlights the
extent to which regulators go to ensure tax revenues and prevention of crime and terrorism. Today,
these AML compliance requirements have been extended to businesses that operate as exchanges
for GPCs. However, these old regulations are insufficient at encapsulating the new technology
GPCs this extension is not suitable. This highlights the need for regulations to catch up with GPCs
such that AML laws and taxation laws are not circumvented.
AML regulations are not well-implemented in developing economies because they’re often
seen as undue external pressure. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has assessed that money
laundering proceeds amount to somewhere between 2% and 5% of global gross domestic
product.66 A recent paper by Weeks-Brown67 also suggested that criminal proceeds from laundered
amount to between 2 and 5% of global GDP every year. This corresponds to $1.6 to $4 trillion a
year. The United States has the biggest share of this and has therefore attracted a lot of concern
from regulators. Partner institutions are usually in favor of strict AML laws because it enables
more legitimate cash flow that enables the formal economy. Ofoeda et al,68 have suggested, based
on data from 2012 to 2018 across 165 economies, that anti-money laundering regulations generally
promote financial sector development. While lobbying interests are likely always fight against
regulations, such empirical proof validates governmental push for additional AML laws.
Governments are excellent at use AML laws to their advantage not only to counter drugs, but also
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to prevent other crimes. AML laws help governments make a strong case that the attempt to hide
the real source of money is tantamount to obstructing justice.69
Effective AML help governments deter crime because they create a scenario where the
incentives are low for those who commit crimes. Bitcoin and other GPCs have been used online
for the purchase of drugs and other illegal products and services. GPCs are a major concern for
lawmakers across the world because some of these currencies make it difficult to trace transactions.
Regulators are looking for ways to prevent GPCs from becoming a way around AML laws.
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that compliance with AML laws is a key factor that affects the
regulation of GPCs and their exchanges. AML laws have also helped governments detect and
prevent terrorist activities and tax evasion. Casinos, bars and sports books have embraced Bitcoin
as it is an easy vehicle for money laundering. Bitcoin and other GPCs have joined casinos, bars,
and other traditional techniques70 as a go-to technique in money laundering. This is because GPCs
are seen as a convenient alternative to the more commonly accepted legal tender.
The concept of ‘legal tender’ has been the focus for some scholars in the context of
regulation and policy. The legal tender status confers legitimacy upon a unit of payment by legally
recognizing it as being sufficient for payment towards satisfaction of public and private debts.71
This legal status is also the most crucial link between law and money. GPCs such as Bitcoin have
been used for payments in the US and were successful due to the buyer and the seller agreeing on
the value of Bitcoin. Even when transactions involve credit, eventually one of the parties is legally
obligated to make a cash payment. The legal tender status of the dollar means that someone who
is paid $10 in legal tender to cover a $10 debt cannot claim that the debtor still owes them money.
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Governments have the ability to enforce laws that ensure financial stability by ensuring that debts
are collected. This makes populations trust governments with unparalleled power and a monopoly
over money and related systems.
Legal tender and sovereignty are deeply intertwined concepts. One of the core elements at
the intersection of law and money is the legal tender status, which can be conferred only by
sovereign governments.72 This highlights the power of sovereignty. British imperial authorities
banned the creation of currencies in the colonies in order to remain the only sovereign power.73
Similarly, the US Constitution explicitly granted the power to coin money solely to the federal
government, denying it to the states. GPCs are challenging this precedent across the world by
offering alternatives to government-backed fiat currencies. In 1785, the Continental Congress
adopted the dollar as the unit for the national currency. At that time, a wide variety of private notes
were printed and allowed to circulate. In 1790, after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress
chartered ‘The First Bank of the United States’ to operate until 1811 and authorized it to issue
paper bank notes to eliminate confusion and facilitate commerce. This highlights how political
power is at the heart of a monetary system’s validity. The dissolution of sovereign power can also
mean the loss of legal tender status. The failure of the Confederate States of America, for example,
made Confederate currency worthless after the Civil War. Transitions from an old to a new
political power usually shakes up the entire monetary system because of questions concerning
reconcile old debts. For example, when Czechoslovakia became independent from the AustroHungarian Empire, it introduced its own national currency. This decision led to several problems
about outstanding debts that were expressed in Austro-Hungarian crowns.74 This highlights the
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need for stability, which can be achieved only with powerful political entity that can maintain
sovereignty and implement laws to govern systems that enable the fiat currency to be used
seamlessly. Legal tender laws protect the unity of money and the sovereign’s right to collect
seigniorage i.e., profit from creating money. To ensure legal tender status and sovereignty, laws
usually penalize the act of refusal to accept payment in legal tender. For example, in medieval
England, such refusal could result in imprisonment with the charge of “contempt of the king’s
majesty.”75
Legal tender status is also closely connected to financial and social stability: It can be
politically challenging to maintain the legal tender status.76 During emergencies like wars,
governments tend to leverage their power to create money, usually in the form of bills of credit or
promissory notes.77 Such policies are often not economically sound. For example, when the Union
government issued greenbacks during the US Civil War and made them legal tender, they were
not backed by gold.78 After the war, when these greenbacks were not convertible to valuable forms
like gold, they were challenged in court.79 The Supreme Court ruled that the question was a
“political” rather than “juridical” one,80 highlighting how politics can trump economics. The legal
tender also has several limitations due from various social, technological, and environmental
conditions. Since human behavior does not always follow rules, the legal tender is not always the
only form of money that’s used. Small communities can recognize alternatives to the legal tender
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that can act as de facto money.81 The rise of GPCs, especially in the early stages, is an example of
this. Before the rise of GPCs, such alternatives were used only during extreme conditions.
Hyperinflation and political turmoil are the most common conditions that forces such alternatives.
For example, in the 1990s, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated, it
led to political and economic crises that led to the devaluation of the ruble and the search for
substitutes.82 A currency becomes more valuable for an individual when other people use that same
currency. This social aspect of money has allowed for numerous monetary innovations throughout
history, challenging the connection between money and the sovereign. GPCs are the latest
innovations on this front.
Government's role in enhancing transparency in markets has often been highlighted in
literature. Securities markets, for example, are affected by information asymmetries. Currently,
the SEC delegates the task of setting financial accounting rules to the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB).83 However, most institutions rely on market prices much more.84 In
some cases, governments intervene to stabilize the economy. For example, the American Bankers
Association once appealed to the SEC and FASB to suspend or relax fair-value standards claiming
that prices in distressed markets had become misleading indicators of the true underlying value of
bank assets,85 i.e., the market prices were no longer reliable or accurate. This, again, highlights the
powerful role of politics in the economy. This power comes from sovereignty. The concept of
sovereignty has often been discussed by scholars in relation to money and monetary policy.
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Throughout history, money has been a symbol of independent nationhood and sovereign
monarchies. The hierarchy of national currencies in the world usually matches the hierarchy of
power. The US dollar is currently seen as the global reserve currency and more than one half of
currency circulates outside of the United States.86 When the Fed became the world’s banker and
the US Dollar became the basis of the world’s monetary system, the United States gained the
power of seigniorage. At this time, it was assumed that capital movements would be small, and
that conflicts could be easily resolved through international deficit financing and other such
methods. This survived through the 1960s, when American policies caused discontent amounts its
closes allies. The then French President, Charles De Gaulle, was unhappy with the hegemony of
the dollar, which he claimed gave ‘extravagant privileges’ to the US because it could print dollars
to fight foreign wars, buy foreign businesses, and go into deep debts without worries about
negative consequences. Great power competition between nations is another major factor in the
context of monetary policy. Literature has repeatedly highlighted that hegemonic powers play a
key role in creating and maintaining stable financial and monetary systems. Another lesson from
the history and evolution of the international monetary system is that political differences between
states never fade. Therefore, a well-functioning monetary system at the international level
demands strong leadership by a nation or a group of nations that have a vested interest in
maintaining the system. Leaders must provide a ‘lender of last resort’ privilege, carry out economic
transactions, and provide liquidity.
Money is an important element in the legal framework that governments provide to support
economic activity, protect property rights, and enforce contracts. The ability to grant legal tender
status is a prerogative of the sovereign government. Throughout history, when governing entities
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changed from empires and kingdoms to dictatorships and democracies, and even as money evolved
from coin to paper and then to bank deposits and electronic currency, politics and law remained
the primary forces that shaped the way monetary systems worked.87 This pattern is not likely to
change in the future. Great power competition between nations, especially superpowers, will also
remain relevant in context of money and monetary policy. For new forms of money to function,
they need to be compatible with political, economic, social, technological, and legal institutions
that facilitate the economy. Innovations make regulators uncomfortable because, by design,
innovations disrupt the status quo. Regulatory oversight becomes more difficult with innovation
that scale fast and across borders. This could make national governments inefficient at managing
the effects of GPCs. In theory, an international organization could be a better fit for this role.
However, it will be highly difficult for any single institution or company to gain a predominant
status because governments can reign in on market monopolies using anti-trust laws. Scholars like
Eichengreen88 have shown that, while the hegemonic stability theory does partly apply to
international monetary relations, international cooperation has been equally important to the
design and functioning of monetary systems.
Money has become an instrument of economic governance and macroeconomic policy. For
a long time, governments have chosen monetary policies and standards based on ground realities
on economic activity both within and outside of their jurisdiction.89 Cryptocurrency is a new
phenomenon in some regards, but it is also a new type of money. Therefore, a deep dive into the
literature on money and monetary policy was necessary to understand key concepts and gaps. This
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literature review discussed academic works on the topics of government’s monopoly on money,
the dynamics of substitutes to fiat money, monetary policy. and regulation of currencies. Subtopics
such as economic viability of private money, competition and coexistence between fiat and private
money were also discussed. Specific subtopics such as money laundering, taxation, roles of partner
institutions, legal tender status, economic and political stability, and sovereignty were seen to be
relevant factors that concerned governments and regulators. The literature review also showed how
money influences and is influenced by political, economic, social, technological, legal, and
environmental (PESTLE) dimensions. To understand these factors in more detail and with more
context, the following chapter explains how the concept of money was born and how it evolved to
set the stage for GPCs.
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORY OF MONEY

The word money has its roots in the Anglo-Norman term for a special piece of metal, a
coin, or the place where those coins were manufactured i.e., the mint. The terms money and
currency are often used interchangeably despite not being identical. Money refers to an intangible
and abstract concept used to express prices and value, while currency is the physical manifestation
of the same in the form of coins, paper notes, etc. Before the concept of money came about, trade
was carried out through the barter system, the exchange of goods. To trade something under the
barter system, a double coincidence of wants or needs is a prerequisite which does not occur too
often. For example, if a person wants to trade their fish for a pair of shoes, they need to find another
person who wants fish and also has shoes to trade. Probabilistically, this gets very difficult. To
find parties who want the same thing that the other person is willing to offer is therefore highly
inefficient. This prompted innovators to find better ways for societies to trade.
Over time, barter systems used items such as salt, weapons, cattle, and animal skins started
being used as a medium of exchange. The primary role of money, from the very beginning, was
that of an economic tool. Since these commodities were in high demand throughout the economy
and were useful or valued by communities, they effectively played the role of money and were
therefore referred to as commodity money. However, most forms of commodity money were not
highly scalable because the value of commodities varied across early societies. This shows how
critical social factors are in the context of money and currencies.
The earliest references to money were seen in Mesopotamian stone tablets and inscriptions
from as early as 3000 BCE. Written records suggest that there was a system of representative
money created to enable debts payments to the temples. Farmers who made the payments received
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a receipt in the form of a clay token. As populations and trade networks grew over time, there was
a pressing need for a form of money that would be valued and accepted as a medium of exchange
across different communities while also being easier to transport. Innovators at that time ended up
with metals as the preferred mediums of exchange. This was primarily because precious metals
had intrinsic value by virtue of their scarcity and their visible appeal. Metals were liked by people
across various communities and therefore allowed scalability. Initially, before technology allowed
proper coinage, small chunks of metals were used in trading. Technology played a key role as an
enabler in this evolution.
Metal coins had several advantages: they could be mass-produced, they were highly
durable, and they were easy to carry. They could also be divided into smaller units of value by
simply chunking them down. The scarcity of metals, combined by the laborious processes involved
in extraction, led to a favorable balance of supply and demand. Carefully designed processes that
were hard to imitate created standard sizes and designs that were difficult to counterfeit. Large
scale manufacturing of metal coins first began in the kingdom of Lydia during the seventh century
BC. This led to highly standardized quantities of payment that facilitated the kingdom’s trade,
making it one of the richest empires in Asia Minor at that time.
Other kingdoms followed Lydia in creating their own versions, making coins prevalent
throughout the Mediterranean. Each kingdom stamped their unique insignia on the coins they
minted for two equally important reasons: (1) to facilitate the flow of trade within their
jurisdictions and spheres of influence, and (2) to establish the authority of the king or queen. This
marked the beginning of the ascent of politics, law, and power as key factors related to money
alongside economics, technology, and society. Under the Roman empire, money became an
important political tool for unifying and expanding the empire by reducing the costs of trade and
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by funding armies that kept emperors in power. Social dynamics such as feudalism further
complicated the role of money in society by setting up a hierarchical system based on oaths of
loyalty. As seen in the case of the evolution of coins, the pattern of economic and social needs
combining with new technological capabilities of the day to create new and better monetary
instruments that later become subject to legal and political forces is seen repeatedly throughout
history as evident in the evolution of different forms of paper money and digital money.
The earliest form of paper currency was first developed in China during the 7th-century
CE under the Tang dynasty. Merchants were allowed to issue receipts of deposits in order to avoid
transporting copper coins during transactions, especially large ones. Paper money, in the proper
form, started circulating in the 11th century CE, under the Song dynasty. This started when the
government started issuing “jiaozi” credit notes that were redeemable for any other object of value
within a specified period of time. However, no other conversion was allowed. Therefore, these
bills were essentially traded without any commodity backing. It is therefore argued that the first
form of paper money was also the first fiat currency, i.e., it was created by government fiat without
any intrinsic value (unlike commodity money that was valuable as gold, silver, etc.). These fiat
currencies had value because there was a mutual agreement among their users that they had value
and because the government, backed by the emperor, threw its weight behind the currency to assure
the population of its stability and enforceability. By the end of the eleventh century CE, there was
a massive increase in the amount of paper notes that were in circulation. This kept growing, leading
to increased demand in printing paper money, which, around 1274 CE, led to the establishment of
a nationwide paper currency standard backed by gold and silver. In the 13th century CE,
globetrotters such as Marco Polo spread the idea of paper money to Europe.
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The groundwork for the emergence of paper money in the western world was created
through the invention of the bills of exchange. The bill of exchange was a proxy for a specific
quantity of gold that could be exchanged in a different city. This made trading much easier for
merchants by helping them avoid risks while traveling with large amounts of highly valuable
metals. This came at a time when several trade fairs were organized across Europe to attract
merchants and consumers. The bill of exchange enabled commercial activities across borders by
encouraging more merchants to travel to these trade hubs. The bill of exchange is an excellent
example of a legal innovation that can support the economy. Until the 16th century, silver, and
gold, which had intrinsic value, were seen as the only reliable stores of value. The wealth of a
country was linked directly to the amount of gold and silver in the sovereignty. When the era of
exploration and colonization began, seafaring powers plundered other parts of the world. The large
amounts of precious metals that were pillaged from colonies by European kingdoms enriched their
economies while also causing inflationary periods and frequent economic turbulence across
Europe. These were handled well most of the time, especially when there were no challenges to
the sovereignty of the kingdom.
Over time, the nature of money changed drastically due to economic and political reasons,
as Gilpin90 explains in his brilliant sketch of the evolution of the international monetary system.
Money was transformed from being a ‘gift of nature’ to a creation of the State. Control over money
supply became a key aspect of the State. This change was born two centuries ago but took full
effect only during the post-World War II era when Keynesian economic policies dominated.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, this change was in the making. Governments started issuing
paper money, modern banking took shape, and private credit instruments were created. For the
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first time, governments had a strong hold over the monetary system, albeit more so in theory than
in reality. The financial revolution that happened over these two centuries created paper money
which created an abundant supply that would not have been possible with previous forms of
money. This caused the adverse side effect of inflation which generated instability.
One of the fundamental dilemmas of international monetary relations has been the conflict
between maintaining domestic economic autonomy and maintaining international monetary order.
The classical gold standard - the system in which the value of a currency was defined in terms of
the gold for which the currency could be exchanged - existed between 1870 to 1914. This era
reflected liberal, laissez-faire ideals that dominated at that time. The system, however,
deprioritized domestic economic activity and pursued the goal of international monetary stability.
The banking system weakened the price-specific flow mechanism. Three key points are to be
noted: (1) the system did not arise automatically; (2) the system did not work in an impersonal
way, it was organized and managed by Great Britain, thanks to their hegemonic power at that time;
and (3) the system was not politically symmetrical in its effect on various economies across the
world. Broz91 argues that these policies stemmed from domestic societal foundations. Based on a
survey of British, French, and German experiences, he showed that the support of domestic
coalitional bases was instrumental in keeping the gold standard functioning. This highlights how
the way in which domestic constituency is at the heart of the international monetary system, just
like it is with every other political system. In turn, this delineates the importance of the political
dilemma between choosing domestic political stability and international financial stability. Such
externalities involving heterogeneous national preferences are of great significance. The collapse
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of the gold standard in the interwar period was partly due to large negative consequences produced
by the policy choices, which were made in response to domestic political forces.
The interwar years that lasted between 1914 and 1944 saw a flurry of changes. World War
I had a crippling effect on the international monetary system. A return to the gold standard was
ruled out because there was high inflation, which affected the purchasing power of gold. The
Genoa Conference in 1922 created a gold-exchange standard as a solution. However, it lasted only
a few years. The collapse of this system was one of the factors that led to the Great Recession of
the 1930s. The following reasons also contributed to the breakdown of the international monetary
order: (1) Many governments started using their control over monetary levers to prioritize domestic
welfare objectives such as economic stability and full employment, deprioritizing the need to
maintain stability in the international monetary order; (2) there were changes in power dynamics,
with labor and business gaining significant growth in power in comparison to the governments;
(3) the British economic policy set gold values high, which worsened the overall situation. By this
time, America was the world's foremost creditor nation. American deflation resulted in a global
liquidity crisis that exacerbated the Depression. There were no strong mechanisms to enforce rules
and manage the system. This led states to pursue nationalistic ‘beggar-my-neighbor’ policies,
resulting in the economic order breaking down.
The great powers reprioritized their social and national interests and started looking
inwards, which contributed to the rise of fascist movements. States turned their backs on
international liberalism. In this isolationist culture, cooperation was not easy. Germany, Italy, and
Japan ended up with autocratic regimes that would go on to wreak havoc. At the Ottawa
Conference in 1932, the ‘Sterling bloc,’ the ‘Dollar bloc,’ and the ‘Gold bloc’ were formed.
Economic warfare and competitive devaluations broke out. The United States took responsibility
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and tried to restore stability. In 1934, the Reciprocal Trade Act helped reduce tariffs. This basic
principle was at the heart of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which was
created after World War II. The simultaneous achievement of international and domestic balance
had been altered. Central banks had taken over the automatic equilibrium that existed, setting the
stage for an era of heavy government intervention in the economy.
Most economists since the 18th century are of the opinion that the creation and
maintenance of a monetary mechanism and issuing money is one of the cardinal responsibilities
of governments. This has led to a deeply ingrained culture of economic sovereignty in several
countries. However, as Hayek, the Austrian economist, notes, even Adam Smith did not list this
as one of the essential duties of a government. 92 The Bretton Woods System that lasted between
1944 and 1976 had the following main priorities: (1) achieving economic growth and full
employment; (2) creation of a stable economic world order that would prevent a return to the
destructive economic nationalism of the 1930s. In 1944, the Bretton Woods conference attempted
to achieve these priorities. Cooperation between the British and the Americans was instrumental
to the success of this bold initiative, highlighting the importance of great power cooperation in the
world, especially on monetary issues.
The vision was to create a world where governments would have enough freedom to pursue
their national economic objectives while maintaining international monetary order through fixed
exchange rates. These basic features conflicted with each other because a nation cannot freely
pursue macroeconomic policies and absorb foreign currencies without making corrections on its
exchange rates. This ‘embedded liberalism,’ as Ruggie93 characterized it, attempted to effect
Keynesian growth simulation policies at home without disrupting international monetary stability.
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The Fed became the world’s banker, and the US Dollar became the basis of the world’s monetary
system, giving the United States the power of seigniorage. At this time, it was assumed that capital
movements would be small, and that conflicts could be easily resolved through international deficit
financing and other such methods. This survived till the 1960s, when American policies caused
major problems in the system.
The end of the fixed exchange rates came about in the early 1970s. The US Government
had to spend heavily on the Vietnam war, and also had to hide its cost from the public. This led to
an inflated dollar. Speculative attacks on the overvalued dollar and other such reasons led the
Nixon administration to devalue the dollar in August 1971. To achieve this, the US announced that
it would no longer redeem the US dollar for gold. Furthermore, to force other countries to
appreciate their currencies, the US imposed a 10% surcharge on imports until it achieved its
planned levels of devaluation. This led to negotiations in which major industrialized nations
decided to institute flexible rates at the Jamaica Conference in 1976. Reckless American policies,
along with increasing international mobility of capital were the main catalysts for this adoption.
This change led to increased integration of global financial markets. The rule-based international
monetary system created at the Bretton Woods Conference was replaced by a shaky political
agreement
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dominant

economic

powers.
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monetary

and

financial

interdependence of national economies followed, forging a great impact on domestic and
international economics.
The three key aspects required in a well-functioning monetary system at the global level
are: (1) Adjustment - an international monetary regime must possess the methods to restore
equilibrium; (2) Liquidity - providing enough liquidity in the system is crucial in order to function
smoothly; and (3) Confidence in the system - the intangible force that legitimizes the system is
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instrumental for stability. Many arguments have been made in favor of both more stable exchange
rates and more flexible exchange rates. The former posit that flexible rates have failed, and that
closer cooperation and restraints on the American economy, both of which were hard to achieve,
were necessary. The latter posit that fixed exchange rates are expensive in a world where
international financial flows are increasing rapidly. A system of flexible exchange rates allows
economies to adjust to external shocks. There is merit in the argument that exchange rate
fluctuation is a safeguard for the real economy.
No international system can function without cooperation between nations. Currency
stability in the international monetary system can exist along with domestic policy flexibility if
and only if there is strong cooperation. The main reason nations don’t cooperate is they often have
to give up some sovereignty. Scholars such as Gilpin 94 disagree with the argument that
globalization took away significant economic control from nation-states, saying that nation-states
had little control in the first place. This is true at least today, especially in a more interconnected
and interdependent world. Other scholars have used other arguments to justify why it’s a good idea
to not let states have too much control. For instance, Keynes has argued that national economic
policy did not always concern itself with the welfare of the lower order of societies, implying that
states often use economic control for domestic political gains. Government monopolies over
money have caused what every monopoly and the implied lack of competition causes: inefficiency.
Private currencies that must compete with other private currencies and/or the government, have
been described by some scholars as being capable of bringing increased efficiency to the monetary
system. Although an efficient international monetary system would be preferred by every country,
deep political and economic differences are likely to prevent major reforms.

94

Ibid 96

46
To understand more about the origins of the intertwined relationship between nation-states
and their control of currencies within their sovereign territory, this part of the chapter will trace
the history of national and territorial currencies. Eric Helleiner has been the most prominent
academic on the topic of national currencies. As Helleiner 95 explains, conventional ideas about
money have undergone drastic changes over time. Each country traditionally had its own
territorial, exclusive, and homogeneous currency. These nationalized currencies are now being
challenged by supranational forms of money like the euro. In some least developed countries
(LDCs), foreign currencies such as the US dollar are sometimes adopted as the national currency,
a phenomenon referred to as ‘dollarization’. Dollarization has been a contentious issue despite its
advantages i.e.., reduction in transaction costs from using the same currency in international trade.
This shows that there's nothing natural about the existence of territorial national currencies, and
by extension, government’s monopoly on money. However, the extinction of national currencies
can undermine the Westphalian world order, for good or bad.
Helleiner96 explored the origins of territorial currencies in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, describing key changes that first produced territorial currencies. He identified
two preconditions for the birth of territorial currency, the presence of nation-states and industrial
technology. He also identified four main motivations that prompted policymakers to create
territorial currencies: (1) the desire to construct national markets, (2) macroeconomic and fiscal
goals, (3) strengthening national identities, and (4) competitive nature of territorial currencies.
Territorial currencies, he claims, were challenged throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Helleiner identified several factors that challenged national currencies: the free banking
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movement, supporters of monetary unions, currency substitution, and subnational currencies. This
section explores these topics in detail in order to understand the historical origins of national
currencies.
Contrary to the common assumption that national currencies have been deeply entrenched
and highly competitive, prior to World War I several European countries participated in regional
monetary unions that permitted co-circulation of each other's currencies. Helleiner points out that
there was substantial political support for a worldwide monetary union in the late 1860s.
Supporters of the ‘free banking’ movement had worldviews that were similar to those who support
and operate today’s private, decentralized, and denationalized, currencies. Before 1914, free
bankers questioned national currencies based on the economic argument that allowing privately
issued bank notes would be the ‘liberal’ thing to do. They lobbied against the dominance of a
single homogenous national bank note within their territories. Their allies included private banks
and regionalist libertarian groups, like today’s scenario.
In the interwar period, political patronage for currency unions and free banking waned.
However, two different factors challenged territorial national currencies: currency substitution due
to high inflation, and subnational local currencies. The former is commensurate to today’s
‘dollarization’ trend. The driving reason was loss of trust in the national currency. Competition
from sub-national local currencies was short-lived but is a phenomenon that has received little
attention. These are comparable to store credits and internal transfer units within apps that transfer
money. This topic is discussed towards the end of this paper, along with insights from similar
theoretical insights, and related cases and simulations. Between the late nineteenth and mid
twentieth centuries, Imperial powers tried to replace pre-colonial currencies. The colonial powers
profited from these and from the large monetary unions they had formed to consolidate colonies.
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However, after World War II, most newly independent countries discarded their colonial monetary
structures and ended these monetary unions. These historical details clearly show that territorial
and national currencies came about for political reasons and not for economic efficiency. This
gives hope for denationalized, decentralized currencies. Their success is not impossible because
there is nothing about national or territorial currencies that make them economically superior to a
global currency.
The rise of national currencies teaches several important lessons. National currencies have
two main roots: political, and technological. Helleiner points out that the emergence of the nationstate in the nineteenth century was a precondition for the creation of territorial currencies, and that
most of the processes that led to the existence of these currencies were made possible by the nationstate's ability to dominate the areas it governed. The state’s policing powers, its centralized
authority, and its ability to establish trust were the sources of its power. In today’s globalized
world, this power has been declining The very rise of global cryptocurrencies is seen by many
scholars as a testament to this. Territorial currencies could not have come about if not for
technological transformation. The emergence of new industrial technologies (such as the mint, and
the printing press) that affected the production of coins and notes in the nineteenth century were
instrumental in cementing the role of national currencies. These developments led to increased
uniformity, standardization, and scaling. Governmental authorities were also able to drastically cut
costs. The quality also improved, making counterfeiting much harder and more expensive.
Helleiner also highlights that these technological aspects have not received the scholarly attention
they deserve.

49
In sum, the decision to create territorial currencies was influenced more by politics than
economics. Helleiner 97 identifies four sets of motivations that appeared in multiple contexts: (1)
Fostering the emergence of national markets by altering transaction costs, (2) The desire to control
the domestic money supply for macroeconomic purposes, (3) Fiscal needs of the state, and (4)
Strengthening national identities. For cryptocurrencies to co-exist, they will need to offer the same
benefits or provide better ones. In the next section, we explore how the Euro - the first major
supranational currency - came about, to form ideas on how a change towards acceptance of
denationalized currencies might happen.
The most notable supranational currency in history is the euro. The adoption of the euro by
member states of the European Union was a watershed moment in international monetary history.
Wyplosz,98 in his 1997 paper, details the complex processes that led to the completion of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), describing the economic and political reasons that led
these countries to adopt a single currency. He points out that the logic behind monetary union is
not merely political. The goal of having a single currency has been on the table since the late 1950s
but was never achieved because economic conditions were never conducive to the adoption. The
Maastricht Treaty, which supersedes national legislations of member countries, is the main pillar
on which the euro stands. As Wyplosz 99 notes, the treaty was achieved primarily because the lifting
of capital controls had reduced options a ‘lesser of two evils’ scenario: (1) Allow exchange rates
to float freely or, (2) accept Germany’s domination over Europe’s monetary policy through the
Bundesbank. The first option was not compatible with a completely borderless economic area
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because it carried the seeds of protectionist pressure, which would create financial instability and
threaten economic integration.
The Bundesbank’s domination, despite the positive changes it had catalyzed by eliminating
inflation, had baggage: high unemployment, the policy blunders that caused the currency crises of
1992–93, and perennial disagreements over the objectives of the Bundesbank. One main
contradiction was that the Bundesbank’s constitutional mandate to Germany deviated from the
role it had to play in Europe. This was a problem because any resolution would have entailed
changing the Bundesbank’s constitution. These conditions led to the emergence of the economic
and monetary union (EMU) as the best possible economic solution. For there to be enough
international support for denationalized, decentralized currencies to be a part of the international
monetary system, an agreement like the Maastricht Treaty will be required at the UN level, along
with a situation that would lead nations to agree that this new direction deserves exploration.
Wyplosz100 has claimed that analyzing the costs and benefits of a monetary union
quantitatively is exasperating and pointless. As an economist, he admits that economists are unable
to accurately compute the costs and benefits. In the case of the euro, in addition to limited
understanding of monetary and exchange rate policy, there was also the problem of not having any
precedence. The direct benefits of having a common currency are the reduced transaction costs
and reduced uncertainty. These factors contribute to transparency in competition, making the
economy better. Other direct benefits include lower real interest rates, especially for countries
where there is a premium currency risk. Institutional arrangements that come along with the EMU
are also attractive to members. The central bank would have greater independence from political
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control in an EMU, and this would be beneficial to the economy. This highlights that international
competition is achieved not through exchange rate manipulation, but by increased cooperation.
The most dominant theory used by economists to evaluate the viability of currencies is the
theory of optimum currency areas. This theory helps in the economic analysis of creating a
currency union. This analysis focuses on the costs associated with the loss of macroeconomic
flexibility. Foregoing a national or territorial currency will mean the loss of an independent
national monetary policy. The theory incorporates factors such as the nature of external shocks,
the extent of factor mobility, wage, and price flexibility, as well as the openness, size, and
diversification of economies. If these costs are low, the region is declared to be well suited for an
‘optimum currency area’ (OCA) in which the system would be tenable. Helleiner 101 rightly asserts
that this theory has several shortcomings, and that it is not helpful in explaining many challenges
such as dollarization, the growth of local currencies, or the support for free banking.
Scholarship has repeatedly demonstrated that politics can prevail over economics.
Controlling powers play a key role in creating and maintaining stable financial and monetary
systems. Another lesson from the history and evolution of the international monetary system is
that political differences between nation-states never end. Therefore, a well-functioning monetary
system at the international level requires a supervisory body that is invested in protecting the
system. As highlighted in the literature review, this leader is responsible for establishing a ‘lender
of last resort’ privilege to carry out economic transactions and providing liquidity. Typically, an
international organization with the most robust military and economy would fill this role. Initially,
Great Britain took this charge followed by the United States. In today’s world the private sector
has the potential to take on this responsibility.
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Eichengreen102 has shown that, while the hegemonic stability theory does partly apply to
international monetary relations, international cooperation has been equally important to the
design and functioning of all three monetary systems discussed above. The international monetary
system creates a classic prisoner's dilemma where national economies can gain at the cost of others,
but all nations would gain if they cooperated. It’s very difficult to get states to cooperate, but the
private sector is better at maintaining healthy competition and creating and constantly improving
efficiency and customer satisfaction. However, this can be achieved only if governments give up
their monopoly on money. As Cohen103 describes, for effective cooperation, participating
governments will need to voluntarily pre-commit to some form of external authority over their
individual behavior (at least regarding monetary policy). Such a submission would not go well
with a domestic audience. This raises the question; What types of domestic audiences lead to a
stable international monetary order? Frieden104 argued that currency policy is more likely to be
contentious in economies that are more open and that internationally oriented economic actors tend
to prefer a fixed exchange rate more than domestically oriented ones. Such audiences are, by
extension, likely to be open to competition in currencies, having seen what competition has done
for them in other sectors such as technology and consumer goods. However, nation-states will not
allow this to happen because it would be tantamount to giving up part of their sovereignty. Money
and sovereignty are deeply intertwined.
Many scholars have theoretically explored the topic of governmental monopoly over
money, the possibility of denationalized currencies, and some researchers have studied cases that
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relate to this concept. Some of which have used computer simulations to explore outcomes. There
has been constant debate on whether having fewer national currencies is better for the international
monetary system, than having too many national currencies. Scholars such as Hausmann 105 have
argued in favor of fewer national currencies, while others such as Eichengreen have gone further
and claimed that the best way to guarantee a stable international monetary system is complete
monetary integration, i.e., a single currency managed by one central bank. Gilpin 106 argues that
there has been no stable and satisfactory international monetary system since the early 1970s partly
because reforming the monetary system involves complex technical issues. Every possible solution
to technical matters carries important implications for the distribution of wealth and is therefore
laden with political problems.
Today’s highly globalized, multipolar world order might be ripe for a more highly
decentralized monetary system. Blockchain technology is seen by many scholars, economists, and
technologists as being a new technical solution to improve the monetary system, just like paper
money and coins did through legal innovations such as bills of exchange and technological
innovations like the mint respectively. Blockchain networks, which enable global private
currencies, prevent double-spending and counterfeiting, and make it possible for users to exchange
the digital assets for other digital assets and fiat currencies. Some aspects such as energy costs,
and a few technical delays still prevent GPCs from becoming mainstream, but its proponents claim
that it is only a matter of time before these problems are overcome, just like the internet transitioned
from slow dial-up speeds to broadband optic-fiber speeds. China has taken the lead in responding
to the threats posed by GPCs by mimicking its approach to the internet by taking the best aspects
of the technology and combining them with its centralized model to maintain control. China has
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been the pioneer in applying the blockchain to create a centralized system that enables its fiat
currency. Such central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are seen as governments’ response to
GPCs and are poised to be the next major step in the history of money.
The key conclusion from the history and evolution of money is that the influence of
technology on monetary history should not be overlooked. The materials used for currency, the
degree of convenience it provided, and the monopoly that governments have historically had over
monetary systems illustrate how money continues to evolve. Technological developments enabled
new forms of money in the past and continues to do so. Money was created as an economic enabler
that allows individuals and institutions to trade. As money and its forms evolved, they created
interconnectedness and interdependencies on a global scale. Today, global private currencies are
doing this alongside traditional fiat currencies. The next chapter explains the origins and evolution
of GPCs to understand how this happened.
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORY OF GLOBAL PRIVATE CURRENCIES

In April 2021, the value of the cryptocurrency market crossed the $2 trillion mark for the
first time.107 In just over two months, this total market capitalization value had doubled because of
massive spikes in interest from institutional investors. This unprecedented growth rate and dollar
value baffled proponents and detractors alike. It was just about a decade ago that the first
cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, which accounted for over 50% of the entire cryptocurrency market
capitalization in 2021, was born as an idea. This chapter traces the history of Bitcoin followed by
the history of the Diem (formerly known as Libra) and the history of Coinbase. Key points on
other important cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum are also mentioned in order to provide a
comprehensive account. As of February 2022, Bitcoin is still in operation while Diem, which never
took off, was effectively shut down in early 2022 because of intense regulatory pressure.
While Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, was born in January 2009, blockchain technology,
which enables Bitcoin was decades in the making, just like every scientific invention that builds
on research from the past. Bitcoin, and all cryptocurrencies, would not be possible without
blockchain technology. Bitcoin was also not the first digital currency. There were several attempts
at creating electronic cash systems in the decades that preceded. Bitcoin was the first successful
electronic payment system because of its design. In 1995, American cryptographer David Chaum
built a type of electronic money called Digicash. It was one of the earliest forms of cryptographic
electronic payments. Digicash required a specific software to withdraw money from a bank and
then required specific encrypted keys in order to send the withdrawn money to a recipient. This
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was followed by BitGold in 1998. Nick Szabo, the designer of BitGold designed a system that
required a participant to dedicate computer power to solving cryptographic puzzles in exchange
for a reward, similar to Bitcoin’s system. The computers that solved the puzzle received a reward.
In the case of Bitcoin, the reward was in the form of Bitcoins and Satoshis (fractions). Szabo’s
system was not successful because it could not solve the problem of double spending without the
role of a central authority.
The double spending problem refers to a potential flaw in a digital cash system in which
the same single digital token can be spent more than once, leading to an untenable system. Unlike
physical forms of money such as metal coins or paper currencies, a digital token is a digital file
that can be easily duplicated or falsified. The creator of Bitcoin - an anonymous individual or
group of individuals known as Satoshi Nakamoto - solved this problem by creating a system that
enables widespread networks of pseudonymous miners to manage transactions within a
blockchain. Satoshi Nakamoto’s main contribution was the ability to solve the double-spending
problem in a decentralized fashion. The blockchain prevents double spending by ensuring that
each transaction is logged in an immutable way within every block, and by using complex puzzles
to verify whether there is double spending. The distributed nature of the blockchain shields Bitcoin
from being influenced or completely shut down by regulators. This is the root cause of most of the
regulatory concerns.
On October 31, 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto published the white paper called Bitcoin – A Peer
to Peer Electronic Cash System, describing the functionality of the Bitcoin blockchain network.
Satoshi began working on Bitcoin on August 18th, 2008. This was the date of purchase for the
domain Bitcoin.org. Satoshi Nakamoto mined the first block, a total of 50 Bitcoins, on January 3,
2009. Satoshi embedded the headline of a newspaper on the first block in order to establish the
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economic preconditions, i.e., the financial crisis, that lead to creation of Bitcoin. This first block
is referred to as the Genesis Block. In the beginning, it was seen as just a collectible. Bitcoin had
almost no value for the first few months. In April 2010, a few months after trading started, the
value of one Bitcoin was around 14 cents. On May 22, 2010, a computer programmer named
Laszlo Hanyecz bought two pizzas by sending 10,000 Bitcoins to another member within the
Bitcoin community who then placed the order using a credit card, marking the first Bitcoin-enabled
commercial transaction. The value of Bitcoin surged to 36 cents by the end of May 2010 because
of the pizza incident. From there, the cryptocurrency began gaining value over the internet as the
number of users grew, a phenomenon referred to as ‘the network effect’. For the next few years, a
market was beginning to form around Bitcoin. In February 2011, the value rose to $1.06. A few
months later, thanks to a Forbes story on the new “cryptocurrency,” the prices spiked again. By
the end of May 2011, the price was around $9. When Gawker, the news outlet, published a story
about Bitcoin's appeal within the online drug dealing community, the price tripled within a week,
reaching close to $27. This highlights how comfortable Bitcoin’s users are with the fact that the
cryptocurrency enables drugs. At this point, the total market value of the Bitcoins that were in
circulation was close to $130 million. This initial success led to the creation of other similar
products. In October 2011, Litecoin, the second closest competitor was launched. These copycats
were collectively referred to as Altcoins.
Despite all the competition, the price of Bitcoin saw a steady increase. In September 2011,
the Bitcoin Foundation was founded. A new competitor named Ripple entered the market at this
time. Ripple was funded by venture capitalists. Interest in this sector has grown year on year.
Today, the venture capital scene is highly bullish on the cryptocurrency market and has invested
billions into several startups. In 2013, Bitcoin faced several legal issues such as criminal

58
investigations and technological issues such as software glitches. Bitcoin prices were highly
unstable for a few years. For example, on November 19, its price peaked at $755 and later crashed
to $378 that very day. By the end of November, the price was at $1,163. By January 2015, the
price was back to $152.
Between 2014 and 2016, Bitcoin attracted a lot of attention from the mainstream media for
being the subject of scams and illegal drug deals. The event that triggered this is referred to as the
Mt. Gox incident. Mt. Gox was the name of the world’s largest Bitcoin exchange until it collapsed
and declared bankruptcy in January 2014 after losing 850,000 Bitcoin. The theft of these Bitcoins
remains a mystery. This incident has been a cautionary tale for other exchanges. Yet, there have
been several hacks ever since. Most of the hacking activity has been linked to North Korea. 108
Between 2016 and 2018, Bitcoin became more popular across the world and saw steep increases
in its valuations. Bitcoin prices rose from $434 in January 2016 to $998 in January 2017. Several
software updates were made to the Bitcoin network over the years. In July 2017, a software
upgrade was added to support the Lightning Network, which helped in increasing the speed of
transactions. Another update was added to improve scalability.
These upgrades made significant changes to the way the network functioned, leading to
massive increases in its price. The price rose to around $2700 within a week. By the end of 2017,
Bitcoin prices reached close to $20,000. Around this time, there was new competition from a
blockchain network called Ethereum, which remains the closest competitor to this day. Ethereum
brought smart contracts to cryptocurrency, opening a wide array of potential use cases and
generating thousands of different projects. Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies have
been on a roller coaster ride ever since, with several booms and busts. Financial regulations and
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security concerns continue to plague every cryptocurrency while hacks continue to haunt every
cryptocurrency exchange. Cryptocurrencies are highly volatile and may not survive the regulatory
environment over time. But blockchain technology is seen as being a game changer not just for
the finance sector but also for other sectors such as energy, transportation, etc.
The rise and fall of Libra, the cryptocurrency project that could have changed the history
of money, highlights several key lessons on regulatory responses to global private currencies. The
following paragraphs trace the entire history of Diem, formerly known as Libra, the ambitious
stablecoin initiative proposed by Meta, the company formerly known as Facebook. Throughout
the dissertation, Meta and Facebook are used interchangeably. Diem is a cautionary tale for every
cryptocurrency, especially stablecoins. More importantly, Diem is an ideal case study to
understand interactions between regulatory agencies and the cryptocurrency industry. Throughout
the dissertation, Diem and Libra are used interchangeably. Libra faced resistance from regulators
from the day it was announced. Literally minutes after the announcement was made, the then
French Finance Minister, Bruno Le Maire, declared that Libra could not be allowed to become a
sovereign currency. This was followed by months of strong resistance from regulators within the
United States. The rest of this section details the journey of Diem from its birth as an idea in Silicon
Valley to its death at the hands of the regulators in Washington D. C.
In early February 2018, Howard Wu, a Silicon Valley investor with expertise in
cryptocurrencies was invited to Facebook headquarters in Menlo Park to discuss the implications,
opportunities, and risks of introducing Facebook’s massive user base of more than 2 billion online
users to the new and exciting blockchain technology.109 Facebook, like most technology
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companies, requires its employees and consultants to sign strict non-disclosure agreements and
therefore not much is known about what exactly was discussed during that meeting. A few media
reports later shed some light on Facebook’s plans on this front. The Verge, an American
technology news website, reported that Morgan Beller, a 26-year-old woman, was one of three the
key executives behind Facebook’s plan to make its own currency. It was reported that Morgan
Beller was listed as a co-creator of the proposed Libra digital currency, alongside Vice Presidents
David Marcus and Kevin Weil. Morgan Beller was the head of strategy for CaLibra, the ‘wallet’
i.e., software application that was being designed to store Libra, the proposed digital currency. It
is important to note that Beller was previously a partner at Andreessen Horowitz, Silicon Valley’s
top venture capital firm and one of the world’s most bullish investors in the cryptocurrency world.
Morgan Beller’s colleagues, during an interview, highlighted her deep passion for financial
inclusion and her belief in the abilities of cryptocurrency technology to have a positive impact in
underserved communities around the world. This narrative of Libra being a force for global
development by ‘banking the unbanked’ was pushed strongly by Facebook. However, it was
received with skepticism, given the company’s track record. Facebook had lost the trust of
regulators and users because of their handling of user data. Privacy was promised but never
delivered because it must be sacrificed for profits. Libra was therefore seen as another moneymaking project that will use user data for advertising and profits.
In December 2017, David Marcus, a Vice President at Facebook who was one of three
employees who led the Libra project, joined the board of Coinbase, a fast-growing cryptocurrency
exchange.110 Coinbase would then go on to become a multi-billion-dollar public company through
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an Initial Public Offering (IPO), which was a feat in comparison to the death of the Libra project.
The reason Coinbase survived was that from day one, it was open to adapting its way based on
inputs from regulators. Coinbase also bragged about this strategy to establish themselves as
friendly innovators while others in the cryptocurrency space tested the limits of the law and that
of the regulators. Until April 2018, David Marcus was primarily in charge of Facebook Messenger,
the communication tool that enabled Facebook users to chat with each other. In early May 2018,
David Marcus announced that he would be leading a new blockchain unit at Facebook.111 Media
reports referred to a mysterious blockchain division 112 within Facebook, but no other details were
available.
A few days later, it was reported that Facebook had plans to launch its own cryptocurrency
with the goal of integrating payment systems within its platform 113 through its messenger tool.
This was seen as a dramatic move given Facebook’s massive user base. With two billion users, it
was deemed the largest digital nation on the planet. Facebook also had its own marketplace within
the website for buying and selling goods. Having its own currency would have made Facebook a
lot more powerful given how valuable financial data is, especially given the millions of daily active
users it had. A few months later, in December 2018, Bloomberg reported that Facebook was
building a stablecoin for WhatsApp transfers.114 This was significant because the WhatsApp
messenger, which was owned by a subsidiary of Facebook, was used by millions of people across
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the world every day for business and personal communication. In February 2019, Facebook
acquired Chainspace,115 a company that developed smart contracts. The scope of Facebook’s
digital currency project was growing by the day and now seemed to move beyond just currencies
and into smart contracts.
Around this time, The New York Times confirmed that Facebook was building a
cryptocurrency that could be used across its different platforms,116 confirming the size of Libra’s
ambitions. Later that year, Facebook started hiring more people for the Libra project, including
“Blockchain Liaisons.”117 Until this point, there was no clear official name or narrative by
Facebook about the project. A few weeks later, the cryptocurrency project was referred to as
“Project Libra” publicly for the first time 118 in the context of reported discussions between
Facebook, Visa, and Mastercard. The report suggested that the Libra would be a fiat-backed
stablecoin and was seeking funding to the tune of $1 billion.
In May 2019, Christian Catalini, a cryptoeconomist, takes a leave of absence from his
position as a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Sloan School of
Management to work at Facebook 119 on the Libra project. Facebook also poached experts from
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Coinbase,120 the leading cryptocurrency exchange. This hiring spree and the resulting media
attention made heads turn, leading to a letter from the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs asking Facebook for more details about its cryptocurrency project. 121 At the end
of May 2019, Facebook registered “Libra Networks” as a new company in Geneva, Switzerland. 122
Facebook was reported to roll out a stablecoin in several countries within a year i.e., in the first
half of 2020. Facebook was also reported to have been in talks with Coinbase and Gemini, the two
leading cryptocurrency exchanges in the United States.123
In June 2019, due to increasing concerns from regulatory agencies, Facebook held talks
with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to allay fears about the proposed
stablecoin.124 There were rumors that Facebook could launch Libra to the world in the coming
weeks125 but that never happened due to alarms raised by regulators in other parts of the world,
especially Europe. Facebook’s head of financial services for Northern Europe had to confirm that
the proposed stablecoin would be pegged to a basket of currencies and not just one currency.126
While nation-states and regulatory agencies were wary and confused about Libra, private sector
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giants such as Uber, PayPal, Visa, Stripe, MercadoLibre, Bookings.com, and Mastercard were all
reported to be backing Facebook in this ambitious project. 127
However, concerns over Facebook’s handling of data were reported to have killed at least
three other partnerships.128 This highlights the importance of transparency in operations, even for
the private sector. On June 18, 2019, Facebook formally introduced Libra to the world. The Libra
project presented an ambitious vision of a decentralized, autonomous organization that would
oversee the entire project and deliver a ‘borderless, easy-to-transfer means of exchange’. Facebook
claimed that its participation in Libra would be through CaLibra, a new subsidiary which would
build a digital wallet for the project, and that Facebook’s role would be otherwise limited. The
project was designed to be led by the Libra Association, a group of 28 companies, to oversee the
development of the cryptocurrency. The Libra Association soon grew and had over a hundred
companies,129 creating a massive coalition of private sector titans that seemed to be ready to take
the monetary system away from the clutches of governments across the world. On June 18, 2019,
the very same day Facebook formally introduced Libra, U.S. lawmakers called for an immediate
halt to Libra’s development until they had a better understanding of the project130. Representative
Maxine Waters, Chair of the House Financial Services Committee was the woman leading this
charge.
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Facebook had not even responded to the letter from the U. S. Senate Banking Committee
that was sent over a month ago,131 Now, with Rep. Maxine Waters also on the case, Facebook had
to answer to both houses of the Congress. The U.S. Senate Banking Committee announced it will
hold a hearing on Libra in July.132 The U.S. House Financial Services Committee also announced
that it would hold a hearing on Libra in July.133 To make things worse, regulators from across the
pond were also signaling their postures. Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, said
that while he was open-minded about Libra, it would have to adhere to strict regulations before it
could launch.134 Facebook was also being ganged up on by G7, the intergovernmental organization
made up of the world's largest developed economies: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States,
United Kingdom, and Canada. The G7 had just announced that it was forming a task force to
evaluate Libra.135 Pressure was building up across the world. The Monetary Authority of Singapore
announced that it was looking for more information on Libra, and that it had held talks with
Facebook.136
In July 2019, even before the scheduled Congressional hearings, there was more pressure
from U.S. lawmakers demanding that Facebook cease all development activities related to its Libra
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cryptocurrency on grounds that the project could pose systemic risks that endanger U.S. and global
financial stability. "It appears that these products may lend themselves to an entirely new global
financial system that is based out of Switzerland and intended to rival U.S. monetary policy and
the dollar. This raises serious privacy, trading, national security, and monetary policy concerns for
not only Facebook’s over 2 billion users, but also for investors, consumers, and the broader global
economy," 137 the lawmakers wrote in their letter. The letter referred to the privacy issues involving
Facebook, including the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which involved a political consulting firm
gaining access to the data of over 50 million Facebook users. This data was successfully used to
target swing voters in the Brexit referendum. The letter also surprisingly admitted that, if
successful, the Libra project could create “a new Swiss-based financial system that is too big to
fail.” Public opinion was also not in favor of Facebook or Libra. There were attacks from
organizations such as Public Citizen, a North American privacy and consumer watchdog, which
demanded that lawmakers halt Libra’s development.138 David Marcus, the head of the Libra
project, had to write an open letter to clarify “misunderstandings” about Libra. In this letter, he
confirmed that he will testify before both the U.S. Senate Banking and U.S. House Financial
Services committees. 139
Meanwhile, on the other side of the planet, Wang Xin, the head of research at the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC), said that Libra could force the Chinese central bank to accelerate its
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research into a digital currency. 140 He seemed to be highly wary of the fact that there is a firstmover advantage to be gained in being the first major global digital currency. China was already
working on creating a hybrid currency that worked like a cryptocurrency but was controlled and
operated by the State. PBOC was the first major central bank to study digital currencies, starting
in 2014, a step to counter the challenge from cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin. China had taken
similar approaches before as evident in its hybridized model of state-controlled capitalism and
competition-controlled internet. Wang Xin admitted that, if Libra becomes widely used for
international payments and effectively acts like money, it could accordingly have a large influence
on monetary policy, financial stability, and the international monetary system.141 As discussed in
chapter 8, China later created the world’s first successful pilot of a Central Bank Digital Currency
(CBDC) way ahead of others.
David Marcus, the head of Libra, in his response to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee’s
questions, declared that Facebook would not link personal information with Libra transactions.142
However, he does not get any kudos from anyone. He is instead met with more pushback from
other parts of the government. This time, it’s the Federal Reserve. Jerome Powell, the Fed
Chairman, announces that Libra would not be permitted to launch until Facebook has answered
questions about its operations. He raised concerns around financial stability and consumer
protection,143 saying such a project is “systemically important” given the size of Facebook’s user
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base.144 This was followed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s comments that he is not
comfortable with Libra because it could be misused by criminal entities.145 These various
comments clearly indicate the most common regulatory concerns: preventing crime and preserving
financial stability and state sovereignty. Just before the Senate hearing, U.S. President Donald
Trump’s tweets saying he is "not a fan" of cryptocurrencies. These were his first public comments
on crypto since becoming president. He added that Libra “will have little standing or
dependability” and that "If Facebook and other companies want to become a bank, they must seek
a new Banking Charter and become subject to all Banking Regulations, just like other Banks, both
National [...] and International."146
On July 16, 2019, David Marcus testified before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee,
positioning the Libra project as a path to financial inclusion for underserved populations. "Our first
goal is to create utility and adoption, enabling people around the world – especially the unbanked
and underbanked – to take part in the financial ecosystem," he said.147 He assured lawmakers that
the Libra Association would work with the Federal Reserve and other central banks to make sure
that the proposed stablecoin does not compete with sovereign currencies or interfere with monetary
policy. “Monetary policy is properly the province of central banks," he added. David Marcus’s
comments and the U.S. Congress's concerns clearly establish that GPCs, including stablecoins, are
a threat to the State’s ability to carry out monetary policy. Gary Gensler, the former Chairman of
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the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), in his prepared remarks ahead of testifying
before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee that Libra looks like a security and should be
regulated as one because its value is pegged to a basket of sovereign currencies and government
bonds.148 He added that some aspects of Libra's structure may also fall under banking regulations.
He further explained that the Libra Reserve is effectively proposing "a private form of money"
which can be used for payments, storing value and lending "the proceeds to banks (as deposits)
and governments (as debt securities)."
Tether, a stablecoin that was launched before, had already set the precedent for a stablecoin
issuer operating as a fractional bank. But Tether was not a concern because it did not have access
to two billion users. On July 17, 2019, one day after the Senate hearing, David Marcus testified
before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee and reiterated that Libra would not launch
until regulators' concerns were fully addressed.149 This was not enough for some lawmakers
including Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.), who asked Marcus if he would at least promise to carry
out a small pilot test of Libra, involving no more than 1 million users. Such a pilot test had to be
overseen by the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), before fully
launching the currency. David Marcus refused to commit to such a pilot project but reiterated that
he would commit to working with regulators. "I don't think you should launch a new currency at
all," Rep. Maloney declared during the hearing. Rep. Brad Sherman (D.-Calif.), in a seemingly
hyperbolic statement, suggested that Libra was somehow more dangerous to America than 9/11.
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Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) asked David Marcus whether he believed that the
currency was a public good. David Marcus responded saying. “It’s not up to me to decide.”
Several of the lawmakers were concerned about Libra's threat to U.S. financial dominance,
which confirms that great power competition is a key regulatory factor. David Marcus assured the
lawmakers that the Libra reserve would be backed mainly by the U.S. dollar. He then specified
that it would be 50 percent dollars and the rest would be a combination of Euros, British pounds
and the Japanese yen. It was clear that the Republicans on the panel were less hostile. It was also
clear that Congress was able to draw understand the differences between Libra and
cryptocurrencies 150 i.e., the fact that Libra is a stablecoin pegged to fiat currencies and that Libra
can be transparent, clearly establishing the importance of compliance with fiat currencies, and
transparency in operations as key regulatory factors. These hearings signaled that Libra was not
going to be approved by lawmakers in its current form.
Just a week after the hearing, there were signs of cracks within the Libra coalition. The
first sign was Visa’s CEO Alfred Kelly’s statement that his company was not yet a member of the
Libra Association and that the letter of intent to join the association was nonbinding.151 Public
opinion was also not in Libra’s favor. A survey by CivicSense, a consumer polling group, found
that, in mid-2019, more adults in the U.S. trusted Bitcoin than Libra.152 Just 2 percent of those
polled felt they would trust Libra while close to 40% preferred Bitcoin. This was not a good sign
because Libra was hoping to replace Bitcoin as the most dominant global private currency. In an
attempt to signal increased cooperation, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg declared that his
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company would take however long it needs to convince lawmakers and launch Libra153 while the
company also conceded, in a disclosure filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
that Libra may never launch.154
Regulators across the world then started firing warning shots at Libra, hoping to get similar
responses. There were several demands from across the world for more information about the
privacy implications of Libra. In a joint statement published by the U.K. Information
Commissioner's Office (ICO), and data privacy commissioners from Australia, Albania, Burkina
Faso, Canada, the EU, U.K., and the U.S., shared concerns that Facebook has failed to specifically
address the information handling practices that will be in place to secure and protect personal
information.155 This, again, highlights the role of transparency in operations as a critical regulatory
factor for GPCs. In August, 2019, the European Commission launched an antitrust investigation
of the Libra Association based on concerns that Facebook's planned digital payment system could
unfairly lock out competitors because of the nature and size of the Libra Association's partnership
structure.156 This regulatory backlash sparked concerns among some Libra Association members,
some of whom were reported to be considering a pullout. 157 Meanwhile, in the United States,
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo suggested that Libra should be regulated similarly to the

Nikhilesh De, “However Long It Takes': Zuckerberg Vows to Win Over Libra Regulators,” CoinDesk, last
modified September 13, 2021, https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/07/25/however-long-it-takes-zuckerbergvows-to-win-over-Libra-regulators/.
154
Daniel Palmer, “Facebook Libra Might Never Launch, Company Concedes in SEC Disclosure,” CoinDesk, last
modified September 13, 2021, https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libra-might-not-ever-launch-concedes-firm.
155
Daniel Palmer, “Global Regulators Warn on Privacy Risks of Facebook's Libra,” CoinDesk, last modified
September 13, 2021, https://www.coindesk.com/global-regulators-warn-on-privacy-risks-of-facebooks-Libra.
156
Daniel Palmer, “Facebook Libra Already Facing an EU Antitrust Probe: Report,” CoinDesk, last modified
September 13, 2021, https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libra-already-facing-an-eu-antitrust-probe-report.
157
Daniel Palmer, “Tensions Rising at Facebook Libra as Backers Consider Quitting: Report,” CoinDesk, last
modified September 13, 2021, https://www.coindesk.com/tensions-rising-at-facebook-Libra-as-backers-considerquitting-report.
153

72
SWIFT network,158 which processes most of the world’s cross-border payments and works closely
with American and Western governments. U.S. Rep. Maxine Waters announced that her office and
the U.S. House Financial Services Committee will continue to evaluate Libra,159 and that she was
not convinced about the project after meeting with Swiss regulators.160
Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, echoed the same concerns raised by
Rep. Maxine Waters, saying Libra has the potential to displace the US dollar as the world’s reserve
currency.161 This, again, highlights the role of great power competition as a regulatory factor
affecting GPCs. Mark Carney also suggested that the US should create a wholly digital alternative
to the U.S. dollar. Comments by Mark Carney and his counterpart at the Chinese central bank
clearly suggest that Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are the future of the currencies. This
would continue to prove the primacy of politics in deciding the dynamics of the financial and
monetary system. While Visa, PayPal, Uber and other tech and payment giants within the Libra
Association started having second thoughts, other members such as Andreessen Horowitz (a16z)
and Union Square Ventures, the two venture capital firms that are bullish on cryptocurrencies,
seemed to remain unfazed by regulators.162
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In Europe, Libra had more concerns. In September 2019, Yves Mersch, a member of the
executive board at the European Central Bank (ECB), warned that Libra could impair the European
Union’s monetary policy and affect the ECB’s control over the euro. 163 He raised concerns about
the threat posed by Facebook's Libra to monetary policy and consumers in the EU. His assessment
was that Libra had the potential to impair the monetary policy transmission mechanism by
affecting the liquidity position of euro area banks and undermine the single currency’s
international role. These points reinforce the finding that sovereignty and transparency in
operations are key regulatory factors in the case of GPCs. Around the same time, the U. S. Under
Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Sigal Mandelker, warned that
Libra and other cryptocurrencies must comply with existing anti-money laundering (AML) laws
and other regulatory requirements to tackle financial crimes.164 “Whether it’s Bitcoin, Ethereum,
Libra, our message is the same to all of these companies: anti-money laundering and combating
the financing of terrorism has to be built into your design from the get-go," she said, after a meeting
in Geneva with representatives from the Swiss government, the Bank for International Settlements
and other international financial organizations. This cements the fact that the primary regulatory
factor affecting GPCs is compliance with AML laws.
After taking hits from the political, social, and legal domains, Libra was struck by the
technological domain when a third-party found vulnerabilities in Move, Libra’s scripting
language.165 This again, highlights the importance of transparency in operations as a factor and the
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importance of technology as a dimension for smooth operations of GPCs. Libra had a breakthrough
when Mark Branson, the director of the Financial Market Authority (FINMA), the Swiss financial
markets watchdog, indicated that Switzerland was willing to work with Libra. Mark Branson added
that the country would not bow to foreign pressure to prevent Libra’s launch.166 In a bold statement,
Mark Branson stated that, if Switzerland wanted to become a major financial center, it had to live
with the potential risks of working with major projects such as Libra. This is an example of how
GPCs can manage to survive by gaining political support from one part of the world and use that
to survive and operate across the world. He noted that cryptocurrencies come with both risks and
potential benefits, and they could in fact help to tackle money laundering if traceability of
transactions becomes fully available. Clearly, transparency in operations is a key regulatory factor
for GPCs.
However, there was a different type of reaction from one of Switzerland’s neighbors. Bruno
Le Maire, the French minister for Economy and Finance, declared that Libra would not be allowed
to launch in its current form. "I want to be absolutely clear: In these conditions, we cannot authorize
the development of Libra on European soil," he said. 167 "It would be a global currency, held by a
single player, which has more than two billion users around the world. The monetary sovereignty
of states is under threat," he added, highlighting the role of sovereignty as a regulatory factor for
GPCs. Le Maire expressed strong concerns about Libra becoming a substitute for a national
currency and causing financial disruption. He also brought up the role of cryptocurrencies in
money laundering and terrorist activity. In response to all this, the Libra Association released a
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friendly statement highlighting how the Minister’s concerns further underscores the importance of
the association's ongoing work with regulatory bodies and leadership around the world, and that
the association and its members are committed to working with regulatory authorities to achieve a
safe, transparent, and consumer-focused implementation of the Libra project. In response, Bertrand
Perez, the Libra association's managing director and Chief Operating Officer (COO), denied that
the stablecoin can cause disruption to the monetary policies of central banks with currencies
included in the Libra reserve, which was designed to be a basket of fiat currencies and government
bonds. "It is their monetary policies that will influence the Libra through the basket and not the
other way around," he argued. 168 Bertrand Perez was confident that Libra would launch on
schedule, sometime around the end of 2020.
Libra had more international scrutiny waiting. The Bank for International Settlements, an
international financial institution owned collectively by central banks with the goal of fostering
international monetary and financial cooperation and serving as a bank for central banks,
announced in September 2019 that its Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, which
included at least 26 central banks, would question the Libra Association to get more information
on the proposed stablecoin.169 At this meeting, Libra was expected to answer questions on its
planned scope and structure. The central banks' findings were included in a report for the G7
nations in October. David Marcus, in an attempt to convince hawkish regulators such as France’s
Bruno Le Maire, reiterated that Libra is a threat to monetary sovereignty or economic stability. 170
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"We believe strong regulatory oversight preventing the Libra Association from deviating from its
full 1:1 backing commitment is desirable," he added.
International pressure on Libra did not subside. There were more concerned parties.
Changchuan Mu, who had just been appointed as the director of China’s Research Institute on
Digital Currency, China’s cryptocurrency czar, expressed concerns that although every major
global power did not welcome Facebook’s Libra, the stablecoin’s advance might be too late to
stop.171 “It is very unlikely that one can totally stop people from buying Libra despite rigorous
regulations,” he added. The only way to stop Libra, he argued, was a legal ban by the United States
and that if this doesn’t happen, it is highly likely that Libra will become a dominant international
currency. He reiterated that Libra would chip away the State’s power to execute monetary policy
and that this was a fight for monetary sovereignty. Controlling capital flows and preventing money
laundering were listed as the key reasons behind the Chinese crackdown on cryptocurrencies.
China’s national digital currency plan was being implemented at that time. The idea was to create
a digital currency that was fully backed by the central government and pegged one-to-one to the
Chinese renminbi. The primary goal was to replace cash. Libra was seen as a threat to this digital
Yuan although Facebook is banned in China.
While China wanted Libra to be completely shut down, Japan called for international
cooperation in regulating Libra.172 Haruhiko Kuroda, the governor of the Bank of Japan, declared
that if launched, Libra would have a huge impact on society. He echoed the findings of a task force
that was set up by the G7 to examine issues raised by Libra, saying rules of the highest standards
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were needed to minimize the use of digital currencies in money laundering and funding terrorism.
In Europe, Benoit Coeure, a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB),
who led the BIS interview declared that Libra has been a wakeup call for central banks and
policymakers.173 He called for banks to respond while making some rare positive comments on
Libra. He claimed that stablecoins such as Facebook's Libra could help connect 1.7 billion people
across the world, who are currently unbanked, and make cross-border payments cheaper, faster,
and more transparent. Similar comments were echoed by Bertnand Perez, the head of the Libra
Association, at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva during a blockchain event. He claimed that Libra
could help the U.N. achieve its sustainable development goals., repeating the international
development narrative that has accompanied Libra from the beginning.174
Meanwhile, The Libra Association was about to fall apart. The Wall Street Journal reported
that Mastercard and Visa are reconsidering their role in the Libra Association175 given the global
regulatory pushback faced by the proposed cryptocurrency. This regulatory pressure increased in
October 2019 when U.S. Representatives French Hill and Bill Foster warned, in a letter to Federal
Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, 176 that Libra could remove some of the U.S. government’s authority
over financial governance. Adding fuel to this fire, executives from Bank of America, M&T Bank
Corp. and KeyCorp also warned that Libra could be a monetary threat. Soon after these cascades,
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PayPal formally withdrew from the Libra Association.177 Sensing an opportunity to strike, U.S.
Senators Sherrod Brown and Brian Schatz warned Visa, Mastercard and Stripe that they may see
heightened regulatory scrutiny if they continue working on Libra.178 In their letters to the CEOs of
these companies, the senators highlighted that Facebook, the driving force behind the network, has
failed to satisfactorily answer regulatory concerns over terrorism, money laundering, monetary
policy, and economic destabilization.
On the other side of the pond, Olaf Scholz, the German Finance Minister who would later
succeed Angela Merkel as the Chancellor, declared that he was “very very critical” of Libra and
supported the idea of a digital euro. 179 Clearly, governments across the world had seen the
opportunity in building their own version of Libra in the form of a Central Bank Digital Currency
(CBDC). Around the same time, The Bank of England published a set of principles that Libra
would follow in order to launch in the U.K.180 The Bank of England recognized Libra as a
systemically important payment system and demanded access to monitor payment chain
information as one of its conditions. This demand highlights the importance of transparency in
operations as a critical regulatory factor. In response to all these regulatory pressures, on October
11, 2019, Mastercard, Visa, Mercado Pago, Booking Holdings, eBay, and Stripe announced their
withdrawal from the Libra Association.181 Soon after this, in an attempt to compensate for the loss
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of some of its key members and to show progress, 21 companies signed the Libra Association
charter, formally creating the governing council for the stablecoin initiative and electing an
executive board.182
Sensing that Libra was trying to move forward, regulators from the United States and
abroad started attacking Libra again. In the United States, Lael Brainard, Governor of the Federal
Reserve, strongly criticized Libra stating that the Facebook-led project would need to resolve
several regulatory hurdles before going live. He reiterated that Libra could become a global threat
to monetary stability, in part due to Facebook’s massive user base, which includes almost onethird of the world’s population. 183 “If a large share of domestic households and businesses come
to rely on a global stablecoin not only as a means of payment but also as a store of value, it could
impact central banks' balance sheets,” he said. The head of Sweden’s Riksbank declared that Libra
is forcing central banks to reconsider their approach to money, and that the stablecoin would be a
‘catalytic event’ for central banks,184 France’s Bruno Le Maire slammed Libra again, reminding
that it could undermine monetary sovereignty. 185
Libra had a few supporters as well. U.S. Senator Mike Rounds of South Dakota praised
Libra in a letter to Anchorage, a member of the Libra Association that was domiciled in his state.
He praised Libra as a technological advancement that’s necessary to help unbanked and
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underbanked consumers. "As it stands, we have no clear legal way to ascertain whether a
cryptocurrency is a security. What legal foundation we do have for these types of questions is
rooted in the Securities Act of 1933. That law was written more than half a century before
computers and the internet were created, more than two decades before Hawaii was admitted to
the Union, a decade before the jet engine was developed, and in a period of time in which 90
percent of rural America lacked electricity," the Senator added, putting the technology in
perspective. 186 However, there were only a handful of lawmakers who saw any value in allowing
Libra to continue. In an attempt to extend an olive branch to lawmakers and regulators, David
Marcus, the head of the Libra project at Facebook, hinted that he is open to dropping its basketbacked stablecoin in favor of issuing a series of single-currency stablecoins. 187 This move
highlights how compliance with the fiat currencies is a key regulatory factor that would condition
regulatory response for GPCs.
David Marcus further added that China stands to win if the United States shuts Libra down
as suggested by the head of the Chinese Digital Yuan project.188 This highlights the role of great
power competition as a regulatory factor for GPCs. On October 22, 2019, Mark Zuckerberg
appeared in front of lawmakers on Capitol Hill. He presented Libra as a tool for global
development by highlighting how Libra can bring financial services to 1.7 billion unbanked
individuals.189 In a clear sign of surrender, on October 23, 2019, Mark Zuckerberg testifying before
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the U.S. House Financial Services Committee, told lawmakers that Facebook would withdraw
from the Libra Association if it launched before securing all of the regulatory approvals it
needed.190 Around the same time, The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) announced that it
was launching a new fintech research initiative to look into stablecoins and digital currencies,
among other issues.191 -Libra was created based on Bitcoin. Now, several Central Bank Digital
Currencies (CBDCs) were being born based on Libra and Bitcoin.
In December 2019, there were signs of compromise when the U.S. Treasury Secretary
Steven Mnuchin suggested that he was fine with the launch as long as it was fully compliant with
anti-money laundering regulations.192 But the U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard added
that more clarity was needed on how the Libra Association will manage the reserves backing the
stablecoin.193 However, Europe was not ready to give Libra a fighting chance. Christine Lagarde,
President of the European Central Bank (ECB), expressed antitrust concerns stemming from unfair
advantages Facebook’s social media platform may give in stablecoin adoption i.e., it can boost
Libra but lock out other issuers. 194 She also highlighted that Facebook could combine users' social
media data with their financial data, giving a strong competitive advantage that could undermine
contestability. Lagarde had asked the ECB to stay ahead of the curve on central bank digital
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currencies (CBDCs). She was one of the earliest experts to recognize that cryptocurrencies and
blockchain technology could disrupt the central bank business model. Central banks are under
threat from these new technologies the same way Blockbuster was under threat from Netflix. 195
While most central banks were wary of Libra, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) expressed
doubts about its potential adoption. In a document submitted to the Australian government’s Select
Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, RBA officials were skeptical
that cryptocurrencies, in their current and future forms, would ever replace government-issued
money.196
However, in the United States, there were clear signs that there would eventually be a
digital dollar. In January 2020, Former Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo, former CFTC Director Daniel Gorfine, and investor Charles
Giancarlo began working on creating the dollar digital without waiting for the Federal Reserve.
The trio announced the formation of the Digital Dollar Foundation in partnership with Accenture
to design and push for a potential U.S. central bank digital currency (CBDC). The proposed digital
dollar would be a tokenized form of the U.S. currency.197 The digital dollar was announced at a
time when there were indications that Libra was dead. Even the Swiss Finance Minister, Ueli
Maurer, who was also the country's president, had made a blunt statement suggesting that
regulators would not approve Libra anytime soon.198 Vodafone, one of the founding members of
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the Libra Association, withdrew from the coalition to focus on its own mobile payments
platform.199 In February 2020, Mastercard CEO Ajay Banga outlined a number of concerns he had
about Libra, including whether it would become inextricably linked to the proprietary CaLibra
wallet, who could use it and whether the Libra Association members would receive returns.200 As
the sun seemed to set on Libra, the official digital dollar was seen rising. As the federal government
looked for ways to distribute coronavirus aid, support for a digital dollar started gaining steam in
Washington D.C. This centralized version of the sovereign national currency was seen as having
the broadest support in D.C.’s establishment circles.201 However, there were serious concerns
related to privacy and governmental overreach.
In April 2020, the Libra Association rewrote its white paper, announcing that rather than a
single stablecoin backed by a basket of assets, it will now look to issue a series of stablecoins
backed by a single asset each. It still intends to issue a basket-backed coin in some form, but the
new look remains a major concession to policy makers concerned by the project. 202 However, these
changes failed to satisfy lawmaker’s concerns related to Libra’s impacts on the global economy.203
In an attempt to signal compliance, the Libra association named Robert Werner, a former Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and Office of Foreign Assets Control official, as its
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general counsel,204 and Sterling Daines, Credit Suisse’s former head of financial crime compliance,
as the chief compliance officer. In November 2020, it was reported that Libra might launch a
dollar-pegged stablecoin as soon as January 2021, if it gets regulatory approval from the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA).205 Within a month, the Libra association
rebranded the entire project as the "Diem Association" in an attempt to distance itself from the
original multi-currency idea. CEO Stuart Levey declared that the group was ready to launch a
token and was waiting for approval from FINMA.206 However, there was no launch. In May 2021,
one of the co-creators of Diem admitted that the original plan for a stablecoin was naive 207 and had
to make several concessions to appease regulators. Libra was dead. Diem, its successor, was seen
as a radically different project that was backed by a single currency (the U.S. dollar) and was to
be issued in partnership with a bank.
By this time, the verdict on stablecoins was out. In June 2020, the Financial Action Task
Force released a detailed report on stablecoins208 to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors based on an in-depth analysis of their potential impacts. The report suggested that
stablecoins have the potential to spur financial innovation and efficiency, and to improve financial
inclusion. While stablecoins have been adopted on a small-scale, new proposals have the potential
to be mass-adopted on a global scale, particularly where they are sponsored by large technology,
telecommunications, or financial firms. The report highlighted that the propensity for mass-
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adoption makes them more vulnerable to be used by criminals and terrorists to launder money.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) released a similar report from the G7 Working Group
on stablecoins, investigating the impact of global stablecoins. The report concluded that
stablecoins, regardless of size, pose legal, regulatory, and oversight challenges and risks related to
legal certainty, good governance, money laundering, terrorist financing, other forms of illicit
finance, efficiency and integrity of payment systems, cybersecurity and operational resilience,
market integrity, data privacy, data protection, consumer and investor protection, and tax
compliance. It further added that stablecoins that reach global scale could pose challenges and
risks to monetary policy, financial stability, the international monetary system, and fair
competition.
On the first day of February 2022, it was announced that Meta's Diem was shut down.
Diem's CEO Stuart Levey announced the sale of Diem due to unyielding resistance from federal
regulator.”209 As we undertook this effort, we actively sought feedback from governments and
regulators around the world. Despite giving us positive substantive feedback on the design of the
network, it nevertheless became clear from our dialogue with [US] federal regulators that the
project could not move ahead," he said. Diem failed because regulators blocked it in a relentless
manner.210 This shows that the State is still a force to reckon with, no matter how big a company
is. Diem may have died simply because it was highly centralized. Nation-states and international
organizations were able to target and coerce Facebook and others in the Libra/Diem Association.
Meanwhile, Bitcoin continues to survive, probably because its users are distributed and there is no
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one person or organization that can be targeted and coerced by the state or international
organizations. Another major factor that affects the spread of GPCs are cryptocurrency exchanges
- institutions that serve as intermediaries in the process of exchanging fiat currencies for
cryptocurrencies. Some exchanges also allow users to exchange cryptocurrencies for other
cryptocurrencies.
Coinbase, the cryptocurrency exchange giant, despite not being a global private currency
per se, is one that warrants detailed analysis for two reasons: (1) it plays a key role in the
cryptocurrency ecosystem and an enabler that has increased the number of users, and (2) the way
it has successfully navigated regulatory agencies, especially within the United States, becoming a
publicly traded company while Libra crashed and burned. Coinbase is essentially a brokerage that
offers its users the opportunity to convert fiat money to cryptocurrencies, NFTs, and other crypto
assets (and vice versa). Coinbase was founded in 2012 by two strangers, Brian Armstrong and
Fred Ehrsam, who met online on the popular website Reddit. At that time, market value of Bitcoin
was $6. Coinbase’s raison d'etre was to make crypto easy to use211 and thereby bridge the gap
between the crypto enthusiasts and the average person.
Brian Armstrong’s interest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies was partly because of his
belief that there was a pressing need for an alternative to the global financial system that was
dominated by governments and big banks, which, he believed, were controlled by a small group
of people within each nation. The decentralized nature of GPCs, therefore, appealed to him. As a
student, Brian Armstrong spent a year in Argentina. During this time, he experienced how
destructive hyperinflation can be, and understood the link between hyperinflation and heavy
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dependence on cash. All this led him to believe that financial freedom and economic optimism are
intertwined.212 He saw cryptocurrencies as an enabler of financial freedom.
Coinbase was born at Y-combinator, a premier Silicon Valley accelerator. Y-combinator
is famous for taking in founders with ideas that seem crazy and turning them into successful
companies. The most popular success story created by Y-Combinator is Airbnb. When the
founders of Airbnb had the idea to convert spare bedrooms into hotels, they were often ridiculed.
But after they joined Y-Combinator to refine the idea and scale up, they were a major success.
Similarly, Coinbase also went into Y-Combinator with a crazy idea – to become a popular
cryptocurrency exchange – and eventually became a major success story. Just like Airbnb,
Coinbase is now a publicly traded company worth billions of dollars.
From its onset, Coinbase has been working closely and collaboratively with regulators
instead of trying to circumvent them. 213 The company backed demonstrated this through both
actions and words, making regulators more comfortable. For example, in early 2013, Coinbase
registered as a money services business with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) and exposed the company to the same regulations as traditional companies despite the
fundamental differences between traditional monetary systems build around fiat currencies and the
newly evolving system built around global private currencies.
Such approaches kept the company out of regulators’ crosshairs and served as a selling
point that rapidly grew. In less than a year, Coinbase gained more than half a million retail users.
In contrast, the Libra initiative lost regulators’ trust by establishing itself in Switzerland, which
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has a highly favorable political and legal environment for money laundering, tax evasion, and other
financial crimes. Such decisions put Libra on a path toward premature death while Coinbase
continued growing over the years. In early 2015, Coinbase Exchange, a service that allowed
individuals and institutions in 24 US states to trade Bitcoin, was launched. 214 This was a leap
forward because it was designed for professional investors. Before the Coinbase Exchange was
launched, the company focused on smaller investors who were mostly individuals. Coinbase also
grew internationally. In September 2015, Coinbase launched its services in 28 countries including
Canada, solidifying its hold on the North American market. 215 Less than a year later, Coinbase was
operating is 33 countries across the world.
As the company grew and evolved, it had to adapt to the regulatory environment (or the
lack thereof) by working closely with several federal, state, and local governmental agencies.
While the company cooperated with regulators most of the time, there were some notable
exceptions. For example, in November 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) demanded
Coinbase to release internal records involving every customer who purchased digital currencies
through the exchange. This highlights the importance of taxation as a factor in the regulation of
GPCs. Coinbase fought this in court. In its initial request, the IRS requested nine specific kinds of
user data, including complete user profiles, know-your-customer (KYC) due diligence, documents
regarding third-party access, transaction logs, records of payments processed, correspondence
between Coinbase and Coinbase users, account or invoice statements, and records of payments.216
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These detail the importance of AML laws and transparency in operations in the context of
regulating GPCs.
Three years later, the company settled the case and provided data on thousands of
customers.217 However, the outcome was not a total victory for the regulators because the court
ordered details other than the taxpayer ID, name, date of birth, address, transaction logs and
account statements were “not necessary.” 218 This example highlights how existing privacy laws
can favor GPCs in some nations. In 2017, Coinbase increased its activities in the State of New
York. The company worked with state-level regulators and obtained necessary licenses from the
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS).
Coinbase has managed to cultivate a favorable image by being transparent about hacking
incidents. For example, in 2019, the company reported details on a sophisticated hacker’s attempt
to attack its internal network. Coinbase also expanded on the modus operandi by detailing how the
hacker used social engineering, spear-phishing, and vulnerabilities within a browser.219Such
incidents helped the company gain the trust of users and regulators. Later that year, Coinbase, in
collaboration with seven other firms, also led the creation of an initiative aimed at helping other
cryptocurrencies determine whether they were complying with U.S. federal securities law.220 This
helped the company become a leader within the industry, especially on the topic of compliance.
This initiative called the Crypto Rating Council, issued rating on how similar a cryptocurrency or
crypto asset was to existing definitions of a security. This highlights the importance of compliance
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with existing laws and systems (originally built for traditional currencies) as a key factor in the
regulation of cryptocurrencies. Coinbase later took a leap in its role as a compliance-enable by
becoming a software vendor to government agencies.221 Federal agencies, including the DEA and
IRS showed interest in procuring Coinbase Analytics, a platform built to enhance compliance
efforts through increased access to necessary information. This highlights how cooperative
Coinbase has been with regulators and how important transparency is for cryptocurrencies and
cryptocurrency exchanges.
In October, Coinbase announced that it would launch a debit card in collaboration with
Visa, the popular payment processor used by major banks across the world. This, again, highlights
the importance of compliance with existing systems that were built for fiat currencies. Visa has
extensive experience working with regulators across the world and can signal that Coinbase will
navigate regulators water much more safely. Such collaborations, combined with its cozy
relationship with regulators, helped Coinbase achieve a valuation of around $100 billion in 2021,
just before becoming a publicly traded company. 222 The company’s efforts to convince the
Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC), major financial institutions, and a large number of
individual investors through its S-1 Form (a prerequisite for a company to go public) is a clear sign
that the company successfully managed to survive regulatory hurdles for about a decade. However,
this does not mean the company will be immune to regulatory factors. The company, in the S-1
document, has frankly indicated that U.S. regulators may inhibit the company’s ability to compete
with rivals Yet, Coinbase had a successful opening day on April 13, 2021. On the eve of its
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opening, Bitcoin and Ether, the two most popular cryptocurrencies hit new all-time highs,
highlighting the close connection between the exchange and the currencies.
Coinbase had to send several costly signals to convince regulators along the way. For
example, the company submitted disclosures to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) admitting its exchange services may have been utilized to circumvent U.S.
sanctions.223 The company has also paid millions of dollars in fines. For example, $6.5 million had
to be paid to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to settle claims that the
company reported misleading information related to trading volumes. 224 To enhance its ability to
comply with existing laws and to continue sending strong positive signals, Coinbase hired a key
figure from Morgan Stanley’s global anti-money laundering department.225 This, again, highlights
the importance of AML laws and the need to comply with existing systems built for fiat currencies.
This is something the company has issued an open call against. In October 2021, Coinbase released
a regulatory proposal demanding more certainty for everyone. In an official blogpost, the company
argued that existing laws are not well-suited for cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency exchanges
because they were drafted at a time when no one could have even imagined the ongoing
technological revolution. The blogpost argued that these laws do not have the ability to include the
transformational potential that digital assets and crypto innovation make possible. The company
has offered an alternative ‘four-pillar’ approach: (1) regulating digital assets under a separate
framework, (2) designating a single regulator for digital asset markets, (3) protecting and
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empowering holders of digital assets, and (4) promoting interoperability and fair competition in
the sector. Coinbase was ridiculed by its competitors for demanding a separate regulator for the
cryptocurrency market. But it is exactly such preemptive approaches that made Coinbase operate
successfully while Facebook’s Libra failed.
Necessity is the mother of invention. Centuries ago, the need for more practical methods
of payments that were easier to transport led to innovations that created of paper money. Similarly,
after the financial crisis of 2009, the need for better alternatives to government-owned fiat
currencies led to the creation of Bitcoin. The history and evolution of GPCs, especially the case of
Libra, shows how powerful governments are. Bitcoin was born out of a desire to create private
money as an alternative. However, as explained in the following chapters, it ended up
strengthening fiat currencies by inspiring nation states to create Central Bank Digital Currencies
(CBDCs) that can further strengthen governments and their control over monetary systems. This
chapter highlighted specific concerns raised by regulators in the context of GPCs. These concerns
give us a clear idea of the factors that are likely to condition regulatory responses. Governments
seem to be concerned primarily about loss of tax revenues and threats to stability and sovereignty.
Political and economic competition with other nations is also seen as a priority. by governments.
Cryptocurrencies started as an idea on a whitepaper just about a decade ago. Cryptocurrency
exchanges such as Coinbase have democratized and simplified access to Bitcoin, Ethereum, and
thousands of other decentralized, denationalized currencies that operate freely across borders. This
was possible only because Coinbase played a game of cooperation with regulators. The following
chapter uses game theory to further understand interactions between regulators and GPCs.
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CHAPTER 5
GAME THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Game theory involves analyzing strategies in competitive situations where the outcome of
a participant’s action depends critically on the actions of other participants. Since GPCs threaten
governments’ monopoly over money, there will be competition and therefore interactions between
these two players. This chapter applies game theoretical concepts in the context of GPCs. The
chapter presents three sets of frameworks. The first set of frameworks establishes the basic
structure of the game and demonstrates how strategic interactions between regulatory authorities
and global private currencies can be analyzed with the help of game theoretical concepts. The
second set of frameworks build on the first set and presents a more elaborate approach by
connecting political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental (PESTLE) aspects
to payoffs. The third set of frameworks demonstrate how game-theoretical frameworks can be
useful in analyzing taxation-related issues.
The competition, or ‘game,’ in this context is between global private currencies and fiat
currencies. However, various versions and abstractions of these entities are used throughout the
chapter. For example, in the first framework, GPCs are represented by the ‘industry’ while in the
third framework, GPCs are represented by the users. In the case of the United States, as explained
in the next chapter, global private currencies are represented by interest groups, lobbies, and
companies. Fiat currencies are backed by governments and are managed through traditional fiscal
policy mechanisms and legislative approaches. Therefore, fiat currencies are represented by the
‘government’ in all frameworks.
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Inspired by Decanio and Fremstad’s work226 on game theory and climate diplomacy, all
three sets of frameworks represent interactions between the two sides as 2x2 games. The chapter
presents these frameworks with detailed examples and explanations. However, while the original
work by Decanio and Fremstad uses only ordinal values for payoffs, some of the frameworks and
examples presented in this chapter use cardinal values for payoffs. Representing payoffs using
ordinal numbers is useful in performing parsimonious analyses. Ordinal rankings also allow us to
bypass comparisons of utilities in each game and help us gain perspective on what the priorities
are for each side
For example, consider the classic game of Prisoner’s Dilemma. There are several versions
of this game, but the basic idea involves two criminal associates in solitary confinement who may
or may not betray the other. If they betray each other, both end up in prison for a few years. If one
betrays but the other does not, the one who betrays will be set free while the other one will end up
serving a long prison sentence. If neither of them betrays i.e., remain silent during interrogations,
both get a short prison sentence. The game’s payoffs are usually expressed in cardinal values i.e.,
number of years, as shown in Table 5.1 below. The table also shows the two strategies for both
players.
In some cases, these cardinal numbers can be replaced by ordinal numbers that rank the
outcomes from best to worst. In the example of Prisoner’s Dilemma, for each player, the best
outcome would be no time in prison while the worst outcome would be the long prison sentence.
The former can be represented by 4 and the latter by 1. The second-best outcome can be
represented by 3 and the next-to-worst outcome can be represented by 2. Table 5.2 shows a
prisoner’s dilemma game with ordinal values.
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Table 5.1: A Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Cardinal Values
Prisoner 2

Prisoner 1

Stay Silent

Betray

Stay Silent

-1,-1

-10,0

Betray

0,-10

-5, -5

Table 5.2: A Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Ordinal Values
Prisoner 2

Prisoner 1

Stay Silent

Betray

Stay Silent

3,3

1,4

Betray

4,1

2, 2

Game theory assumes players to be rational actors. Therefore, players are expected to
maximize utility. Game theoretical models can help us forecast which strategy is likely to be
chosen by each player in a game based on the payoffs. For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game presented in Table 5.2, the expected outcome is (Betray, Betray) i.e., both prisoners will
betray and end up with sub-optimal outcomes. This outcome represents both the Nash Equilibrium
and the Maxi-Min Equilibrium for this game. In Game Theory, a Nash Equilibrium is a collection
of strategies (one for each player) where there is no incentive for any player to switch strategies.
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The game remains at an equilibrium because every player in the game is satisfied with their game
choices at the same time. The Nash Equilibrium is a common way to define the solution of a noncooperative game involving two or more players. The strategy that is represented in a Maxi-Min
equilibrium ensures the highest payoff that a player can guarantee themselves.227 When a maximin strategy is used, the worst possible payoff is at least as good as the worst payoff from any
other strategy. The Nash Equilibrium and the Maxi-Min equilibrium are not always the same.
Understanding these equilibria for each game can give valuable insights into not just the likely
outcome, but also help us simulate potential scenarios that can lead to different outcomes. The first
set of frameworks establish a basic game setup and use the examples of Libra and Coinbase to
demonstrate two different types of games.
In the competition between GPCs and fiat currencies, the two sides are competing for
influence over monetary and financial systems. The first set of frameworks captures this
competition in a 2x2 game with ordinal payoffs like the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in Table 5.2. In
the proposed game setup, represented in Table 5.3 below, GPCs are represented by the industry (I)
and fiat currencies are represented by Governments (G). Both sides have two options i.e.,
strategies, which represent the two extremes each side can take during strategic interactions.
Governments have two strategies: Legalize (L) or Ban (B) i.e., they can either allow GPCs to
operate within their jurisdictions or pass laws that outlaw GPCs altogether. The GPC Industry (I)
has two strategies: Adapt (A) or Disrupt (D) i.e., cryptocurrency companies such as Libra can
choose to either adapt to existing financial and legal systems that were set up for fiat currencies by
offering complementary services that are tethered to the value of fiat currencies or choose to
disrupt the entire landscape by offering unique services that threaten the value and standing of fiat
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currencies. Table 5.3 shows this game setup. For each player, the values {p, q, r, s} and {e, f, g,
h} can take the values {4, 3, 2, 1} with 4 corresponding to the best outcome, 3 the second-best
outcome, 2 the next-to-worst outcome, and 1 the worst outcome.

Table 5.3: The Game Setup
GPC Industry (I)

Government (G)

Adapt (A)

Disrupt (D)

Legalize (L)

p,e

q,f

Ban (B)

r,g

s,h

Both players have unique strengths, weaknesses, and preferences, which determine the
ordinal values of p, q, r, s, e, f, g, and h. These values then determine the nature of the game and
the equilibria. In the context of competition between GPCs and fiat currencies, the game can be
classified on a spectrum between conflict and cooperation to characterize the situation. Broadly
speaking, the case of Libra is an example of a game of conflict while the case of Coinbase is an
example of a game of cooperation. Modeling the dynamics between GPCs and fiat currencies as
one-shot games is indeed oversimplified. Yet, the approach can be useful because specific contexts
can be modeled within this framework. For example, the interaction between Libra and the US
Congress can be represented in a 2x2 game as shown in Table 5.4. Similarly, the interaction
between Coinbase and IRS can also be represented in a 2x2 game as shown in Table 5.5 below.
The game between Libra and the US Congress modeled in Table 5.4, is a game of ‘chicken’
i.e., a game where two sides race head-on towards each other. In this case, it is Libra racing towards
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its proposed stablecoin to disrupt the global monetary system assuming there will be a way to
legally operate, and the US Congress threatening to ban Libra hoping the social media giant
powering the initiative (Facebook) will scale down its ambitions and adapt. The winner of a game
of chicken is the player who does not change course. The game represented in table 5.4 has two
Nash Equilibria: (Legalize, Disrupt) and (Ban, Adapt). The Maxi-Min strategy is (Legalize,
Adapt). In a game of chicken, the risk-averse player will choose the Maxi-Min strategy. In this
case, Libra is the more risk-averse player especially since it is vulnerable to market forces that can
drive down its shares. Libra did try to convince lawmakers that it would adapt. However,
lawmakers were not convinced and leaned towards banning it. The game between Libra and the
US Congress was a game of conflict.

Table 5.4: Libra v. US Congress
Libra (L)

US Congress (G)

Adapt (A)

Disrupt (D)

Legalize (L)

3,3

2,4

Ban (B)

4,2

1,1

In contrast, the game between Coinbase and the IRS, represented in Table 5.4 is a game of
‘harmony’ i.e., a game of cooperation. The Nash Equilibrium and the Maxi-Min equilibrium are
the same: (Allow, Adapt) i.e., IRS is better off allowing Coinbase to operate because of additional
tax revenues and information sharing, while Coinbase is better off cooperating with IRS because
it is expected and necessary for survival. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in November 2015,
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the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) demanded Coinbase release internal records involving every
customer who purchased digital currencies through the exchange. Coinbase resisted at first, but
eventually cooperated. Coinbase’s overall approach has been highly cooperative i.e., the company
has chosen to adapt rather than disrupt. Game theoretical frameworks such as these are helpful in
exploring not just the Nash and Maxi-Min strategies but also several other combinations.
Furthermore, these frameworks can help understand how a game can be transformed from one type
to another.

Table 5.5: Coinbase v. IRS
Coinbase (C)

IRS (G)

Adapt (A)

Disrupt (D)

Allow (L)

4,4

3,2

Ban (B)

2,3

1,1

This section builds on the basic game setup in Table 5. 3 to build a framework that can be
used to understand how power-shifts can happen in the context of the ongoing competition
between traditional fiat currencies and new global private currencies. This competition fits the
pattern of the Thucydides trap – a rising power challenging an established power. Such situations,
more often than not, are expected to lead to conflicts.228 While some conflicts are inevitable, most
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conflicts are not. The ‘Game Transformation Framework’ (GTF)229 is a tool that was designed to
analyze such situations. In this section, I present an adapted version of the Game Transformation
Framework that fits the context of GPCs. With this framework, future researchers can analyze not
only the regulatory environment, but also market conditions and other contexts in detail while still
keeping tabs on the big picture. This framework was used as a mental model in the analysis of the
three case studies that follow this chapter.
The game transformation framework is based on a hybrid methodology that combines
qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques discussed in the context of global private
currencies. Beginning with primary inputs from detailed qualitative analyses of political,
economic, social, technological, and legal ground realities, this Game Transformation Framework
uses 2x2 games with ordinal rankings to provide a macro-level perspective of the scenario. When
used in conjunction with the periodic table of 2x2 games,230 this approach shows how payoff
swaps, which represent shifts in ground realities, can change the nature of the game and therefore
the resulting equilibrium. The framework’s exploration of various permutations that hypothetically
changes in input might lead to can be used by analysts and policymakers to reverse-engineer
favorable scenarios. The framework is useful for scenario planning because it allows for both
detailed micro-level analyses and strategic macro-level analyses.
GPCs are becoming ubiquitous and are threatening to affect existing financial and political
structures. Between ransomware involving critical infrastructures like the Colonial Pipeline to
IPOs of major cryptocurrency exchanges like Coinbase, there are clear examples of good and bad.
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This framework aims to establish an approach that can explore various scenarios with the use of
game theory. Such an effort would provide means for assessment and training to arrive at a
parameter combination that achieves a particular objective. Inspired, again, by Decanio and
Fremstad’s paper on ‘game theory and climate diplomacy,231 this framework uses highly simplified
representations of strategic interactions between players to deduce useful insights. This section
describes the framework in the context of global private currencies (GPCs) along with various
types of factors that influence the dynamics of the relationship between the various
cryptocurrencies (represented as an aggregate entity) and the regulatory agencies.
Similar frameworks have been used by International Relations scholars on various topics.
Game-theoretic models have been widely used to provide formalized representations of strategic
interactions that form the basis of political negotiations.232 Scholars such as Barrett233 have also
shown that the essence of many international relations situations can be captured by the simple
2x2 framework. Game theory is well suited because the two main schools of thought in politics
and international relations - realism and liberalism – are already essential components of game
theory’s development.234 The use of ranked order preferences in the game transformation
framework is in line with agent rationality. The rankings are also transitive, allowing users to make
inferences based only on ordinal rankings are more generalizable. The “New Periodic Table”
(NPT) of 2x2 order games introduced by Robinson and Goforth235 has also been used to provide
an exhaustive treatment of the possible game-theoretic characterizations of strategic interactions
between nation states. Therefore, it can be used in the field of international studies. The NPT also
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shows the different types of games and how they are positioned relative to each other. This helps
in understanding what types of swaps are required to change a game from one type to another.
The game transformation framework includes two levels of analysis. Level one implements
four steps and level 2 reverses those steps. Step 1 involves a detailed qualitative analysis of ground
realities in the political, economic, social, technological, and regulatory realms. In Step 2,
information gathered in Step 1 is synthesized and converted into scenarios identified by ordinal
values, which serve as aggregates representing those derived scenarios. Step 3 involves choosing
the best strategy given the ground realities on both sides – since each player evaluates both sides
before making their choice. By Step 4, the macro-level perspective of the overall game once both
players have each made their move becomes evident. A Level 2 process entails a ‘reverse
engineering’ approach wherein we can understand how the outcomes would vary if the players’
choices of strategies were different and under what conditions the aggregate value, i.e., the
estimated payoff, from choosing a particular strategy would change. A change in the payoff is
required to justify a change to the originally chosen strategy. To this end, a more detailed ‘what if’
analysis in Step 1 is necessary. Level 1 and Level 2 analyses help us understand the array of
possible scenarios. Level 2 also involves comprehending how the game’s outcome, i.e., the
equilibrium, shifts accordingly as the payoffs change. The framework is built on the simplified
2x2 game represented in Table 5.3. The game used in this framework models macro-level scenarios
between the two players. The framework’s approach assumes that the players are rational actors.
The following sections explain the various steps and levels of the methodology in the context of
analyzing GPCs. The following paragraphs discuss the four steps involved in level one.
Step 1 entails detailed evaluation. In this framework, the perceived political, social,
technological, legal, and economic conditions within a nation, or whatever the jurisdiction of the
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regulatory agency might be, form the basis of cost-benefit analysis for the other side. Each side’s
decision on their approach towards GPCs - i.e., the choice of strategy - is based on this analysis.
These factors indicate how favorable the situation is for GPCs. The political landscape would be
assessed based on an analysis of the current government’s stance on GPCs. While some
governments have aggressive stances such as banning, some do not take any action. For example,
El Salvador has passed laws that make Bitcoin legal tender.236 Meanwhile, China has flip-flopped
and has recently taken steps to completely stop Bitcoin mining within China. Social factors include
how people feel about these GPCs and how the overall culture either supports or protests the idea
of denationalized currencies that have global operations and can potentially threaten that nation’s
fiat currency. Societies in nations that are highly individualistic have shown more positive interest
in GPCs than societies in highly collectivist cultures. Technological factors include both the ability
to mine GPCs and the ability to use GPCs within the economy using advanced payment methods.
Some nations have the former but not the latter i.e., they may have the power to mine GPCs but
not the ability to spend it within the local economy. Legal aspects include regulatory aspects that
directly affect GPCs and existing laws that can potentially be used to either legalize or ban GPCs.
While political will is necessary to take any strong action against GPCs, legal provisions are
necessary in order to allow such political will to be carried out. Environmental factors include laws
and conditions that are either conducive or counteractive to GPCs. For example, laws that regulate
carbon footprints may work against GPCs given the amount of energy they consume.
Step 2 aggregates inputs collected during the first step. This step involves calculating
payoffs for both sides given the conditions analyzed in Step 1. These payoffs also get represented
in the game quadrant represented in Step 4. The payoffs (see Fig. 3) to each player are measured
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in ordinal terms, so the terms {p, q, r, s} and {e, f, g, h} can take on values {4, 3, 2, 1}, where 4
represents the most favorable outcome and 1 represents the least favorable outcome. Payoffs will
be calculated based on how favorable the political, social, technological, legal, and economic
conditions are.
Step 3 involves choice of strategy. Based on ground realities reflected by the aggregated
payoffs, each player chooses one of two strategies. The choice of strategy will be based on the
players’ calculations of payoffs resulting from choosing each strategy.
Step 4 is focused on outcomes. This step involves assessment of dominant strategies. In
game theory, a dominant strategy is the course of action that results in the highest payoff for a
player regardless of what the other player does. Understanding each player’s dominant strategy is
the first step towards understanding the Nash Equilibrium. As explained earlier, a Nash
Equilibrium is a collection of strategies (one for each player) where there is no incentive for any
player to switch strategies. The game remains at an equilibrium because every player in the game
is satisfied with their game choices at the same time. The Nash Equilibrium is a way to define the
solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players. The Game Transformation
Framework also looks at the Maxi-min strategy, which ensures the highest payoff that a player can
guarantee themselves. When a Maxi-Min strategy is used, the worst possible payoff is at least as
good as the worst payoff from any other strategy.
The GTF approach can also be used for a ‘Level 2’ analysis, which uses the same process
but in reverse. For a Level 2 analysis, the first step involves identifying a desired change or swap
in payoffs in the game structure. The next step is to move back and reevaluate whether there needs
to be a change in strategy choice. Following this, more analyses have to be done at Step 1 and Step
2 to understand what ground realities need to change in order to realize the desired change in the
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game structure. The Game Transformation Framework can be a valuable tool for analysts and
scenario planners working on the topic of global private currencies. The framework was used to
analyze and understand the three case studies presented in chapters 6, 7, and 8. The following
paragraphs present the final set of game theoretical frameworks.
Taxation is a key issue in the context of GPCs. The previous chapter highlighted several
concerns related to tax evasion. The following chapters will highlight more specific concerns
related to this topic. Taxing cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets has been a major problem for
governments. This is partly because cryptocurrencies can be pseudonymous (and sometimes
anonymous). If citizens do not report their GPCs and other cryptoassets such as NFTs, which are
usually secured within a permissioned blockchain that cannot be accessed by the government, there
will be a loss of tax revenue. To further analyze this this problem, this section presents an adapted
version of game theory model used to understand the incentives involved in making citizens file
taxes and close assets. The framework used in this section is an adaptation of the game setup
presented earlier in Table 5.3. In the adapted version, the industry is replaced by the user and the
ordinal values are replaced by cardinal values. Table 5.6 shows. One other key difference between
this section and the previous ones, is that this section looks only at Nash Equilibrium for each
scenario since it is the most relevant, especially the mixed strategy Nash Equilibriums.
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Table 5.6: Scenario 1
GPC User

Government

Disclose (D)

Hide (H)

Audit (A)

1,0

2,-5

Not Audit (N)

2,0

0,2

Given the unique nature of the situation (involving lack of permissions to access blockchain
networks at will), the government needs creative solutions. Scenario 1 (shown in Table 5.6) depicts
this situation game with arbitrary numbers. In this setting, the payoffs given are dimensionless
figures that indicate utility (the higher the number, the higher the utility). In Scenario 1, there is no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This translates well to reality because it is neither feasible nor
justifiable for governments to audit everyone all the time. Similarly, some parts of the population
will always break rules i.e., not disclose GPCs and other cryptoassets. In such cases, the mixed
strategy Nash Equilibrium becomes the key component. The key difference between a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is that the former does not
involve players randomizing their strategy while the latter always involves at least one player
randomizing their strategy. At the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, both players are indifferent
between their two strategies, and no player can increase their expected payoff by playing an
alternate strategy. These characteristics allow us to calculate the expected payoffs for each strategy
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and each player. For Scenario 1, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,237 is such that two out of
three users will be honest, and the government will audit two out of seven times. In an attempt to
increase tax revenues from widespread adoption of GPCs, let us say the government decides to
increase the penalty. The next scenario incorporates this change by doubling the penalty from -5
to -10 to test whether this policy change will be effective.

Table 5.7: Scenario 2
GPC User

Government

Disclose (D)

Hide (H)

Audit (A)

1,0

2,-10

Not Audit (N)

2,0

0,2

In Scenario 2 (depicted in Table 5.7), just as in Scenario 1, there is no pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium238 is such that only two out of three users
disclose their cryptoassets i.e., the same as scenario 1. This is because the incentives for the
auditing agencies within the government have not changed. The next scenario changes this
incentive to check whether there will be any difference. In order to raise the incentives for those
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E(A) = E(N) ⇒ 1q + 2 (1-q) = 2q ⇒ q = 2/3,
E(D) = E(H) ⇒ -5p = 2 × (1 − p) ⇒ p = 2/7.
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who audit, let us double the payoff to 4 and restore the penalty to -5 as shown in Scenario 3 (Table
5.8) below.

Table 5.8: Scenario 3
GPC User

Government

Disclose (D)

Hide (H)

Audit (A)

1,0

4,-5

Not Audit (N)

2,0

0,2

In scenario 3 (Table 5.8), the ratios of users who disclose shoots up to 80% i.e., 4 out of 5
users disclose.239 The government is able to achieve its goal of increasing tax revenues. However,
this comes at a cost for the government because of the high personnel costs involved in auditing
more people. This is an example of the kind of specific insights game theoretical models can offer
in the context of GPCs. However, the government will still have issues related to network access.
Alternative solutions such as additional incentives for users and enhanced cooperation with
exchanges (e.g., Coinbase) will be necessary. The set of frameworks used in this section can be
used for similar analysis on other similar problems related to taxation and regulation.
This chapter laid out three sets of game theoretical frameworks with different applications.
These frameworks can be used for analysis and planning of scenarios involving GPCs. Chapters
6, 7, and 8 present detailed analyses of regulatory responses taken by the United States, the
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European Union, and China against GPCs. These three cases were analyzed to understand which
regulatory factors were at play and what the nature of the overall game is. The frameworks
discussed in this chapter can also be adapted for other contexts. Game theoretical models are highly
versatile. There are also several other game theoretical concepts that can be used for better insights
and understanding of GPCs. For instance, take the ‘investment game’ model that is popular in the
field of Economics. Players choose between investing $0 or $100. Players who do not invest get a
payoff of $0. Players who invest make a net profit of $50 if more than 90% of the population
invest, and otherwise lose $100. The cryptocurrency industry is in a similar situation. Insights from
behavioral dynamics related to the investment game could help forecast the different pathways
cryptocurrencies can take. Similarly, the ‘revolution’ game,’ where a revolution can happen if
enough people protest but there is no change in the status quo if very few people protest. One of
the key insights related to the revolution game has been the central role of communication
mechanisms which remove ‘information sets’ enabling better coordination. This applies in the
investment game as well. Both sides - the governments and the industry - could use these insights
to understand the trajectory of this phenomenon. Other game theoretical concepts like Folk
Theorems can be used to analyze long-term outcomes and repeated games with multiple equilibria.
In conclusion, the key takeaway from the game theoretical models explained this chapter
is that the diplomatic middle ground between the two sides can be achieved only if the government
allows cryptocurrencies to operate. This can be beneficial to governments, because of additional
tax revenues. However, this is likely only if GPCs and exchanges accept conditions such as
compliance with anti-money laundering laws, transparency in operations, and cooperation with
fiat currencies and existing systems by tethering valuations or by integrating with CBDCs.
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CHAPTER 6
THE UNITED STATES

This chapter analyzes regulatory responses within the United States, both at the federal
level and the state level with the goal of identifying key factors. Text from bills and laws and
comments by key figures in government and regulatory agencies were used to deduce the key
factors. The United States Federal Government has not been proactive in regulating
cryptocurrencies. This gave individual states the opportunity to play a larger role than states
usually do in monetary aspects. Almost every state has taken some measures that relate to
cryptocurrencies but most of them were minor fixes aimed primarily at ensuring tax revenues from
transactions involving these currencies. This clearly highlights regulators’ primary interest taxation. In order to ensure tax revenues from cryptocurrency transactions, good AML laws and
high degrees of transparency in operations are necessary.
The political system in the United States is unique in the way it shares powers between the
state and the federal levels. The United States, is, after all, primarily a federation of states.
Federalism, by definition, is a system that involves shared responsibilities between states and the
federal government. While some powers are exclusive, some are concurrent. For example, while
the power to create money is exclusive to the federal government, the power to impose taxation is
concurrent. Given the significance of taxation as a factor that affects monetary policy, it is
important to analyze how each state has responded to the new phenomenon of GPCs. Although
the power to make monetary policy rests mostly at the federal level and the dissertation’s unit of
analysis is the nation state, it is critical to understand the sub-units, which, in the case of the United
States, are its constituent states. National politics in the United States is inextricably linked to state
and local politics. Given the significant autonomy each state has, combined with how states differ
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on political and economic issues, it is important to understand how states have responded to GPCs
over the past years. It is also important to understand how federal-level responses and sentiments
are influenced by state-level responses and sentiments.
While most states have focused on exploiting the new phenomenon for more tax revenue,
some states such as New York, Arizona, Maine, Nevada, and Vermont introduced bills that
explored potential applications of the new technology to enhance operations. These states explored
bills that involved ideas such as the acceptable use of blockchain ledgers and smart contracts for
record keeping. Two states clearly lead the pack as the most active regulators - California and New
York. These states house several cryptocurrency and related companies. However, Massachusetts,
which is also home to several tech companies that operate in this industry, has not been active in
regulating. Some states such as Washington, have been hostile to the crypto industry despite
hosting several crypto and related businesses. Some smaller states, such as Wyoming, on the other
hand have taken a highly supportive stance on cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology. This
chapter first analyzes responses and regulatory activities at the federal level. This includes analyses
of announcements by agencies such as the SEC and the IRS. This is followed by a state-by-state
analysis of regulatory activities. Key factors are identified during these analyses.
At the federal level, Elizabeth Warren, the U. S. Senator from Massachusetts, has been the
loudest voice against cryptocurrencies at the federal level. Sen. Warren has repeatedly warned of
risks from cryptocurrencies and has pushed for agencies such as the SEC to exercise oversight
authority.240 Warren has raised concerns claiming that the "highly opaque and volatile" nature of
the cryptocurrency market poses threats to consumers and financial markets. She has also
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repeatedly criticized the lack of regulation. Compared to the European Union and China, the U.S.
has been slow and very passive in responding to cryptocurrencies and related aspects. There have
been a few other loud voices against GPCs in Congress. However, there have been no concrete
outcomes. For example, in 2013, when Bitcoin was becoming popular after 3 years in circulation,
the U.S. Senate’s Finance Committee requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
study the phenomenon. The GAO issued a report in May 2013 with a focus on the taxability of
virtual currency transactions. This clearly indicates that the government’s concerns are primarily
related to taxation. The GAO also requested the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to issue guidance
on this issue. A few months later, in November 2013, the U.S. Senate’s Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee held a hearing on ‘The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency’
to further examine risks, benefits and possible industry regulation. There were no major outcomes
or concrete decisions from any of these reports or hearings.
The next year, however, was marked by clearer rules and guidelines. On March 25, 2014,
the IRS issued a ruling that virtual currencies would be taxed as property. The ruling also
established that virtual currencies were subject to capital gains tax. Again, it was clear that the
focus was on taxation. Around the same time, another federal agency, the Federal Election
Commission (FEC), issued a guideline that seemed to indicate a positive approach. The FEC
allowed political campaigns to accept Bitcoin donations valued at $100 or less. Bitcoins were
allowed to be bought and sold as an investment within the United States. The GAO issued another
report on cryptocurrencies which led the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to
divert its attention on virtual currencies. This was the beginning of the piecemeal approach to
cryptocurrency regulation at the federal level. It is important to note that these efforts are led by
agencies and not by lawmakers although the Congressional Blockchain Caucus and other proactive
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congresspeople and senators did play key roles in sending letters that prompted the attention of the
administration and these agencies. Such piecemeal approaches, which intensified over the years,
has been the primary regulatory response at the federal level until 2021 although several bills were
drafted, and few laws were made.
In May 2021, U.S. regulators raised more concerns and called for increased tax oversight
on cryptocurrencies.241 Jerome Powell, who led the U.S. Federal Reserve at that time, declared
that cryptocurrencies pose risks to financial stability. This point has been echoed by several
regulators and lawmakers in the U. S., clearly establishing at least the perception that GPCs pose
a threat to the State’s ability to successfully manage monetary policy. Jerome Powell also hinted
that more regulation may be warranted. There were signs that the federal government was getting
more organized in reacting to GPCs. Jerome Powell laid out a clear timeline and discussed the
possibility of adopting a digital currency of its own. Other parts of the federal government had the
same stance. The Treasury Department raised concerns that cryptocurrencies, if left unregulated,
could allow wealthy individuals to avoid taxes. Janet Yellen, who was the Treasury Secretary at
that time, also warned that cryptocurrencies pose risks to financial stability and encouraged more
regulations.
Around the same time, Elizabeth Warren, who then chaired the Senate Banking
Committee's Subcommittee on Economic Policy, raised more concerns in a letter to Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), adding more pressure. In the strongly worded letter, she demanded
answers from Gary Gensler, the SEC Chair, by July 28. Warren’s question was specifically about
whether the SEC had authority to protect consumers investing and trading in cryptocurrencies. The
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objective was to determine what future congressional action was needed. She acknowledged that
the U.S. oversight of the cryptocurrency market was ‘patchy’ while demand for cryptocurrencies
and the use of cryptocurrency exchanges skyrocketed. Warren pointed out that ordinary investors
were left at the mercy of manipulators and fraudsters because of the lack of regulations.
Gary Gensler, before taking over as the SEC Chief, had suggested the integration of
cryptocurrencies into the financial regulatory system but seemed to have mixed opinions on the
topic. Warren’s letter to Gensler demanded an explanation on how cryptocurrency exchanges
could be undermining the SEC's mission. Specifically, Warren was interested in whether markets
are still operating in a fair, orderly, and efficient manner. This highlights the importance of
compliance with the current financial system as a regulatory factor. She also asked whether
international regulatory coordination was required. Officials from G20, the Group of 20 major
economies, were expected to discuss the issue during an upcoming meeting. While the issue was
recognized at the international level, there was little to no coordination or action. The situation
within the United States was not that different. Most of the regulatory responses within the US
were by agencies such as the CFTC, SEC, IRS, the Secret Service, and the FBI.
Among these federal agencies, the most active ones have been the CFTC, IRS, and SEC.
While their actions are usually at the granular level i.e., related to very specific details, they impact
the economy and the markets in significant ways. For example, one important move by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)242 was its announcement that the Commission
voted unanimously to approve a guidance that pertains to retail commodity transactions involving
digital assets. In this guidance, the CFTC established clarity on what gets treated as an exception
to one specific article within the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). This had significance because
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the guidance was in specific reference to digital assets that serve as a medium of exchange, which
includes cryptocurrencies. Measures taken by the IRS 243 include specifics on how transactions
involving virtual currencies are taxable by law just like transactions involving other types of
properties. An IRS Notice issued in 2014 (2014-21 -IRB 2014-16)244 is a good example of a formal
guidance given by the agency to individuals and businesses on the tax treatment of transactions
that involve virtual currencies.
The IRS defines a virtual currency as ‘a digital representation of value that functions as a
medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value’. There are also clear disclaimers
in IRS communications that while cryptocurrencies may operate like legal tender, these virtual
currencies do not have legal tender status within the U.S. Measures taken by the SEC245 including
the framework used to analyze investment contracts involving digital assets, especially if there is
an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), which is similar to an Initial Public Offering (IPO) in some ways.
While most warnings by the SEC are generic, there are also several detailed instructions on how
to determine whether a digital asset is a security. The SEC uses the U.S. Supreme Court's Howey
case and subsequent case law as the primary reference on this matter. The focus of the ‘Howey
analysis’ or 'Howey test’ is not only on the form and terms of the digital asset itself, but also on
the circumstances surrounding the digital asset and the manner in which it is offered, sold, or
resold. This is a clear example of how regulators expect GPCs and other cryptoassets to comply
with laws that apply for traditional money and traditional assets.
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Thus, the only actions impacting the cryptocurrency and blockchain industry are from
agencies or financial regulators themselves, whether it is the recently released ‘Cryptocurrency
Enforcement Framework’ by the Department of Justice, enforcement actions from the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) or Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), or most
notably the recent guidance in the form of interpretive letters released by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Meanwhile, within the United States Congress, the topic of
regulatory response to the cryptocurrency phenomenon has been discussed through several bills.
Within both chambers of Congress, there are both supporters and detractors, ensuring healthy
debate. When the congressional subcommittee on oversight and investigations invited expert
witnesses to testify on the risks and opportunities of blockchain technology, both sides of the
argument were represented. The split was somewhat partisan. While Representative Brad Sherman
(D-MN), a ranking member of the committee, was not a fan of cryptocurrencies and was in favor
of regulations, Representative Tom Emmer (R-MN), another senior member of the committee, was
concerned that regulatory interference was preventing Americans from benefiting through
entrepreneurship in the cryptocurrency market. Sherman pointed out that cryptocurrency prices
are highly volatile and that it creates way more losers than winners, comparing it to the lottery.
Tom Emmer (R-MN), on the other hand, praised cryptocurrency and blockchain innovators while
highlighting their concerns about regulations. Several other Republicans have vocally supported
the cryptocurrency industry. Cynthia Lummis, a Republican who was the U. S. Senator from
Wyoming at that time, expressed a desire to see Bitcoin be accepted as a part of a diversified
retirement portfolio to hedge against inflation. The National Republican Congressional
Committee, around that time, began accepting crypto donations for campaign funds. It was clear
that one party was generally more in favor of the cryptocurrency industry than the other.
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In July 2021, the Infrastructure Bill, which was touted as a major reform, put
cryptocurrencies on the crosshairs of the lawmakers who were on a quest for funds. In order to pay
for the bipartisan infrastructure package, lawmakers started exploring the cryptocurrency industry
as a source of tax revenue. Realizing that cryptocurrencies were not easy to trace, there were
proposals for closer scrutiny of digital transactions. This highlights the importance of transparency
in the way GPCs operate. As a countermeasure, a provision in the Senate legislature was created
to give the IRS more power to investigate transactions involving cryptocurrencies and other
cryptoassets.246 The result was a provision that required cryptocurrency brokers and investors to
disclose transactions to the Internal Revenue Service in order to bring more transparency. This was
justified based on widespread allegations that cryptocurrencies had become a vector for money
laundering and tax evasion. This clearly highlights the importance of compliance with AML laws.
These regulatory moves indicated that federal lawmakers have started seeing the cryptocurrency
industry, which had just crossed the $2 trillion mark, as a long-term phenomenon. More
importantly, it clearly showed that the industry was seen as a new avenue to generate federal tax
revenue. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that, if tax enforcement on digital assets such
as cryptocurrencies were successfully enhanced, the federal government could raise close to $28
billion over a decade. Taxation was clearly the primary issue related to GPCs in the U.S.
Although 2021 brought the highest levels of attention on GPCs, the U S Congress showed
interest on the topic over the previous few years as well. One of the earliest efforts by the United
States Congress related to cryptocurrencies was a session by the committee on agriculture on July
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18, 2018. titled ‘Cryptocurrencies: Oversight of New Assets in The Digital Age,’247 this hearing
‘aimed at providing a strong, clear, legal and regulatory framework for digital assets. In 2019-2020
alone, Congress introduced around 40 bills related to cryptocurrencies and blockchain.248 Eleven
of these bills passed the House of Representatives and two became law. However, the two laws
were part of other larger bills. One of these laws called for a Congressional briefing on how
cryptocurrency affects economic sanctions, which is a critical tool in great power competition
among nations. The other law called for a briefing on how the Department of Defense (DoD) could
potentially use blockchain technology. Therefore, both laws were related to great power
competition and to the preservation of the State’s authority. While these two laws, by virtue of
having passed every legislative hurdle with enough votes, give a clear idea of the factors that
concern lawmakers and regulators the most, a lot of insights can be gained from the other bills as
well. While they did not have enough support to become laws, they clearly had enough substance
to get the sponsor’s attention and media attention. In 2021, around 19 bills were introduced 249 but
no laws were made.
Some of the bills had the same ideas such as ordering the Department of Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to explore blockchain technology for improving data analysis
and distribution of data, especially within the government. The emphasis was on improving law
enforcement. In the United States, there has been a heavy focus on understanding how the
blockchain technology and its application, especially cryptocurrencies, can enable transnational
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crime. A good example is the Fight Illicit Networks and Detect Trafficking Act, more commonly
known as the FIND Trafficking Act, which was introduced in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate. The House version of the bill, H.R. 502, had a provision that required the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) to file a report on the use of virtual currency in sex and
drug trafficking. Regulators in the United States have also been keen on exploring how the same
blockchain technology can be used in countering transnational crime. The FIND bill, for instance,
also included the demand to examine ways in which the disruptive characteristics of the blockchain
technology could be deployed in tracking and prosecuting the illicit usages of cryptocurrency. Law
enforcement agencies have successfully used the pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin transactions to
trace some ransomware attacks and drug deals.
The Blockchain Innovation Act (H.R. 8153), The Advancing Blockchain Act (H.R. 6938),
and part of the Digital Taxonomy Act (H.R. 2154) were some of the notable bills that successfully
gained enough votes in the House of Representatives, highlighting that there was majority support
for legislative action related to the emerging blockchain technology. The American
Competitiveness on More Productive Emerging Tech Economy (COMPETE) Act (H.R. 8132),
which included blockchain technology, also passed the House of Representatives. A quick look at
some simple statistics on the 40 bills that were created between 2019 and 202 clearly reveal the
regulatory factors at play. Almost one-third had mentions of terrorism, money laundering, and sex
trafficking, highlighting regulators’ concerns on potential social and economic impacts of the new
phenomenon. Around 40% of the bills explicitly demanded more regulatory clarity for businesses,
highlighting the power of the lobbying sector which was growing at a fast pace. Nonprofits such
as Coin Center and business associations such as the Blockchain Association were growing in
stature around that time. Close to a quarter of the bills dealt with the use of blockchain technology
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in government and business, highlighting that regulatory focus was not exclusively on
cryptocurrencies. Close to one-tenth of the bills had mentions of the digital dollar i.e., the idea for
a central bank digital currency (CBDC).
Some of the bills had other aspects such as the potential impact of the technology on
economic growth within specific communities, highlighting that there was some support in
Congress for the narrative that GPCs could be used as a tool for economic development. For
example, on January 3, 2019, Congressman Bobby Rush (D-IL), introduced a bill that included a
provision to ask the Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to carry
out a study to determine whether blockchain technology could be used to increase investment by
lower-income individuals in startups and other crowd-funded companies. This was part of the
‘RESCUE Act for Black and Community Banks,’ which was designed to support minority banks,
women’s banks, and low-income credit unions. Similar ideas have been floated by others albeit by
other methods. For example, Congressman Darren Soto (D-FL), in a letter to the National
Economic Council, requested the White House to hold a forum on blockchain technology to
explore how its applications can help society at large. He later sent another request, this time to
the U.S. Treasury Secretary, suggesting that the blockchain should be considered as an option to
expedite the processing of Covid-19 stimulus checks.
One of the concerns raised by Congress was the potential use of cryptocurrencies in
evading sanctions. This was triggered by Venezuela’s attempt to create its own cryptocurrency
designed specifically to circumvent sanctions. This problem is similar to money laundering and
tax evasion in that the cryptocurrency-specific mechanisms used by bad actors are the same, but
the implications are larger because sanctions are a critical foreign policy tool. If Venezuela could
do this, so could other nations such as Russia and North Korea. This, again, highlights the role of
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great power competition as a regulatory factor. Among the congressional efforts that mentioned
blockchain and cryptocurrencies in the geopolitical context is the ‘Defending American Security
from Kremlin Aggression Act,’ a bill that was introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC).
The bill aimed to promote international efforts that protect financial institutions and
cryptocurrency exchanges from cyber theft. This was important because several non-State actors,
and rogue states such as North Korea were amassing large sums of money by hacking
cryptocurrency exchanges. Great power competition was also seen between governments and
major corporations such as Facebook (now called Meta). The ‘Keep Big Tech Out of Finance Act’
bill, for example, aimed at prohibiting large technology companies such as social media platforms
from offering financial services. The bill did not stop at trying to restrain such companies from
becoming financial institutions. It also tried to prohibit any affiliations with financial institutions.
The goal was to prevent such giants from establishing, maintaining, or operating any digital
currency or payment system. Over the years, especially after Libra/Diem was proposed, the
number of members of Congress who have taken up the issue of GPCs has increased.
Representative Kathleen Rice (D-NY) has been one of the most active lawmakers trying to
address concerns related to cryptocurrencies, especially the ones related to terrorism. She
sponsored the Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists' Use of Virtual Currencies Act, which
passed the House of Representatives on January 29, 2019, with strong support from republicans.
The bill was co-sponsored by Congressmen Van Taylor (R-TX) and Peter King (R-NY). Per the
bill, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was required to conduct an assessment of how
terrorists use virtual currencies. Specifically, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (within DHS)
had to develop and submit a threat assessment report on the topic. The bill was proposed because
several terrorist organizations were openly using cryptocurrencies to support and finance their
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operations. The Islamic State (ISIL), for example, openly advertised its Bitcoin wallet information
online with hopes that it could raise funds from sympathizers across the world. This strategy was
successful at times, but law enforcement agencies were often able to trace such supporters. For
example, in December 2017, a woman in New York was arrested for obtaining $62,000 in Bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies to send to ISIL. She managed to send the money using shell entities in
Pakistan, China, and Turkey.
Lawmakers were able to see how cryptocurrencies offered a safer, faster, low-cost
alternative for terrorists to send and receive funds across the world thanks to the anonymous or
pseudonymous nature of the system. While the problem was clear, the solution was not.
Lawmakers still have not found a viable solution. The bill was proposed in hopes that the findings
of the report by intelligence could potentially change federal policies. Lawmakers openly admitted
during media interactions that cryptocurrencies have exposed deep vulnerabilities in
counterterrorism efforts and that the government did not have a comprehensive strategy or
response. All but three libertarian-leaning Republican members of the House voted in favor of the
bill. There were reports that these congresspeople did not support the bill because they saw it as a
first step towards a possible ban on cryptocurrencies, which, in their perspective, amounted to too
much governmental interference in the economy. The confluence of political, economic, social,
technological, and legal aspects makes regulatory response to cryptocurrencies highly difficult.
However, some bills give a glimpse of how regulators believe they can best control the
new phenomenon of cryptocurrencies. The Crypto-Currency Act of 2020,250 for example,
proposed establishing agency oversight of digital assets and identified specific agencies to carry
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out such oversight. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was identified as the
primary regulator of cryptocommodities while the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FINCEN) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) were identified as the primary
regulators of cryptocurrencies. The Securities and Exchange Commission as the primary regulator
of crypto-related securities and stablecoins. The bill was designed to require these agencies to
publish details on exchanges trading these assets. This bill’s approach was similar to the piecemeal
approach that existed at the time, (and continues to exist as of February 2022) but with more
specificity and clarity. There was wide consensus among regulators and lawmakers that no one
agency could solely manage cryptocurrencies and other similar blockchain-based commodities and
securities. In April 2021, the House passed a bill251 to create the first ‘Crypto Task Force on Digital
Assets’252. The bi-partisan bill, called the ‘‘Eliminate Barriers to Innovation Act of 2021’’ (H.R.
1602), proposed the creation of a digital assets working group with members from the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Over the years, there have been several public outcries from popular figures outside the
government demanding quick and efficient actions against cryptocurrencies. These have taken the
form of op-eds,253 tweets, etc. Yet, there has not been enough organized effort at the federal level.
There are a few exceptions. For example, President Trump banned the use of the Venezuelan
virtual currency (Petro) soon after the idea was announced. This helped deter some supporters
(located in the United States) from purchasing Petro. The Treasury Department also issued
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guidance on how to treat Petro and other cryptocurrencies. The Treasury Department also planned
to work on cryptocurrency-related issues through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to
achieve global scale. The FATF, being intergovernmental, has helped set global standards on
countering money laundering and financing of terrorism.
Some bills, such as the Consumer Safety Technology Act (HR 8128),254 have highlighted
how lawmakers are also focused on consumer protection. The Consumer Safety Technology Act
planned to direct the Secretary of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission to study and
report on the use of blockchain technology and digital tokens, respectively. The bill did not get
enough votes, suggesting that potential economic advantages do not galvanize as much legislative
support as threats from terrorists and loss of tax revenue. The bill also aimed to establish a program
to promote leadership in financial innovation and financial intelligence. Other bills such as The
Blockchain Innovation Act (HR 8153) and Digital Taxonomy Act of 2019 (HR 2154) also had
provisions that tried to protect consumers. The Blockchain Innovation Act planned to direct the
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission, to study the state of
blockchain technology and its use in consumer protection, specifically to address fraud and other
unfair or deceptive practices. This bill was introduced on September 1, 2020, but it did not receive
a vote. The Digital Taxonomy Act, which also died in Congress, planned to support the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in preventing unfair and deceptive acts and practices related to digital
tokens and transactions.
On July 27, 2021, The U.S. Congress held three simultaneous hearings related to
cryptocurrencies. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on ransomware, while the Senate
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Banking Committee held a hearing on potential uses of cryptocurrencies. Meanwhile, in the other
chamber, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing on central bank digital currencies
(CBDCs). The Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing was titled “America Under Cyber Siege:
Preventing and Responding to Ransomware Attacks,” while the House Committee on Financial
Services’ hearing was titled “The Promises and Perils of Central Bank Digital Currencies”. The
Senate Banking Committee’s hearing had the most neutral title: “Cryptocurrencies: What are they
good for?”. These titles demonstrate two things: (1) how important and unavoidable the topic had
become, and (2) how Congress approached the topic i.e., countering negative effects such as
ransomware while cautiously exploring and exploiting positive effects such as tax revenue and
improvements to the fiat currency.
The Senate hearing on the ransomwares highlighted concerns from multiple agencies.
Lawmakers, connecting the spike in cryptocurrency usage and the spike in ransomware attacks on
American companies, demanded explanations and solutions. Cryptocurrencies were used in
ransomware attacks because they were difficult to trace. Richard Downing, deputy assistant
Attorney General of Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice, during the hearing,
established that cryptocurrencies were enabling ransomware attacks because of their anonymous
and non-reversible nature. Lawmakers were interested in establishing more transparency, but
Downing admitted that there were no proposals or solutions to enhance the U.S. Department of
Justice's authority to track cryptocurrencies. He added that his department was looking at existing
laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act to handle the situation. This highlights the importance of legal
factors and existing laws. Cryptocurrencies that operated in a manner that was compliant with the
fiat currency’s systems would not concern lawmakers.
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Jeremy Sheridan, then-assistant director of the Office of Investigations at the U.S. Secret
Service, who was also questioned by lawmakers during the hearing, asserted that if
cryptocurrencies did not exist, it would be harder to facilitate ransom payments, but that online
ransomware attacks would still occur through other payment mechanisms. He added that
cryptocurrencies make it easier to follow the digital trail of money after such attacks. This surprised
some lawmakers because cryptocurrencies were believed to be difficult to trace, which is true.
Sheridan further clarified that, while there are cryptocurrencies that offer privacy and anonymity
through techniques such as ‘chain-swapping’ and ‘chain-hopping,’ they only become difficult to
trace i.e., not impossible to trace. He also pointed out that cryptocurrencies can be traced even if
it takes a while but fiat currency in the form of cash cannot be traced as easily. However, the
problem, he admitted, is that there is a demand for the right talent i.e., personnel trained to perform
such highly sophisticated technical activities. Sheridan highlighted the important role of
cryptocurrency exchanges as allies. He pointed out that some cryptocurrency exchanges had been
highly cooperative in tracing cryptocurrencies.
To be useful in the mainstream economy, cryptocurrencies often need to be converted into
more commonly used currencies, which happen to be traditional government-backed fiat
currencies such as the U.S. dollar. This exchange, which is similar to exchanging foreign
currencies at an airport, happens online at these cryptocurrency exchanges. Criminal actors are
using techniques like phishing emails to gain access to the data of a business, a nonprofit, or a
government. Earlier that year, FBI Director Chris Wray had compared the challenges of fighting
ransomware to the challenges faced by the United States after 9/11. He estimated that hundreds of
millions of dollars were paid as ransoms in 2020. Ransomware attacks had targeted schools, local
governments, and even hospitals and healthcare providers. Massive ransomware attacks have been
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carried out on critical utilities as well. The most famous example was the cyberattack on Colonial
Pipeline, which involved ransom payments in Bitcoins. These attacks were highly demoralizing
because they involved basic essential goods. Ransomware affected small businesses as well.
Traceability of cryptocurrencies, i.e., transparency in the way cryptocurrencies operate,
was discussed also during the hearing in the Senate Banking Committee. Since the hearing was
held to understand what cryptocurrencies are good for, proponents of cryptocurrencies such Jerry
Brito, the head of the Coin Center were given a chance to voice their views. Jerry Brito claimed
that cryptocurrencies were transparent in their operations because of the open and decentralized
nature of the ledgers. Lawmakers seemed to be keen on understanding whether cryptocurrencies
were truly decentralized in nature i.e., whether there is a need for institutions like banks. While
Bitcoin and other truly decentralized cryptocurrencies do not rely on centralized authorities like
banks when operated by individuals, all cryptocurrencies become somewhat centralized if they’re
bought through a cryptocurrency exchange. This presented both opportunities and threats.
While governments could easily work with cryptocurrency exchanges, as proven in the
case of Coinbase, there were serious concerns because these exchanges are easy to hack. Mt. Gox
and other exchanges were hacked in the past, leading to huge losses. Most lawmakers were not
convinced that cryptocurrencies would be good for the financial system. 255 There were, however,
a few outliers who expressed optimism and positivity. Senator Cynthia Lummis, the Republican
from Wyoming, commented that the transparency and openness of open-source finance can
promote financial inclusion, a claim that’s often made by the cryptocurrency industry. Senator
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Sherrod Brown, the Democrat from Ohio, took a more cautious approach, highlighting that
blockchain technology could have many useful applications that are not in the finance sector.
These comments suggest that there are mixed opinions within Congress on the topic of
cryptocurrencies. However, the key factors that most lawmakers are concerned about seem to be
the same: transparency in operations, preventing money laundering, ensuring compliance with
existing financial systems, preserving the state’s sovereignty, and protecting the global standing
of the nation as a superpower. The other specific question that interested lawmakers during the
senate hearings was whether system failures in the cryptocurrency markets could ripple over to the
traditional financial system. Experts who testified at the hearing warned against taking
cryptocurrency proponents at their word. It was pointed out that the cryptocurrency world was not
that different from the traditional world of finance in the sense that their power was concentrated
in the hands of a few people and is therefore vulnerable to the same types of threats as the
traditional finance system. The difference was that, in the cryptocurrency world, the powerful
people were the core software developers and miners. However, even some government officials
had declared that cryptocurrencies were not a systemic concern 256 at least at that point in time,
despite being highly volatile.
The House Committee hearing on “The Promises and Perils of Central Bank Digital
Currencies” (CBDC), meanwhile, investigated how a CBDC might address concerns related to
monetary policy, financial stability, national security, cybersecurity, privacy, and financial crimes.
This hearing was held by the Subcommittee on National Security, International Development, and
Monetary Policy, which, earlier that year, had held a hearing on how cryptocurrencies might be
used in terrorist financing. The most important statement from that hearing was from the head of
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the Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell. “You wouldn’t need stablecoins; you wouldn’t need
cryptocurrencies; if you had a digital U.S. currency,” he said, making a strong case for a digital
dollar.
The push for the digitization of the dollar, in response to the rapid rise of global private
digital currencies and the accelerated creation of China's digital Yuan, came from within and
outside the United States government. In late 2019, two Congressmen, French Hill (R-Ark.) and
Bill Foster (D-Ill.), in a letter257 to the Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, urged the central
bank to start working on a ‘national digital currency’ in order to prepare the dollar for the future.
of the various risks that the U.S. dollar faces. In this context, the risk is related to the American
dollar’s hegemonic status as the de facto reserve currency across the world. Other congresspeople
who had similar ideas as a solution also prepared bills that tried to kickstart the digital dollar. The
first bill that referred to the digital dollar was the ‘Banking for All Act’ by Senator Sherrod Brown
(D-OH). This was followed by the ‘Automatic BOOST To Communities Act’ introduced by
Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) and Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA). Both bills
proposed the digital dollar as a tool that would expedite the delivery of economic stimulus benefits
in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2021, Representatives French Hill (R-AR) and
Bill Foster (D-IL), took legislative efforts of their own by introducing the Central Bank Digital
Currency Study Act of 2021 (H.R. 2211), which aimed at sponsoring a comprehensive study on
the impacts a CBDC being introduced in the United States. This study was required to include
aspects such as anti-money laundering (AML), cross-border remittances, financial inclusion
efforts, data privacy, and security issues. These topics show that lawmakers see both sides of the
coin on this issue i.e., they recognize the threats from money laundering and terror financing, but
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they also see the opportunity in building more inclusive fintech tools and more efficient payment
systems. French Hill has been one of the most active members of Congress on cryptocurrencies
and related issues. He also introduced another bipartisan bill called the ‘21st Century Dollar Act’
(H.R. 3506), which aimed at funding efforts towards crafting a ‘Dollar Strategy’ that can help the
U.S. dollar retain its throne as the global reserve currency. However, despite multiple efforts by
lawmakers from both major parties, the idea for a digital dollar has not received widespread
support in the House or the Senate.
Most lawmakers seem to be open to considering the idea, but some of them have expressed
concerns related to privacy. China’s fast-track efforts on the digital Yuan made more lawmakers
pay attention to this idea. In July 2021, the U. S. Senate saw a bill (S. 2543),258 introduced by Bill
Hagerty (R-TN), to study the national security implications of China's efforts to create its own
official digital currency. The bill was designed to understand risks from potential surveillance of
transactions, illicit usage, economic coercion, and social control. In this context, the risk is related
to social aspects such as civil liberties. The idea of a digital dollar is also, understandably, not
supported by the cryptocurrency industry in the United States. The industry’s lobbyists, with help
from think tanks, have been successful in painting the digital dollar as a threat to privacy that is
not worth the cost. Yet, research efforts have been ongoing on multiple fronts. The most notable
ones have been the Digital Dollar Initiative, a private non-profit effort by Christopher Giancarlo,
the former CFTC Chair, and the research partnership between the Federal Reserve’s Boston unit
and MIT’s Digital Currency Initiative to explore a U. S. Central Bank Digital Currency.259
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A quick snapshot of the most common perspective from the US federal level to GPCs can
be obtained by reading the prepared statement that was presented by Senator Elizabeth Warren
before one of the hearings. 260 In this, she highlighted that, on the topic of regulating
cryptocurrencies, there is bipartisan support and genuine interest in evaluating both potential
benefits and costs. She also acknowledges that there are serious problems with existing payment
systems. To make this point, she pointed out that close to 33 million Americans have been locked
out of the traditional banking system, and, as a result, forced to use check-cashers and payday
lenders for simple banking services. However, she rejected the idea that cryptocurrencies are the
solution to this problem. She instead highlighted how cryptocurrencies had become an enabler for
illegal activities such as online theft, drug trafficking, and ransom attacks by offering secrecy. She
also included the high environmental costs of mining cryptocurrencies i.e., how much energy is
needed. In contrast, she praised the idea for a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), referring to
it as ‘legitimate digital public money that could help drive out bogus digital private money’. She
also claimed that, if the CBDC is well-designed and well-implemented, CBDCs can help improve
financial inclusion, efficiency, and safety within the existing financial system. While lawmakers
and regulators at the federal level focused on such big ideas, their counterparts at the state level
focused on the finer details and a handful of specific concerns.
Within the US, most states have tried to take regulatory actions regarding cryptocurrency,
but only a handful of states have been active. The most common regulatory attempt that has been
observed across states is the inclusion of cryptocurrencies into existing laws relating to the
transmission of money by redefining the legal term within the state law. States that have done this
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or attempted to do this include Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, Washington, and Wyoming. This move is primarily aimed at ensuring tax revenue by
ensuring compliance with laws that apply to traditional forms of money, which is usually the legal
tender. Another related action taken by states is the inclusion of cryptocurrencies within the
unclaimed property at each state. This is also aimed at ensuring tax revenues. States that have done
or attempted to do this include Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. One other effort
seen across several states, albeit not too many, is the establishment of a committee or a group to
study blockchain and cryptocurrencies with the goal of understanding other potential benefits from
the technology. States that have done or attempted to do this include Indiana, Maine, Maryland,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Several states have
also tried to include cryptocurrencies as an acceptable method for the payment of taxes. This list
includes Illinois, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oklahoma.
States have also taken some action in a coordinated fashion through mechanisms that do
not fall under the control or influence of the federal government. In February 2014, an Emerging
Payments Task Force (EPTF) was created by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS),
a national organization for state banking regulators, to study innovations such as GPCs. This task
force issued virtual currency guidelines to help state regulatory agencies. Actions at the state level
have sometimes been affected by federal guidelines that supersede them. For example, in April
2014, the Texas Department of Banking issued a supervisory memorandum to clarify the
regulatory treatment of virtual currencies under the Texas Money Services Act, but after IRS
guidance on the same topic, the department determined that cryptocurrencies do not fit statutory
definitions of currency or money. However, it was also ruled that some cryptocurrency transactions
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would qualify as money transmissions and would be subject to the statutory provisions under the
Texas Money Services Act, highlighting how both federal and state level regulators have influence
over GPCs. In this case of Texas, the state’s Department of Banking clarified that if a third-party
exchange i.e., an intermediary like Mt. Gox or Coinbase would meet the definition of money
transmission. The goal in most cases, is to ensure tax revenues from transactions and exchanges
involving digital currencies by making them comply with the same rules that apply to traditional
processes.
The rest of the chapter discusses state-level patterns across the United States based on
legislative actions and attempts between 2014 and 2021. Before 2014, there was very little
regulatory response at the state level. Most of the regulatory activity since 2014 has been related
to taxation and crime. This is expected, given the role of States within the U.S., whereas their
powers are related to economic activity. For example, the state of Arkansas ensured its control of
GPCs under the Uniform Commercial Code by amending the Uniform Money Services Act to
include virtual currencies. Similarly, the state of Hawaii adopted a resolution requesting the state’s
department of commerce and consumer affairs to reconsider its 2016 ruling related to asset reserve
requirements for virtual currency companies and cryptocurrency companies to conduct business
in Hawaii, and to align the state’s asset reserve requirements for these companies with the asset
reserve requirements in other states. Indiana repealed and replaced its unclaimed property act to
include virtual currencies.
Some states have gone beyond just ensuring direct revenues and have attempted to
influence the entire cryptocurrency ecosystem. For example, Kentucky created a new section
within an existing law to define terms relating to commercial mining of cryptocurrency using
blockchain technology. Some states have tried to befriend GPCs and their promoters. For example,

134
Louisiana adopted an official resolution commending Bitcoin for its success in becoming the first
decentralized asset to be worth over a trillion dollars. Some states such as Arizona, Louisiana, and
North Dakota, over the years, have indicated their openness towards adopting the new technology
by actions such as the creation of blockchain and cryptocurrency study committees to explore how
the innovative technology can be exploited. Wyoming even created a cryptocurrency advisory
council along with a pool of money to match investment funds in this sector. The following
paragraphs describe how each state tried to regulate cryptocurrencies and synthesize the key
factors.
In the state of Alabama, bills such as HB 318,261 HB 372,262 HB 177,263 H.B. 215264 aimed
at exempting virtual currencies from ad valorem taxation, and at ensuring proper registration of
entities involved in businesses that transact using cryptocurrencies, highlighting how ensuring tax
revenue and compliance with the existing system are key priorities for lawmakers. In the case of
Alaska, similar factors were at play. Bills such as H.B. 271 265 and S.B. 152,266 for example, were
related to surety bond requirements, record retention, reporting requirements, and enforcement
provisions, highlighting the importance of transparency in operations as a regulatory factor. In the
case of Arizona, a blockchain and cryptocurrency study committee was established, highlighting
an open-minded approach. Some bills even tried to strike archaic language in attempts to support
the cryptocurrency sector. Some bills such as SB 1145267 were aimed at income taxes from virtual
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currencies. Many other states have taken such balanced approaches that try to promote the growth
of cryptocurrency-related businesses while also protecting tax revenues. In the case of Arkansas,
bills like HB 1888268 aimed at protecting the rights of purchasers who gain custody of virtual
currencies. Other bills such as SB 150 269 were aimed at updating existing laws such as the Uniform
Money Services Act with the new phenomenon to ensure tax revenues and compliance with
existing systems.
California, the home of Silicon Valley, where most cryptocurrency startups are located,
has seen a lot of regulatory activity. The state’s economy, by size, is the fifth largest in the world.
Therefore, to no one's surprise, legislative activities and other regulatory responses were related to
ensuring tax revenues from all cryptocurrency-related transactions. Bills such as AB 1489,270
which tried to enact the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, aimed at
prohibiting people from engaging in virtual currency business activity unless they were licensed
or registered with the Department of Business Oversight. Other bills such as SB 88,271 which
became law, revised the uniform unclaimed property act to include virtual currencies, just as most
other states have done. In the case of Connecticut, legislative activities and regulatory responses
related to cryptocurrencies involved transactions fees272 and other restrictions on businesses.
Connecticut tried to go beyond cryptocurrencies by studying impacts of the blockchain technology
and its wider applications such as smart contracts 273 on the state’s laws and businesses. The state
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also took actions to ensure that cryptocurrencies comply with existing systems through bills such
as H.B. 6802,274 which expanded the Money Transmission Act to include virtual currencies.
Delaware, where a large number of corporations are domiciled, through bills such as SB
103,275 tried to adopt an express reporting requirement for virtual currencies, highlighting the
business-friendly nature of the state’s approach. Washington D. C., albeit not a state, attempted to
ensure the district’s powers related to unclaimed property in the form of cryptocurrencies through
the inclusion of virtual currencies into relevant laws such as the Unclaimed Property Act.

276 277

Florida has been seen as one of the friendliest states for cryptocurrencies and related businesses
mainly because of cities such as Miami, whose mayor famously took his salary in the form of
Bitcoins.278 However, regulatory attempts at the state level have been mostly neutral. Attempts
have been related to amending the term “monetary instruments” (per the state’s Department of
Legal Affairs) to include cryptocurrencies, 279 and expanding the Florida Money Laundering Act
to prohibit the laundering of virtual currency. 280
In the state of Georgia, there were bold attempts to make the state revenue commissioner
accept tax payments and license fees in the form of cryptocurrencies. 281 This attempt also required
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the conversion of cryptocurrency payments into U.S. dollars, highlighting the need seen by
regulators for compliance with the fiat currency. In Hawaii, legislative activities 282 have tried to
authorize banks to hold digital assets in their custody, and courts to hear claims related to digital
assets. One bill283 tried to establish the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currencies Businesses Act,
while another bill284 tried to extend the Money Transmitters Act to expressly apply to individuals
who engage in the transmission of virtual currency. The latter required licensees dealing with
virtual currency to provide a warning to customers prior to entering into an agreement with the
customers, highlighting a cautious approach. A modified form of the Uniform Regulation of
Virtual Currency Businesses Act was codified into law.285 Idaho, like most other states, has
included digital currencies into the unclaimed property act. 286 Idaho has also changed its laws to
classify digital assets as property, similar to the federal approach.
The state of Illinois amended its unclaimed property act 287 to include cryptocurrencies.
Illinois also saw a bill that aimed at creating a Blockchain Business Development Act to provide
the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation the authority to adopt rules, opinions, or
interpretive letters regarding the custody of digital assets, including digital consumer assets, digital
securities, and virtual currency. The state also saw a bill 288 that tried to amend the Department of
Revenue’s Civil Administrative Code to allow the option of paying taxes in the form of
cryptocurrencies, provided that such payments are converted to U.S. dollars within 24 hours of
receipt of the payment. Illinois also saw attempts aimed at amending the Transmitters of Money
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Act to include digital currencies in the statutory provisions, and to amend the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963. Interestingly, the definition of a was “a medium of exchange that operates like
currency in some environments but does not have all the attributes of real currency”. 289 The state
of Indiana saw attempts towards the creation of a study committee to consider the enactment of
the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act or other virtual currency regulation 290
within the state. Other bills tried to allow the payment of taxes using an ‘approved’ digital
currency.291
In the case of Iowa, in contrast, there were attempts 292 to prohibit the state and its political
subdivisions from accepting payments in the form of virtual currency by defining “cash” as U.S.
currency, and by excluding cryptocurrencies. This bill defined a “virtual currency” as a digital
representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of
value, but is not legal tender in the United States. HF 240 293 provides for exemptions for virtual
currency from certain security and money transmission regulations. Iowa state legislature also saw
a bill that was specifically aimed at people who use lodging facilities.294 This bill, which defined
a lodging facilitator as a person who directly or indirectly provides a virtual currency that users
are allowed or required to use to rent lodging passed in the Senate.295 This highlights how the new
phenomenon is working through specific industries and sectors to influence governments on
legalizing new methods of payments.
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Kentucky’s state senate passed a bill296 that defined "medium of exchange" and "virtual
currency” and amended the definition of "money transmission" to include cryptocurrencies.
Kentucky also included cryptocurrencies in the Unclaimed Property Act.297 Other legislative
efforts taken within the state of Kentucky include the "Kentucky Utility Token Act” 298 that tried
to require developers and sellers of certain open blockchain tokens to file a notice of intent with
the secretary of state, and pay a filing fee, prior to sale in this state, highlighting those revenues
are the top priority. In contrast, in the state of Louisiana, there were efforts to commend Bitcoin
when it reached the trillion-dollar mark.299 This bill also tried to encourage state and local
governments to consider ways that could help them benefit from the increased use of this new
technology. However, the State’s overall approach has been neutral and cautious. For example, in
2020, the governor signed a bill into law300 requiring licensure of virtual currency businesses. This
law also established requirements to apply for licensure and to pay security deposits, among other
requirements. Similarly, in Maine, some of the legislative activities and regulatory responses were
aimed at improving the efficiency of certain consumer credit protection laws to regulate
transmission of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.301 Other attempts aimed at implementing
strategies relating to blockchain, cryptocurrency and other financial technology to promote
regulatory efficiency, enable businesses and governments. 302 There was also an attempt to create
a study for the potential use of blockchain technology in government record keeping. The state of
Maryland also tried to strengthen consumer protections through a bill that passed the State
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Senate.303 The governor of Maryland, in 2018, signed a bill 304 that ordered a study on
cryptocurrencies, initial coin offerings, cryptocurrency exchanges, and other blockchain
technologies.
Michigan’s governor, in 2019, signed acts that amended the penal code 305 to include
cryptocurrencies and distributed ledger technology within the definition of a "financial transaction
device" and “monetary instrument,” 306 highlighting the focus on preventing crime. This was
followed by a similar move to include cryptocurrencies in the definition of money and personal
property,307 highlighting the focus on ensuring tax revenues. Other bills that passed the lower level
of the state legislature include attempts to add cryptocurrencies to the sections related to
embezzlement and money laundering. In the case of Minnesota, legislative activities included
attempts to add cryptocurrencies to unclaimed property308 and the state’s legal definition of money.
There were also attempts to prohibit the solicitation or acceptance of digital units of exchange for
political campaign purposes. The state of Missouri saw attempts 309 at modifying the legal
definition of money laundering to include cryptocurrencies, and at classifying digital assets 310 into
various types in order to provide clarity. One bill 311 tried at requiring the state and every political
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subdivision to accept virtual currency as legal tender and required the state or the political
subdivision that is unable to take virtual currency to upgrade or improve its equipment so that it
can accept virtual currency, highlighting the level of support for the new technology from some
lawmakers.
In Montana, the governor, signed laws that allowed exemptions 312 for cryptocurrencies
from certain securities law, highlighting a cooperative stance. However, other attempts 313 that
passed the State House included laws related to cryptocurrencies and financial institutions, local
revenue, and state revenue, highlighting, again, the importance of tax revenue as a factor. In
Nebraska, similar balanced efforts were seen in the form of bills of that tried to adopt the
Transactions in Digital Assets Act,314 the Nebraska Virtual Currency Money Laundering Act,315
and the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act.316 In the case of Nevada,
legislative attempts include a bill317 that tried to authorize the state treasurer to enter into a contract
to provide for the acceptance of transfers of digital tokens by certain governmental entities.
However, the bill defined the term “digital token” as a digital representation of U.S. dollars that
are converted to and from U.S. dollars by a digital token payment system, highlighting the
importance of compliance with the national fiat currency and the preference for stablecoins.
Nevada also included cryptocurrencies in its Unclaimed Property Act. 318 In 2019, Nevada’s
governor signed an act that recognizes certain virtual currencies as a form of intangible personal
property for purposes of taxation. In New Hampshire, the governor signed a similar bill into law,
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requiring the state treasurer, in coordination with the commissioner of the Department of Revenue
Administration and the Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services, to craft an
implementation plan to accept Bitcoin as payment for taxes and fees, 319 a move that failed to pass
the House before320 New Hampshire’s governor signed two cryptocurrency-related bills into law.
One of these bills exempted people using virtual currency from being licensed as money
transmitters 321 and the other establishes a commission to study the regulation of the cryptocurrency
industry.322
In the case of New Jersey, there has been more focus on efforts related to consumer
protection323 and new job creation324 connected to the cryptocurrency industry. Bills have tried to
propose acts such as the “Digital Currency Jobs Creation Act,” and the Digital Asset and
Blockchain Technology Act. 325 New Jersey also saw efforts to create a viable blockchain based,
digital payment platform to provide payment services to legal and licensed businesses in this state
that do not have access to traditional financial services,326 suggesting that some lawmakers saw
potential in the technology. The same bill also required digital currency businesses operating in
New Jersey to register with the Department of Banking and Insurance and establish certain
consumer protections. The definition of a ‘digital currency,’ per this bill, included “any type of
digital unit that, regardless of legal tender status, has no administrator and is: (1) used as a currency,
medium of exchange or stored value; or (2) used as a substitute for government currency.” 327 The
definition, interestingly, specifically mentioned exclusions such as “(1) digital units that have
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nominal or no value as a currency or medium of exchange and are not used as a substitute for
government currency; (2) digital units that can be used solely with a gift card program; (3) digital
units that are used solely within online gaming platforms and have no market or application outside
of those gaming platforms, or can be redeemed for real-world goods, services, discounts, or
purchases, but cannot be converted into, or redeemed for government currency or digital currency;
or (4) digital units that are used solely within an affinity program but do not otherwise meet the
definition of digital currency as defined in the bill.” 328 These exceptions highlight how lawmakers
are trying to carve out enough room for store value cards, loyalty cards, and other existing
substitutes to currency that would otherwise get regulated along with cryptocurrencies.
The state of New York stands out in the way it highlights the environmental factor, i.e., the
effect of cryptocurrency mining on the environment, as a regulatory factor within the United
States. New York state saw bills that tried to establish a regulatory sandbox program, 329 a task
force to study the potential designation of economic empowerment zones for the mining of
cryptocurrencies within the state, 330 and a digital currency task force to provide the governor and
the legislature with information on ‘the potential effects of the widespread implementation of
digital currencies on financial markets in the state’ 331. There were also attempts to create a task
force to study the impact of a state-issued cryptocurrency. 332 The state also saw an attempt to
require state agencies to accept cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin, as cash
as payment.333 To protect the environment from the harmful effects of cryptocurrency mining
activities that use a lot of electricity,, one bill aimed at directing the New York State Energy
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Research and Development Authority to conduct a study on powering cryptocurrency mining
facilities with renewable energy. 334 Another bill tried to address this issue by proposing the
establishment of a moratorium on the operation of cryptocurrency mining centers until they
undergo a full generic environmental impact statement review to ensure that the center’s operations
will not adversely affect the state’s greenhouse gas emission targets as set in the state’s Climate
Leadership and Community Protection Act of 2019.335
In North Carolina, a bill tried to include cryptocurrencies in sports wagering, 336
highlighting how keen governments are in leveraging the new phenomenon to increase tax
revenues. North Carolina’s governor has signed at least two cryptocurrency-related laws. One
clarified that is a licensed trader holds virtual currency as permissible investments, the state may
at any time request that the license holder verify the aggregate virtual currency transmission
obligations outstanding and virtual currency held as permissible investments, including virtual
currency stored offline,337 highlighting the importance of transparency in operations and
compliance with fiat currency laws as regulatory factors. The other enacted the North Carolina
Money Transmitters Act to include cryptocurrencies. 338 In the case of Oklahoma, legislative efforts
relating to cryptocurrencies include bills that tried to exempt such currencies from state security
laws under certain conditions,339 highlighting support from some lawmakers. The bill also tried to
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authorize virtual currency as payment to any state agency and its political subdivisions under
specific conditions.340
In Pennsylvania, there were legislative efforts to ensure that cryptocurrencies are not used
to bribe public servants. This included efforts to tighten financial disclosures by including
cryptocurrencies.341 Pennsylvania’s governor, in 2016, signed an amendment to the Money
Transmission Business Licensing Law 342 to include cryptocurrencies. In South Carolina, there has
been a lot of effort aimed at capitalizing on cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology. The
"South Carolina Blockchain Industry Empowerment Act of 2021” 343 was proposed by a bill with
the goal of making the state an incubator for tech industries working on applications involving
blockchain technology. The state also saw a bill that redefined terms and included a definition of
cryptocurrency to the South Carolina Anti-Money Laundering Act. 344 The State House saw a bill
that redefined political campaign contributions to include cryptocurrencies.345
In Texas, legislative efforts included bills aimed at including cryptocurrencies in sports
wagering,346 highlighting how lawmakers want to maximize tax revenues. Another bill, in a sign
of some lawmakers’ ideological support to cryptocurrencies, proposed a constitutional amendment
that would have created the right to own, hold, and use any mutually agreed upon medium of
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exchange.347 The state also saw efforts to include digital currency in money laundering laws. 348 In
an attempt to encourage local governments to innovate, one bill aimed to require each state agency
and local government to consider blockchain and other next-generation technologies to improve
efficiency and effectiveness. In Vermont, the governor signed an act that enabled the use and
promotion of blockchain technology and created a study for the potential use of blockchain
technology in government records. 349 In the state of Washington, legislative efforts included bills
that tried to establish a 1% wealth tax on cryptocurrencies and other intangible financial assets. 350
Washington’s governor signed into law a bill that included cryptocurrencies in licensing and
enforcement provisions that apply in the transmission of money. One bill aimed at prohibiting
marijuana producers, processors, and retail outlets from using cryptocurrencies for the purchase or
sale of marijuana or marijuana products, 351 highlighting how the new technology intersects with
other new developments in the legal sector, especially ones such as a federally restricted substance
that require high levels of financial transparency.
These state-level efforts highlight the roles of three major regulatory factors: ensuring tax
revenues from GPCs, ensuring transparency in the way GPCs operate, and ensuring that GPCs
play by the same rules that apply to traditional fiat money. It is also clear that GPCs and its
regulation needs to be studied from each PESTLE dimension. The interplay between the PESTLE
factors is also evident, as seen in cases such as New York’s attempt to use legal measures to ensure
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environmental standards, and in South Carolina’s efforts to use legal measures to ensure economic
growth through the new phenomenon.
In conclusion, it’s clear that regulatory responses to GPCs in the United States is neither in
favor of nor against GPCs. The dynamics between regulators and users, especially organized
market forces such as companies and lobbies, has been mostly cooperative. This is partly because
libertarian principles have deep roots across America. Several politicians, at both the federal and
state levels, seem to believe that the new phenomenon has more benefits than threats. Even the
recent executive order by President Joseph Biden on regulating cryptocurrencies was officially
labeled as being focused on ‘ensuring responsible development of digital assets.352 This executive
order is the first of its sort and is also the first to take a whole-of-government approach. Its stated
goals are to protect consumers, financial stability, national security, and to address climate risks.
These goals further highlight the importance of political, social, economic, and environmental
impacts of GPCs. The order also mentions the need to promote American leadership in
technological and economic competitiveness and to promote American leadership in the global
financial system, establishing the importance of technological impacts and great power
competition. The need to explore a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) that is consistent with
America’s priorities and democratic values are also mentioned. These points also establish that, in
the United States, regulators are open to cooperate with the GPC ecosystem.
However, a CBDC is not likely to wipe out GPCs within America because there seems to
be strong grassroot-level support for the new phenomenon, which is likely to lead to political
support at the state and federal level. Several local governments at the city-level have also been
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embracing the cryptocurrency phenomenon by trying to become a hotspot. Miami, which holds
the Annual Bitcoin Conference is a good example. Francis Suarez, the mayor of Miami, has
proposed to build a "crypto coast" to attract businesses and people from across the world. 353 The
obvious motive seems to be to benefit from the second- and third-order effects of the economic
impacts of having a major global hub.
At the grassroot levels, most of the support for and interest in the new phenomenon seems
to be because of philosophical alignment with libertarian views i.e., the ability to counter the power
of centralized entities such as banks and governments while basic functions of money, such as the
ability to pay for everyday transactions, are also met. Benjamin Franklin once said, “The purpose
of money is to purchase one's freedom to pursue that which is useful and interesting”. A small but
vocal part of the country seems to agree with this founding father’s view on money. This chapter
highlights five factors that are relevant in the context of regulatory responses to GPCS: compliance
with AML laws, compliance with systems built for fiat currency, transparency in operations,
culture of sovereignty, and great power competition. However, the most prominent factors in the
case of the United States are compliance with AML laws, and compliance with systems built for
fiat currencies. The regulatory game between the government and industry is a game of
cooperation.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Euro, the supranational currency created by the European Union, was officially launched
on the first day of January 1999. It became the legally approved currency for more than 300 million
people across Europe. However, this was not achieved easily. The euro was under the radar for the
first three years i.e., it was used only for accounting purposes in electronic payments and other
behind-the-scenes processes. The Euro was not introduced as a retail currency i.e., in ‘cash’ form
until the first day of January 2002. It was at this point in time that the Euro actually replaced the
banknotes and coins of several national currencies such as Germany’s Deutsche Mark. This
conversion was done at fixed rates. This highlights how long and complicated the process of
introducing an official currency is in the case of fiat money. In contrast, GPCs are able to launch
and become operational overnight and be immediately available across the world. It is also
important to note that not all European Union member states use the euro as their currency,
highlighting a notable feature in the way the supranational entity approaches currencies. These
details matter given the scope of this dissertation.
EU member states work together through common institutions that perform four different
functions: executive, legislative, judicial, and financial. The European Commission and the
European council perform executive functions. The European council sets the policy agenda for
the EU while the European Commission proposes and implements legislation. The European
parliament and the Council of European Union (Council of Ministers) perform legislative
functions i.e., they approve or reject legislation. Members of the European Parliament are elected
directly by EU citizens, highlighting the role of national and local politics within each member
state. The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Auditors perform
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judicial functions while the European Central Bank performs financial functions. Judges at The
Court of Justice are appointed jointly by national governments. The European Central Bank’s
President and executive board are appointed by the European Council. However, the European
Council is composed of national leaders from each member state. Although member states work
together through pooled sovereignty, some areas such as foreign policy and security policy are at
the sole discretion of each member state. Furthermore, since EU-level decision making requires
unanimous consent of all EU nations. A single nation’s veto can derail an EU decision.
The European Union has several major differences when compared to the United States. In
the United States, the member states have no choice but to use the US Dollar as the legal tender.
However, in the European Union, as of early 2022, 8 of the 27 countries in the European Union
were not in the ‘eurozone’ i.e., they do not use the euro as the official currency. The other 19
member states use euros, in the form of banknotes and coins, as the legal tender. The eurozone is
not confined to continental Europe. It also includes a few overseas territories and islands such as
the microstates of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City. These entities use the euro
through a formal arrangement with the European Union. There are also a few other nations that
are not members of the European Union yet use the Euro without any such formal arrangements.
This list includes Montenegro and Kosovo. The euro has become the single currency that unites
over 300 million people across Europe and beyond, promoting economic interdependence. The
euro has become a tangible symbol of European integration. The euro is a tool designed to
intertwine European states economically and socially in order to fulfill the ultimate political goal
of preventing major armed conflicts. Euro clearly demonstrates how money is a political,
economic, and social tool.
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The EU member states that chose to use their own currency instead of the euro did so
because they wanted to retain independence in specific aspects such as the ability to set monetary
policy, manage national debt, tackle inflation, and devalue the currency when necessary. These are
not possible to implement when a common currency such as the euro, which is managed by a
supranational entity placed above the national level through pooled sovereignty. A common
currency can be highly beneficial in many ways, especially for nations that are not advanced or
well-developed. But it’s often seen as a disadvantage by nations that are highly developed because
it comes at the cost of economic and monetary control. Global Private Currencies are similar to
supranational currencies in these aspects. GPCs take away some powers related to monetary policy
but can offer a global scale of operations for small nations. However, GPCs are not controlled by
one central entity unlike supranational currencies. In the case of the euro, the European Union
controls the currency through the European Central Bank (ECB) and applies its monetary policies
across the board to all nations that use the euro as legal tender.
There are several specific prerequisites that need to be met before the EU allows a nation
to adopt the euro as legal tender. However, nations that become EU members are given the right
to postpone efforts meant to meet these prerequisites. This allows nations to buy time to consider
several key factors related to the adoption of the euro as the legal tender. The primary factor that
concerns policy makers in nations is inflation. The most effective countermeasure to control rising
inflation is an increase in interest rates. Countries that have not adopted the euro are able to change
interest rates, if needed, through their central banks to manage inflation. Countries in the eurozone
do not always have this option because they had to cede this power to the European Central Bank.
After the economic crisis in 2008, the European Central Bank raised interest rates in anticipation
of high inflation in Germany. This mitigated the economic crisis in Germany but other nations in
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the eurozone that had weaker economies bore the brunt and suffered a lot more. GPCs do not allow
for such adjustments at all. However, the value of GPCs i.e., their exchange rate will be affected
by changes in interest rates and inflation rates that affect other currencies. The other key factor
that policy makers are concerned about is currency devaluation. Economic issues that arise from
periodic cycles of high inflation, high wages, reduced exports, or reduced industrial production are
usually managed at the national level by devaluing the fiat currency to make exports cheaper.
Currency devaluation also attracts more foreign investments. Currency devaluation is not an option
for nations in the eurozone because it’s controlled also by the ECB.
EU nations differ from each other in several ways - land area, climate, economy, population
size, languages, religion, etc. Yet, several of them agreed to be a part of the common currency
area. A notable exception is Denmark, which opted out. Denmark is legally exempt from adopting
the euro. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden
do not use the euro. Another good reason to retain control at the national level is the ability to be
the lender of last resort. Nations that do not use the euro as legal tender rely on their own
independent central banks and not the European Central Bank to act as the lender of last resort for
the national debt. This is highly beneficial in situations that lead to spikes in treasury bond yields.
To manage drastic increases in bond yields, central banks buy back the bonds in order to increase
liquidity within their markets. Being in the eurozone is economically riskier because the European
Central Bank does not buy bonds that are specific to a member nation, thereby leaving each
eurozone nation to face different levels of crises. Such adverse situations do not affect nations with
strong economies as much as they affect those with weak economies. The United Kingdom, which
used to be a member of the European Union but not the eurozone, had a faster recovery from the
2008 financial crisis because it was able to independently slash domestic interest rates and perform
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quantitative easing much earlier than the European Central bank did. The Bank of England initiated
its quantitative easing program in March of 2009 while the European Central Bank waited till 2015
to start its quantitative easing program. Response to cryptocurrencies has seen a similar pattern
i.e., EU nations that are not in the eurozone have more options and can respond faster. Within the
eurozone, the euro is the only legal tender i.e., creditors are obliged to accept payment in euros.
However, the European Union has also made it clear that parties may also mutually agree to
perform transactions with other official foreign currencies such as the US dollar or use privately
issued alternatives such as local exchange trading systems, voucher-based payment systems, or
virtual currencies such as Bitcoin.354 The EU has also clarified that all transactions are subject to
taxation laws and anti-money laundering laws, highlighting the importance of taxation and money
laundering as universally important criteria.
One of the earliest responses to GPCs by the European Union was in December 2013 when
the European Banking Authority (EBA) issued an official warning 355 about virtual currencies
including Bitcoin. This communique warned users of possible risks while buying, holding or
trading virtual currencies. It declared that there was no specific regulatory protection to cover
losses in the event that a platform that exchanges or holds virtual currencies fails or goes out of
business. The EBA claimed to be assessing all relevant issues linked to virtual currencies but put
the onus on the user to scrutinize financial risks. This early warning defined virtual currencies as
“a form of unregulated digital money that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank and that
can act as means of payment.”356 The EBA also acknowledged that, in its view, virtual currencies
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may exist in many forms such as currencies that are used within online gaming environments and
social networks. The document also clarified that, while transactions made through such virtual
currencies may not include any fee or not involve a bank, they might still be taxable. Furthermore,
it clarified that holding virtual currencies may qualify for capital gains tax and advised users to
consider whether such tax liabilities apply in their country of residence, highlighting the role of
nations even within the European Union.
A few years later, in 2014, the EBA issued a detailed document explaining its opinions on
virtual currencies. 357 This document acknowledged that cryptocurrencies, which it refers to as
virtual currencies, appeared on the institution’s radars only in September 2013. The EBA, based
on its analyses of cryptocurrencies, identified several potential benefits such as reduced transaction
costs, faster transaction speed and financial inclusion. However, it also opined that these benefits
are not highly relevant in the European Union and that the risks associated with the new
phenomenon outweigh these benefits. The EBA identified more than 70 specific risks across
several categories such as risks to users, risks to non-user market participants, risks to financial
integrity, money laundering and other financial crime, risks to existing payment systems, and risks
to regulatory authorities. The EBA report recommended national supervisory authorities to
discourage credit institutions and payment institutions from buying, holding or selling
cryptocurrencies, suggesting that a game of conflict was in the making. Furthermore, the document
suggested that EU legislators declare virtual currency exchanges as ‘obliged entities’ under the EU
Anti Money Laundering Directive. This was aimed at making cryptocurrency exchanges subject
to strict anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing requirements. Taxation was a major
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factor in the EU as well. On October 22, 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared in
one of its decisions that transactions involving an exchange of currencies for Bitcoin or other
virtual currencies (and vice versa) will be exempt from value-added tax (VAT). This meant that
buying or selling Bitcoin would be exempt from VAT in all EU Member States.
On July 5, 2016, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal to amend the
Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD). This proposal defined virtual currencies as “a
digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a public authority, nor
necessarily attached to a fiat currency, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of
payment and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.”358 The document acknowledged
that gaps existed in the oversight of several financial means used by terrorists. Virtual currencies
were listed in this document alongside prepaid cards and cultural artifacts as being a risky financial
instrument. The proposal aimed at addressing those gaps but explicitly stated that it did not want
to create unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary,
law-abiding citizens and businesses, highlighting that the EU's approach is balanced. The
document acknowledged the need to increase security but also the need to protect fundamental
rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. The proposal acknowledged that
suspicious transactions made through virtual currencies were not sufficiently monitored by the
authorities at that time, highlighting security risks associated with the new peer-to-peer system.
In order to improve the ability to detect suspicious cryptocurrency transactions, the
proposal posited regulatory options such as bringing virtual currency exchange platforms and
custodial wallet providers under the scope of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)
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while allowing more time to consider options such as voluntary self-identification of virtual
currency users. The report clarified that its proposals would not have any negative effects on the
benefits or advancement of blockchain technology, highlighting that the EU is trying to strike a
balance between encouraging innovation and ensuring security. The report optimistically claimed
that anonymity will become more a liability than an asset for virtual currencies because the
credibility of virtual currencies will not rise if they are used for criminal purposes. However,
legislative actions that followed attempted to actively counter anonymity.
On January 29, 2018, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voted to move ahead
on a proposal that made an attempt to end the anonymity associated with virtual currencies, virtual
currency exchange platforms, and custodian wallet providers by declaring that they have to apply
customer due diligence controls such as customer verification requirements that are followed by
banks.359 On February 12, 2018, the European Supervisory Authorities for securities (ESMA),
banking (EBA), and insurance and pensions (EIOPA) jointly issued a warning to consumers about
virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, which were characterized as being highly risky and unregulated
products that were not suitable for investments, savings, or retirement planning products. The
warning was similar to earlier statements by ESMA and EBA. In November 2017, the ESMA
issued a warning on the risky nature of initial coin offerings (ICOs).
The EBA had issued similar warnings in December 2013, July 2014, and August 2016. In
2018, the then President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, who went on to
become Italy’s head of state, also issued a warning that Bitcoin and other digital currencies were
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very risky assets due to their high volatility and speculative prices. 360 Despite all this, the European
Union has consistently shown signs that it desires to take a balanced approach i.e., one that allows
innovation while ensuring security. This was evident when the European Commission, on March
8, 2018, presented an action plan to take advantage of opportunities presented by technologyenabled innovation in financial services through blockchain. 361 This ‘FinTech Action Plan’
included plans for an EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum, which was required to report on the
challenges and opportunities of crypto assets.
On December 19, 2019, the consultation period for a comprehensive, EU-wide regulatory
framework for crypto-assets362 started. This was followed by another feedback period between
October 2, 2020, and 11 January 11, 2021. This framework was the EU’s plan to respond to the
emergence of not just cryptocurrencies but also other crypto-assets and other applications of these
new technologies. The scope included mitigating the risks such as fraud, cyberattacks, market
manipulation. The initiative aimed to assess the extent to which cryptoassets were covered by
current EU legislation, and whether new legislation was needed in this field. The initiative had
four general objectives: (1) to provide legal clarity and certainty in order to encourage safe
applications of crypto-assets and blockchain technology in financial services, (2) to support
innovation and fair competition through an enabling framework that allows services related to
crypto-assets, (3) to ensure a high level of protection for consumers and investors, and to uphold
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market integrity, and (4) to address potential financial stability and monetary policy risks from the
increased use of crypto-assets and blockchain technology.363
The specific objectives of this initiative were (1) to remove regulatory hurdles related to
“issuance, trading and post-trading of crypto-assets that qualify as financial instruments, while
respecting the principle of technological neutrality,” 364 (2) to increase funding opportunities for
companies through increased Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and Securities Token Offerings
(STOs), (3) to limit the risks of fraud and illicit practices, (4) to allow consumers and investors
across the EU to access new cross-border investment opportunities and payment instruments. This
comprehensive regulatory framework is the culmination of years of efforts taken in a piecemeal
fashion, similar to efforts seen in the United States at the same time. The framework is aimed at
creating a bespoke regime for cryptoassets that can ensure high levels of confidence in investors
and customers.
In March 2022, in a clear sign that the EU is paying a game of cooperation, the European
Parliament voted against a de facto ban on Bitcoin.365 The Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA)
legislation, a controversial proposal that was designed to counter pollution and other environmentrelated impacts of energy-inefficient cryptocurrencies, failed to pass the parliament. However, the
EU Parliament’s committee on economic and monetary affairs voted to move forward with a
legislative framework for regulating digital assets. The committee just chose to drop a proposed
rule within the framework that would have resulted in a ban on the use of a method, known as
proof-of-work, that is energy-intensive but is essential for Bitcoin and several other
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cryptocurrencies to operate. In a tweet, Stefan Berger, a member of the EU Parliament who
supports cryptocurrencies, declared that this is a clear sign of future-oriented crypto regulation in
the EU. Markus Ferber, another EU lawmaker, claimed that the EU wishes to support the
cryptocurrency industry. However, actions at the EU-level are determined by sentiments within its
member nations, which are highly diverse. It is therefore important to understand what has been
said and done within the EU’s constituents. The following paragraphs analyze the most notable
GPC-related comments and actions within each EU member nation.
Regulatory responses by EU member nations are varied. Several member nations have
given clear warnings about the potential problems related to cryptocurrencies. This list includes
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cypress, Denmark, Finland, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain. Some states have clearly highlighted their
goal to tax cryptocurrencies and related crypto assets. This list includes Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Finland, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. Very few member nations
have established or tried to establish special committees or study groups to explore
cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology. The two that stand out on this front are Austria and
Germany. Some member nations have clearly mentioned or declared that compliance with existing
fiat currencies is critical towards allowing cryptocurrencies. Italy is an outlier on this topic because
of the way it has clarified this point. Some nations have clearly stated that transparency in
operations is critical towards allowing cryptocurrencies to operate. Belgium has stood out in
making this point clear. Some member nations have very clear positive lean on this technology
and phenomena. Luxembourg and Malta stand out in this regard. Some member states have
highlighted the connection to crime and have taken very cautious steps towards this whole
phenomenon. Slovakia stands out in this regard. The following paragraphs describe efforts taken
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at the national level across the European Union in order to paint a more detailed picture of how
this new phenomenon has been received within the European Union.
In Austria, the ministry of finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen) has clarified that
cryptocurrencies do not qualify as legal tender or as financial instruments and has categorized them
under other intangible commodities. 366 On the issue of taxation, specifically income tax, the
ministry has clarified that cryptocurrencies will be treated similar to other business assets.
However, mining of cryptocurrencies, and operating online cryptocurrency trading platforms and
cryptocurrency ATMs are categorized as commercial production activity. This highlights how
regulators at the national level within the EU are adapting their interpretations to ensure that
cryptocurrency-related regulations maximize taxation. However, national regulators do not have
too much room because of the superseding nature of the EU in some respects. For example, in the
case of Value Added Tax (VAT), Austria, just like other EU members, must follow the ruling of
the European Court and exempt cryptocurrencies from VAT. Therefore, within Austria,
transactions that involve an exchange of a traditional currency for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin
(or vice versa) are exempt from VAT. The technological aspect of cryptocurrencies has baffled the
legal system in many ways. For example, mining activity is not subject to VAT, because the
activity does not have a specific end user or receiver at the end. Existing VAT rules require an
identifiable recipient for the value added activity.
The distinction between a currency and a method of payment plays a key role in
understanding the way cryptocurrencies are treated in several jurisdictions across the world.
Austria treats Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies similar to other forms of payment that are
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accepted but does not recognize them as currency. The Austrian National Bank does not treat
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin as currencies on grounds that they have a limit on the quantity
and do not have a stabilizing central authority 367. Therefore, in Austria, cryptocurrencies are not
covered by the E-Money Act or the Payment Services Act. These details highlight how legal
aspects dictate regulatory responses. Austria’s treatment of cryptocurrencies may seem mostly
cooperative but there have been strong signs of caution and conflict. A former governor of the
Austrian National Bank has voiced strong warnings against cryptocurrencies, 368 specifically
Bitcoin, referring to them as highly speculative assets that carry high levels of risks, and has
welcomed regulatory efforts. In 2018, Austria’s then federal minister of finance, Hartwig Löger,
has announced that a Fintech Regulation Council will be set up in order to regulate
cryptocurrencies. He also lauded the EU's efforts related to the money laundering directive that
was explained earlier. The Austrian ministry of finance has also taken efforts to strictly regulate
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Hartwig Lögerhe also pushed for more efforts to educate the public
on the new phenomenon. The Austrian government has taken several efforts to warn investors and
to clarify that cryptocurrencies are not supervised. The key factors at play in Austria seem to be
transparency in operations and compliance with the existing legal system that applies to traditional
money.
In Belgium, there has been very little action against cryptocurrencies although the overall
tone has been balanced and neutral. In July 2013, the then Belgian Finance Minister stated that
while cryptocurrencies do pose problems as a money laundering tool that can enable other illegal
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activities, such problems should not be overstated.369 Based on studies done by the Banque
nationale de Belgique (BNB), i.e. the Belgian National Bank, and the European Central Bank
(ECB), the minister claimed that cryptocurrencies do not pose any significant risk to the financial
system or to its individual users, adding that that there was no need for government intervention.
However, in January 2014, the Belgian National Bank, Autorité des services et marchés financiers,
the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA), released a joint press release that warned
Belgians about cryptocurrencies by highlighting their risks. Through this press release, the
government made it clear that cryptocurrencies were not legal tender. It was also clarified that
cryptocurrencies are completely unregulated by the government, putting the onus on the consumer
to be more careful. In April 2017, Koen Geens, the then Minister of Justice announced that a legal
framework for cryptocurrencies would be established.370 In a sign that compliance with existing
systems is a key factor, the Belgian minister added that one of the objectives of the planned
framework was to set up a mechanism that could verify the conversion and exchange rates of
cryptocurrencies the same way traditional financial systems do. Geens also raised concerns about
the anonymous nature of some cryptocurrency transitions and highlighted the need for
transparency in the way cryptocurrencies operate. He added that anonymity could be used in
laundering money. Geens also expressed interest in being able to monitor efforts that promise
unrealistic returns and to properly evaluate cryptocurrencies when they are seized as part of
criminal investigations. In December 2017, Jan Smets, the then governor of the BNB, clarified that
cryptocurrencies are not actual currencies because they are not guaranteed by a central bank or a
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government as a means of payment. The case of Belgium is a game of cooperation albeit one that’s
being played very cautiously by the government.
In Bulgaria, there has been a heavy focus on taxation issues related to cryptocurrencies. In
2014, Bulgarian tax authorities issued rulings that required individuals to pay taxes on capital gains
from selling cryptocurrencies by treating it as a transaction similar to the sale of financial assets.
In 2015, a Bulgarian court ruled that activities associated with buying, selling, and paying with
cryptocurrencies are not subject to licensing requirements, creating an environment that was
conducive for the new phenomenon to thrive. However, in 2018, the Bulgarian National Bank,
tempered the scene by echoing concerns raised by the European Union about the risks associated
with cryptocurrencies, highlighting issues such as the price volatility. 371 In a statement similar to
those made by authorities in Austria and Belgium, the Bulgarian National Bank clarified that
consumers who buy cryptocurrencies need to be aware of the risks involved, adding that investors
might lose some or all the money.372
In Croatia, cryptocurrencies are not recognized by the government as legal tender, but they
are not banned or deemed illegal either. However, the government has approached the new
phenomenon with a lot more caution than its fellow EU members. Croatia regulates some
cryptocurrency businesses under its anti-money laundering (AML) regulations In December 2017,
Croatia’s Financial Stability Council issued a warning to investors in the cryptocurrency space
about associated tax liabilities, 373 highlighting the focus on tax revenues, which usually means
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heavy focus on AML regulations, transparency, and compliance with traditional systems.
However, just like most other EU members, Croatia has also clearly stated that regulators are not
responsible for any oversight related to businesses involving cryptocurrencies and has warned its
population of the risks associated with the new phenomenon. 374 Cyprus has taken a similar
approach. The Central Bank of Cyprus has warned that there are no protective measures to cover
losses from investing in cryptocurrencies, adding that the price volatility is too high. 375
Czech Republic has taken a more liberal approach compared to other EU members. In
February 2018, Mojmír Hampl, the then Vice-Governor of the Czech National Bank (CNB)
declared that there was no intent to ban cryptocurrencies and that they will continue to be treated
as commodities. He also made it clear that the government does not want to hinder the development
of the budding industry, hinting that the regulatory game is highly cooperative in nature. However,
these statements were accompanied by clarifications that the government does not plan to actively
help or promote the cryptocurrency industry. Hampl compared cryptocurrencies to a casino,
implying that cryptocurrency investments are like bets that could be lost. On the legislative side,
the Czech Republic has seen amendments to anti-money laundering laws that were designed to
make individuals involved in businesses that buy, sell, store, manage, or mediate the purchase or
sale of cryptocurrencies to be liable, 376 in order to deter users from misusing the new phenomenon
for tax evasion, crime, and terrorism.
In Denmark, the government has issued several statements on cryptocurrencies, but the
overall approach has been cooperative. In 2013, when Bitcoin was the only major cryptocurrency,
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Denmark’s financial supervisory authority (Finanstilsynet) clarified that Bitcoin was not a
currency and that no regulations were being planned. The Finanstilsynet added that, based on its
evaluation of the Bitcoin system, it was determined that the new phenomenon did not fall under
any existing category such as financial services, electronic money, services, or currency exchange.
Based on this assessment, the Finanstilsynet declared that Bitcoin activity was not covered under
current financial regulations. This stands in contrast to the most common position seen across the
EU i.e., categorization of cryptocurrencies under one or more existing provisions. In 2014, the
Danish government issued another statement in which it compared Bitcoin to glass beads, implying
that it has no value. In the same year, The Danish Central Bank clarified that cryptocurrencies are
not protected by any laws or guarantees and are highly risky, just as most of its EU counterparts
did. However, this tone changed a few years later when, in 2017, the Director of the Danish Central
Bank warned that cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin, could be deadly.377
While most of the other central banks were either considering or developing their own
digital currencies in the form of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), the Danish Central
Bank announced that it was not in favor of creating one. Denmark has taken a hands-off approach,
compared to other EU members. However, the Danish government has also issued clear rules on
several issues involving cryptocurrencies. For example, it has clarified that losses from
transactions involving cryptocurrencies cannot be deducted as a cost of doing business and that
cryptocurrencies cannot be used in billing. In line with the ruling by the Court of Justice of the
European Union, Denmark also clarified that cryptocurrencies are exempt from Value Added
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Taxes (VAT).378 In 2017, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority released a report that
allowed businesses to launch Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) but clarified that such activity, unlike
cryptocurrency transactions, will be monitored and regulated by the Authority. In 2018, there was
a notable change when the Danish Tax Council announced that losses from cryptocurrency
investments are tax deductible but that profits from such investments are subject to income tax. 379
Taxation is clearly the most important factor in the case of Denmark.
In Estonia, the focus has been on anti-money laundering efforts. In November 2017,
Estonia amended its anti-money laundering legislation to include cryptocurrencies. 380 The
legislation defined cryptocurrencies as “value represented in digital form that is digitally
transferable, preservable, or tradable and that natural persons or legal persons accept as a payment
instrument, but that is not the legal tender of any country or funds.”381 The anti-money laundering
legislation was designed to have widespread impacts. For example, it applies to service providers
involved in cryptocurrency exchanges and also requires such exchanges to procure a license in
order to operate. The focus on AML laws is aimed at ensuring tax revenues while also trying to
prevent misuse of cryptocurrency by criminals and terrorists.
In Finland, there has been a similar focus on ensuring tax revenues and preventing crime.
In 2013, The Vero Skatt (Finnish Tax Authority) took efforts to ensure that cryptocurrency
transactions are subject to income taxes and capital gains taxes. It further clarified that transactions
involving cryptocurrencies will be treated as trades and that the losses from the sale of
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cryptocurrencies are not deductible under the Finish Income Taxation Act. The latter was justified
on grounds that such a loss in value did not fit into existing legal definitions, highlighting the
power of existing legal systems.
In 2014, the Central Bank of Finland, similar to its counterparts, declared that
cryptocurrencies are highly risky and are not regulated.382 It further clarified that cryptocurrency
payments do not fit into the legal definition described in the Payment Services Act. In 2017, the
Vero Skatt issued additional clarifications on determining the value of cryptocurrency transactions.
The exchange rate was to be determined at the time of realization of the Bitcoin i.e., when it
becomes cash. The agency also required that all relevant records be retained for six years. The case
of Finland is a good example to highlight how important tax revenues and preventing crime are as
factors in regulating cryptocurrencies. Governments have to strike a balance between allowing
cryptocurrencies to operate in order to gain tax revenues but ensure that these operations are not
enabling terrorism or crime. The Vero Skatt has gained millions in revenue from taxes on
cryptocurrencies 383 while also monitoring those who trade and use cryptocurrencies.
In France, the government is moving towards establishing a regulatory regime but has so
far taken only very few measures. France’s overall response to cryptocurrencies has been
standoffish, compared to other EU members. The key factor at play here is the culture of
sovereignty. In 2013, Banque de France, the French Central Bank, released a report that criticized
cryptocurrencies for being a vehicle for speculation and an instrument for money laundering and
other illegal activities. 384 This was followed by a joint statement by the Autorité des Marchés
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Financiers (AMF), the French Financial Market Authority, and Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et
de Résolution (ACPR), the Prudential Supervisory Authority, which warned investors that
cryptocurrencies are unregulated and risky, adding that the French law does not see Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies as financial instruments. However, the French Financial Market Authority
and the Prudential Supervisory Authority also recognized the potential benefits of blockchain
technology, highlighting attempts at taking a balanced approach from some parts of the
government.
French politicians, however, have been hawkish against cryptocurrencies because they’re
seen as a threat to the government’s monopoly on money. This was seen in the French Finance
Minister’s comments on Libra. The French legislative and executive branches have investigated
various approaches to regulating cryptocurrencies. The French National Assembly, one of the two
houses of the French Parliament, initiated two fact-finding missions: one on cryptocurrencies 385
and one on blockchain technology (and other similar technologies). Additionally, the French
Minister of the Economy initiated a separate effort specifically aimed at understanding how to best
regulate cryptocurrencies in order to “better control their development and to prevent their use for
tax evasion, money laundering, or the financing of criminal or terrorist activities,” 386 clearly
explaining the regulatory concerns at play. Great power competition is also on the minds of the
French politicians as evident by the joint efforts between France and Germany to take joint efforts
in order to ensure that the Euro does not slide in importance. 387
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Germany has been more cooperative than most EU member nations, especially in its initial
responses. The Bundesanstalt fürFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), the German Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority, qualified virtual cryptocurrencies as units of account, thereby
recognizing them as financial instruments. The German Federal Ministry of Finance, in its
guidance, determined that using cryptocurrencies as a means of payment is not taxable.388
However, the government has taken a highly cautious approach by requiring authorizations to
perform business transactions that involve cryptocurrencies. When Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)
became popular in 2018, the government decided on a case-by-case basis. However, the
government’s responses have gained nuance over time. For example, while cryptocurrencies are
exempt from VAT, in accordance with the ECJ ruling, other digital currencies used within online
games are not. The German Bundesbank (the central bank) later declared that Bitcoin does not
qualify as a virtual currency nor digital money, because it does not fulfill all functions of a currency
and is not a part of a national monetary system, bringing the German stance in line with those of
other EU members. 389 Carl-Ludwig Thiele, a then member of the executive board of the German
Bundesbank, raised concerns about environmental issues arising from the high energy needed for
mining cryptocurrencies, highlighting the role of environmental aspects among some regulators.
However, he also acknowledged that blockchain technology might be a useful innovation. 390
In Ireland, the government has taken a ‘wait-and-see approach’ and has also let the EU lead
efforts. However, the Irish government has taken some of the usual steps, especially in response
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to Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs).391 In March 2018, the Central Bank of Ireland announced that
initial coin offerings (ICOs) would be allowed on a case-to-case basis by determining whether the
ICO can be treated as a transferable security that’s permitted under existing financial services laws.
This is another case that highlights the importance of compliance with laws that apply to the legal
tender and existing financial instruments. Ireland has also clarified that capital gains tax laws apply
to transactions involving cryptocurrencies.392 The Central Bank of Ireland has closely followed the
European Banking Authority in its warnings, 393 demonstrating the power dynamics between EU
and its member nations on issues with cross-jurisdictional nature.
In Italy, the focus has been on taxation. In September 2016, Agenzia delle Entrate, the
Italian Revenue Agency, issued a Ministerial Resolution394 to clarify how cryptocurrencies would
be taxed, other than being exempt from Value Added Tax (VAT). The resolution declared that
profits and losses on cryptocurrency operations are subject to corporate taxes and the Italian
regional production tax. Cryptocurrency-related operations performed by individuals who own
them for purposes that are not commercial are exempt from these taxes. Italy also amended its law
to subject cryptocurrency exchanges to the same regulations that apply to traditional money
exchange operators. The case of Italy highlights how taxation remains the top issue for regulators,
and how regulators tend to take the easy path of fitting the new phenomenon into old laws that
were built for fiat currencies and centralized systems.
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In Latvia, the focus has been on AML efforts. In November 2017, Latvia amended its antimoney laundering laws to include cryptocurrencies and to include new monitoring requirements
for cryptocurrency exchanges. Latvia defines a cryptocurrency as a “digital representation of a
value that may be digitally transmitted, stored, or traded, and acts as an exchange instrument
without being legal tender,”395 and has thereby made it clear that cryptocurrencies cannot be treated
as official currency. The government has also clarified that cryptocurrencies will not be recognized
as currencies because they’re unregulated and not linked to any national currency, 396 highlighting
how their decentralized nature, which created a large fanatic user base across the world, is also the
reason they’re not accepted or recognized by official entities in several parts of the world. Latvia,
despite these clarifications, allows cryptocurrency transactions. The Bank of Latvia and the
Latvian State Revenue Service have also clarified that cryptocurrencies are a contractual means of
payment that can be used in transactions. In contrast, in neighboring Lithuania, the game has been
more of a conflict. In October 2017, the Bank of Lithuania announced that financial services have
to be dissociated from activities related to cryptocurrencies. Furthermore, it added that financial
market participants cannot provide services associated with cryptocurrencies.397 However, in the
case of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), Lithuania has been more flexible. The Bank of Lithuania,
like some of its fellow EU members, has chosen to allow ICOs to take a case-by-case basis
depending on the details of the offering, based on compliance with established laws on
crowdfunding, collective investment, and investment services. 398
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In Luxembourg, the government has prioritized customer protection and has shown a great
deal of interest in understanding not just cryptocurrencies but also the underlying blockchain
technology and its applications. Although the government has issued several warnings like most
of its EU counterparts, it has been relatively more welcoming and cooperative. In June 2017, Pierre
Gramegna, the then Minister of Finance, recognized cryptocurrencies as actual currencies during
a Parliament session, asserting that cryptocurrencies are accepted as a means of payment for goods
and services by a significantly large circle of people.399 However, he also added that
cryptocurrencies will be bound by the same laws that apply to traditional currencies, highlighting
the importance of this compliance factor. He also mentioned money laundering and the financing
of terrorism as key factors. He has, since then, continued to encourage innovations around
cryptocurrencies and crypto assets, 400 and has stated that the blockchain technology is an
unavoidable phenomenon that brings added value and efficient services to consumers. 401
However, the government’s overall approach has so far been balanced and cautious. In
March 2018, Luxembourg’s Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), the
Financial Sector Monitoring Commission, issued a warning on the risks associated with
cryptocurrencies.402 In this statement, the CSSF clearly laid out its key concerns related to
cryptocurrencies: (1) high volatility, (2) lack of consumer protections against theft and hacking,
(3) lack of liquidity, (4) high levels of misleading information being circulated in the markets, (5)
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lack of transparency in the way cryptocurrencies operate, and (6) widespread usage of
cryptocurrencies in money laundering and other illegal activities. However, the CSSF too has
acknowledged that the blockchain technology has a lot of untapped value that can be used
beneficially.
The case of Malta is a special one. The government has explicitly stated that it is working
on a legislative framework to provide the necessary legal certainty to allow the cryptocurrency
industry to flourish and has released several documents and proposals that are in line with this
intent. In October 2017, the government released a consultation document with a proposed
regulatory framework for investments in cryptocurrencies. 403 In November 2017, the government
published another similar document on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), although this one suggested
that some cryptocurrencies might be regulated under existing financial services legislation. The
document also suggested that some cryptocurrencies may not be regulated because they may not
fall under existing laws. The government later issued a statement that it plans to facilitate a
regulatory framework for cryptocurrency-related activities and initial coin offerings (ICOs).404
Three bills have been proposed in Malta to create such a regulatory framework: The Malta
Digital Innovation Authority Bill (MDIA Bill), The TAS Bill, and The Virtual Currency Bill. The
MDIA Bill aimed to establish the Malta Digital Innovation Authority (MDIA) in order to create a
dedicated entity that can focus on innovative technology arrangements and their uses for public
interest. MDIA’s objectives are (1) to promote government policies that favor technical innovation
related to blockchain technology and its adoption by the government, (2) to maintain Malta’s
reputation and protect consumers, and (3) to certify technology arrangements and register
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technology services providers. The TAS Bill aimed to establish a regime for the registration of
technology service providers The Virtual Currency Bill aimed to establish a framework for ICOs
and a regulatory regime for cryptocurrencies and related businesses. Malta has also explored ways
to leverage cryptocurrencies within the gambling sector. The Malta Gaming Authority has stated
that it is committed to allowing the use of cryptocurrencies. 405 A new Gaming Bill, which included
cryptocurrencies, was also proposed. 406 No other EU member has taken such elaborate steps to
leverage opportunities presented by cryptocurrencies and blockchain.
In the Netherlands, the government has focused on finding ways to work with the EU and
other international partners in responding to the rise of cryptocurrencies. De Nederlandsche Bank
(DNB) - The Central Bank of the Netherlands - has shown interest in studying cryptocurrencies
and blockchain technology. However, the DNB has also issued warnings similar to those issued
by its counterparts in other EU nations. In February 2018, after a long study, the DNB published
a document on cryptocurrencies and ICOs. This document claimed that cryptocurrencies do not
have any implications in terms of monetary policy because they are not real currencies. 407 This
assessment was made based on the argument that cryptocurrencies were not widely used for
payments because they are not universally accepted. The Dutch government has suggested that
cryptocurrencies should be regulated on a European or international level 408 while ensuring that
the benefits of the blockchain technology are not foregone. The DNB supported the EU decision
to extend the scope of the anti-money laundering directive (4AMLD) to include cryptocurrency
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exchanges and issuers of crypto wallets but did not support a ban on cryptocurrencies, highlighting
that this is a game of cooperation.
In Poland, the government has taken a relatively more cautious approach, compared to
most its EU counterparts, and has focused heavily on taxation. In January 2018, the then Prime
Minister Morawiecki announced that Poland would either ban cryptocurrency or create regulations
to prevent the new phenomenon from becoming a pyramid scheme. 409 Prior to this, in 2017, the
Polish National Bank and the Financial Supervision Commission had jointly issued a warning
against investing in virtual currencies. The agencies cited concerns related to fraud and price
volatility. The Polish government had clarified that while cryptocurrencies are not considered legal
tender within Poland, trading in cryptocurrencies is also not illegal. The Polish Ministry of Finance
has taken efforts to ensure tax revenues from trading in cryptocurrencies by subjecting transactions
to income tax and by subjecting sales and purchases of cryptocurrencies to the same taxes that
apply to the transfer of property rights.410 Romania has taken a more cautious approach than Poland
has. In February 2018, Romania’s National Bank discouraged local credit institutions from getting
involved in the cryptocurrency sector due to reputational risks,411 making references to an earlier
warning from 2015.412 This announcement led to the closure of several cryptocurrency exchanges
because the local banks shut down those accounts. In contrast, Portugal has not seen any clear
regulations related to cryptocurrencies other than the ones that apply through the European Union.
The Banco de Portugal - the Federal Reserve Bank of Portugal - has stated that trading and issuing
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cryptocurrencies are activities that are neither regulated nor supervised by any authority. 413
However, with the recent EU framework, there will be more clarity and more regulations across
all EU member nations.
In Slovakia, the focus has been on taxation. The government responded with great caution
in the beginning. In 2013, the National Bank of Slovakia warned that unauthorized currency
production constitutes a criminal offense. 414 However, the stance has softened over time, primarily
because of the potential tax revenues, In March 2018, Slovakia’s Ministry of Finance, which had
previously raised concerns related to the anonymous nature of cryptocurrencies, announced that
that all revenues stemming from cryptocurrencies will be taxed. The announcement had a
sweeping interpretation of what was considered to be a taxable transaction. 415 In neighboring
Slovenia, the focus has been on consumer protection. Slovenia’s Financial Stability Board has
advised investors to stay cautious and to ensure that their cryptocurrency-related investments are
in line with their personal preferences and investment goals.416 After Slovenia’s central bank issued
a warning to its citizens about the risks related to the lack of regulations and supervision of
cryptocurrencies,417 some of the commercial banks curbed their cryptocurrency sales.
Spain has taken a cautious approach during initial response to cryptocurrencies but has
recently tried to explore ways to benefit from the booming industry. Early warnings from Comisión
Nacional de Valores - Spain’s National Securities Commission- and the Banco de España - the
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Central Bank of Spain - warned that cryptocurrencies are risky and unregulated. 418 Recent reports
suggest that Spain’s government is considering a friendly approach towards regulating
cryptocurrencies and has also been considering tax breaks to attract blockchain and fintech
companies to set shop in Spain.
In conclusion, EU member nations’ efforts within their national jurisdictions and the EU’s
efforts at the supranational level demonstrate how difficult it is to regulate cryptocurrencies within
the EU. Blockchain’s new technological features and their environmental, political, social, and
economic impacts, and legal impacts, combined the cross-jurisdictional nature of this phenomenon
within the EU further complicate one’s ability to fully comprehend the situation. However, the
same five factors - compliance with AML laws, compliance with the fiat currency’s systems,
transparency in operations, culture of sovereignty, and great power competition are relevant in the
case of the European Union as well. The most prominent factors in the case of the EU are
transparency in operations and the culture of sovereignty. The case of the EU v. Cryptocurrencies
is a cooperation game, although some EU member nations are involved in a game of conflict.
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CHAPTER 8
CHINA
China’s response to the rise of Global Private Currencies is the Digital Yuan, also known
as eCNY, the world’s first-known functional Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). This
approach is reminiscent of the way the Chinese government handled the rise of the internet and
technology giants such as Facebook. China facilitated the creation of government-backed
alternatives to Facebook such as WeChat and TenCent, while blocking Facebook. Similar
approaches have been taken to counter Google and Amazon through alternatives such as Baidu
and Alibaba respectively. However, the Chinese CBDC is owned and operated by the government
with support from private technology giants such as WeChat. The Chinese government has strictly
banned all cryptocurrency transactions and is therefore in a game of conflict. However, this
absolute ban is very recent. Before the ban, the government was mostly cooperative in its approach
to GPCs and China was a hotspot for businesses and people interested in this sector. The first
cryptocurrency exchange in China started in 2011 in response to the high levels of interest within
the country. Over the next five years, China became a significant force not only in trading of
cryptocurrencies but also in the market for equipment used to mine cryptocurrencies. At one point,
China even had the largest Bitcoin exchange by volume in the world.
The game changed from cooperation to conflict in 2012, when Xi Jinping took over as the
President of China. Xi Jinping vision of China’s global standing and digital economy did not have
a place for a new phenomenon that offered an alternative monetary system that was private and
decentralized. When Facebook proposed its Libra, the Chinese regime warned governments across
the world that such global private currencies would undermine their sovereignty and make central
banks powerless. The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has also argued that the ban on
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cryptocurrencies is meant to prevent financial crime and ensure economic stability. The
government has also claimed that the full ban on cryptocurrencies is in response to the adverse
environmental effects of crypto-related mining activities, which tend to be energy. The ban is also
seen as the latest step of the government’s “common prosperity” campaign, which is meant to
ensure equitable growth across China. Several analysts have noted that the cryptocurrency ban was
implemented to control capital flight from its markets because GPCs were able to circumvent
conventional restrictions on monetary transfers.
China’s authoritarian single-party system of governance ensures top-down implementation
of policies without debate or dissent. This is remarkably different from the political systems in the
United States and the European Union. Although China has the world’s largest economy by some
measures, it is still not as advanced as those in the United States or most of the EU nations, and
therefore has unique problems. For example, the capital flight issue is something that the United
States and the European Union do not have to worry about as much as China does. The large
amount of power that cryptocurrency mining activities consumed was another concern for China.
The low cost of electricity, which was in part because of currency devaluation meant to support
exports, attracted more mining activity, which adversely affected the supply conditions for other
industries within China. This prompted several provinces to ban cryptocurrency mining activities
over the years well before the overall ban in 2021. The rest of this chapter explains in more detail
how regulatory responses evolved over the years, followed by how the Chinese Central Bank
Digital Currency (CBDC) evolved as the ultimate response.
China’s government has been highly effective in taking actions against cryptocurrencies
from the very beginning and has implemented several regulatory actions to protect investors and
prevent financial risks. These actions include the banning of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs),
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restricting cryptocurrency, and discouraging cryptocurrency mining activities. The government
has also used other methods such as internal circulars, which are uniquely influential within the
Chinese system. However, no major legislations relating to cryptocurrency regulations were ever
passed. In 2009, just when Bitcoin was born, the Chinese government took actions to stop the
trading of virtual goods for real currency within online games such as World of Warcraft, 419
specifically actions that were referred to as gold farming. By 2013, there was a lot of interest in
Bitcoin within China, which prompted the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) to issue a warning
similar to the ones issued by its counterparts in other parts of the world. The warning was issued
in coordination with several other parts of the government - the Cyberspace Administration of
China (CAC), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) - highlighting the unified way in which China’s government
operates.
Another notable contrast in the warning was that, alongside declaring that cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin were not legal tender and clarifying that these cryptocurrencies did not have any
legal grounds, the agencies also ordered banks and payment institutions in China to not use Bitcoin.
This directive extended to the use of cryptocurrencies in billing products and services related to
cryptocurrencies. However, this early ban did not extend to trades between individuals, although
warnings about price volatility and potential use in money laundering were issued by the PBoC.
The activity of mining cryptocurrencies was also left out of the preview of this initial regulatory
analysis. This led to a boom in mining of cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin, within some parts
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of China. This industry expanded because some Chinese provinces had the right settings:
comparatively low electricity cost, easy access to necessary technology such as Graphics
Processing Units (GPUs) from the local manufacturers, and a tech-savvy population. In 2016,
when Initial Coin Offerings became the most prominent fundraising method involving
cryptocurrencies, the same group of regulatory agencies issued a new warning aimed at investor
protection and financial risk prevention. 420
ICOs and other cryptocurrency transactions were troublesome because they also facilitated
the flow of money out of China while affecting the value of the Yuan in an unfavorable way. The
regulatory agencies created new rules that outlawed the creation of new cryptocurrencies through
Initial Coin Offerings on grounds that it amounted to public financing without official
authorization and therefore ordered that monies raised through ICO be returned to investors.
Additionally, it was announced that engaging in ICOs may also be treated as being involved in
other financial crimes such as the illegal issuance of tokens or securities, illegal fundraising,
financial fraud, or pyramid selling. This highlights how regulators in China also expect
cryptocurrencies to comply with laws and systems designed for traditional fiat money. The
agencies also clarified that cryptocurrencies involved in ICOs are not issued by China’s monetary
authority, having no legal status with fiat currencies as legal tender. As a result, it is prohibited to
circulate in the market. Financial institutions and non-bank payment companies were also
restricted from providing services that supported token-based fundraising activities such as ICOs.
In September 2017, the Chinese government took additional measures to contain the
circulation of cryptocurrencies by banning exchanges from trading cryptocurrencies for fiat
money, and from purchasing or selling cryptocurrencies. The exchanges were also no longer
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allowed to set prices of cryptocurrencies or provide other related services, essentially shutting
down the trading operations of every cryptocurrency exchange within China.421 This regulatory
move forced some exchanges to relocate outside China. Some of the exchanges remained active
but offered only services that were still legal: converting cryptocurrencies to other
cryptocurrencies without involving cash deposits. The government’s focus now moved on to the
energy–intensive mining industry that was growing rapidly. In 2018, regulations on
cryptocurrency mining ramped up in some Chinese provinces. Despite such measures, China was
leading the world in mining Bitcoin, the most prominent cryptocurrency.
In April 2019, more efforts were taken against cryptocurrency mining, this time at the
national level. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) declared that
Bitcoin mining was an undesirable industry that was causing high levels of environmental
pollution. More than half of the Bitcoin network’s mining power was located in China at that point
in time. The NDRC eventually toned down its concerns and no immediate actions were taken. By
2020, there were more regulatory actions aimed at countering fraud and money laundering
activities through cryptocurrencies. For example, the People’s Bank of China announced plans to
block dozens of foreign websites that still offered cryptocurrency exchange services. This was
done in response to increasing capital flight concerns. By June 2021, all mining activities within
China were brought to an end. Finally, in November 2021, there was an absolute cryptocurrency
ban in China.
The most significant regulatory move against cryptocurrencies within China was by
China’s State Council, the chief administrative authority within China, against mining and trading
activities. The State Council of the People's Republic of China, in the Chinese system of
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government, is the most influential institution especially in the context of local governments at the
provincial level. Among the members of the State Council are the Premier and the heads of each
of the cabinet-level executive departments. In 2021, three provinces - Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang,
and Sichuan, hosted several cryptocurrency mining operations that were subjected to strict
crackdowns forcing cryptocurrency miners to cease their activities. This was followed by a wider
ban on cryptocurrency transactions422 by ordering all banks to stop trading, clearing, and settlement
services related to cryptocurrency transactions. 423 The People’s Bank of China justified the ban
claiming that cryptocurrency transactions have disrupted economic and financial order, causing an
increase in “money laundering, illegal fund-raising, fraud, pyramid schemes, and other illegal and
criminal activities.”424
The crackdowns were highly effective. 425 Regulators in China went to great lengths to
ensure the prevention of cryptocurrency-related activities after the ban, claiming it was necessary
to maintain economic and financial order and social stability. For example, the government ordered
the termination of capital accounts connected to cryptocurrency exchanges and other dealers to
prevent them from transferring funds. It was widely reported that the Chinese government had
discussions with major banks prior to the ban to ensure that banks and other partners such as tech
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firms not involved in cryptocurrency transactions. 426 The People’s Bank of China has been leading
this assault on cryptocurrencies but it has been advised by key players such as the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Construction Bank, Postal Savings Bank,
Industrial Bank, and major tech firms such as Alipay. To create a strong deterrent, the Chinese
government has warned the public that all cryptocurrency-related transactions, including those
done at cryptocurrency exchanges abroad, will be treated as criminal activity. Cryptocurrencies
are not allowed to be in circulation in any form anymore. This ban has impacted the price of
cryptocurrencies across the world, 427 highlighting the influence of China and its citizens in the
cryptocurrency market. The price volatilities helped the government's ban look justified. Bitcoin
was hardest hit by the ban as almost 65% of all Bitcoin was powered in China.
China’s economic planning agency once commented that the crackdown was important to
meet carbon goals, highlighting the importance of environmental factors in the regulation of
cryptocurrencies. The Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance, which maintains the Cambridge
Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index to estimate the cryptocurrency’s energy consumption, 428
has compared the usage of Bitcoin’s electricity consumption to be equal to that of several nations
combined. Prior to the ban, government agencies discouraged cryptocurrency mining activities by
curtailing investments, raising electricity costs, and blocking new entrants into the sector. Such
actions were necessary also because the spike in mining activities also led to higher electricity
rates and a severe power crisis. The ban was also enacted due to the fact that cryptocurrencies were
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draining capital from China. Since it’s difficult to narrow down exact figures and locations given
the nature of cryptocurrencies, there are no official estimates. However, some studies have claimed
that close to $50 billion worth of cryptocurrency moved from accounts that originated in East Asia
between 2019 and 2020.429 This trend escalated the need for more capital controls within China.
Although China already had strong capital controls including clear annual limits on the
purchase of foreign currencies, which cryptocurrencies fall under, the government saw the need
for more regulations due to the rise of global private currencies as a new alternative to traditional
methods for transferring money out of the country. Traditional methods that facilitate capital flight
include purchasing foreign real estate, under invoicing, over invoicing, and human-centered
procedures such as hawala. Cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin, soon became a preferred method,
thanks to their pseudonymity and decentralized nature, which make them harder to detect. 430
China’s ban on cryptocurrency exchanges, which did not include the ban on mining activities, was
seen as a response to the capital flight problem, although it was never officially attributed to it.
Chainalysis, a premier cryptocurrency analytics firm, has noted that capital flight has been
facilitated mostly by stablecoins such as Tether, which is also known as USDT. Tether is pegged
to the value of the US dollar and therefore does not have the same levels of volatility as Bitcoin
and other free-floating cryptocurrencies. The ban on cryptocurrency exchanges prohibited the
exchange of Tether for both fiat currencies and cryptocurrencies. However, it was easy to use
foreign bank accounts to procure Tether, making capital flight easy. The problem with capital
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flight was not merely a socioeconomic one, but a political one because it stood in the way of the
Chinese Communist Party’s ‘common prosperity’ campaign. 431
President Xi Jinping has used the term ‘common prosperity’ in his vision to create a China
that could narrow the large wealth gap, which is seen as a threat to national unity and to the
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Under Xi, the term has been defined in simple terms
as a policy that would lead to a more equal income distribution. The term was originally used in
the 1950s by the People’s Republic of China’s founder Mao Zedong and later in the 1980s by the
President Deng Xiaoping. Xi Jinping has made common prosperity one of the core elements of the
Chinese Communist Party’s governing foundation. In an attempt to achieve this, he has initiated a
pilot program in Zhejiang, one of China's wealthiest provinces, to narrow the income gap by 2025.
To reach this goal, Chinese leaders have relied on taxation as an economic redistribution tool.
Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and opening-up of the Chinese market, China has had a
wealth distribution system that relied primarily on labor. Taxation is seen as a part of the ‘second
distribution’ system. Under Xi, there has been an increased push to encourage high-income firms
and individuals to give back to society through donations. This channel has been referred to as the
‘third distribution’ system. 432 Since cryptocurrencies can help people evade taxes and relocate
capital instead of donating or investing them within China, they are seen as a threat to Xi Jinping’s
goal of achieving common prosperity. This has also been a major factor in the government’s
decision to ban cryptocurrencies altogether. However, the most important reason for the ban is the
risk that cryptocurrencies could compete with China’s digital Yuan.
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China has shown keen interest in blockchain technology since the beginning. The digital
Yuan has been strongly backed by President Xi Jinping from the beginning. He has explicitly
declared that he wanted China to play a key role in formulating international rules on digital
currency and digital tax in order to create new competitive advantages. Great power competition
is a key factor that led to both the expedited development of the digital Yuan (CBDC) and also the
absolute ban of cryptocurrencies. Almost every nation has expressed interest or initiated research
but very few have made progress. The only CBDC to have undergone extensive trials is the digital
Yuan. China began exploring the concept of a sovereign digital currency much earlier than other
governments did. This was prompted by the success of Chinese e-commerce platforms such as
Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu. These companies had created digital payment systems that scaled
rapidly across China. The CBDC was designed to leverage these networks
The digital Yuan is part of the rising superpower’s 14th five-year plan. The People’s Bank
of China (PBoC) created the ‘Institute of Digital Money’ as an internal research initiative within
the bank to improve its CBDC. In contrast, this initiative’s American counterpart - the Hamilton
Project – is a public-private partnership between the Boston Fed and Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). It has been frequently reiterated that the digital Yuan is just a digital version
of the sovereign currency that is backed by the central bank, highlighting the strong culture of
sovereignty within China. A working paper that was released by the Chinese central bank further
clarified that, unlike Bitcoin and other digital currencies issued by the private sector, the digital
fiat currency had the same legal status as the only fiat currency issued by the bank- the Chinese
Yuan. The paper also suggested that, although some level of anonymity is necessary for small
transactions, the digital Yuan’s backend will retain the ability to monitor, report, and investigate
activities that relate to terrorism and money laundering.
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In 2016, the PBoC’s efforts evolved, leading to the creation of the Digital Currency
Research Institute, which later brought in commercial banks and other payment firms such as
Tencent to collaborate. In early 2017, upon the approval of the State Council, the central bank
started testing its prototypes. In October 2017, the PBoC reported that it had tested algorithms
needed to maintain the digital currency supply, which was a major step ahead. In April 2020, the
People’s Bank of China and the Agricultural Bank of China carried out a larger internal test on the
CBDC. A few months later, the first public trial was launched within one of the provinces. By
April 2021, there had been at least ten such trials. The CBDC was being groomed for an
international demo during the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. Although this timeline looks long,
it is still the fastest project of this sort in the world. No other central bank had been able to develop
and test its CBDC by then. A Deutsche Bank research publication 433 on the Digital Yuan suggests
that the introduction of the digital Yuan had two distinct but interconnected goals. The first one
was to create a digital currency that could compete with other digital currencies such as Bitcoins,
stablecoins, and other central banks digital currencies (CBDC), while ensuring that the renminbi
continues to be the dominant currency in China. As described before, the digital Yuan was not just
the government’s response to cryptocurrencies,434 it was also Beijing’s latest weapon in its great
power competition with the almighty Dollar. The second goal was to revamp China's existing
payment systems by providing a cash-like digital payment method that’s widely accessible at low
costs.
The People’s Bank of China has placed a lot of importance on the research and
development of the digital Yuan. The design of the digital Yuan is important to understand both
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because it highlights similarities and differences vis-a-vis cryptocurrencies, helping us understand
why CBDCs are in such demand across the world. The latter is simply because a CBDC can give
unprecedented power to governments because money touches almost every aspect of life. The
digital Yuan’s features can also help us understand which factors were important to regulators and
lawmakers. eCNY is designed to comply with AML laws, comply with traditional laws and
systems designed for cash and other previous forms of fiat currencies, operate in a transparent
manner i.e., to the government, strengthen sovereignty, and is designed to support China in its
great power competition. To ensure victory in its great power competition, the eCNY is designed
to scale rapidly while ensuring tax revenues, sovereignty, stability, transparency, and anti-money
laundering features. The Chinese CBDC is a significant political tool that can disrupt global power
dynamics.
The most important distinction between GPCs such as Bitcoin and the e-CNY is that the
latter is fully backed by the Chinese government, specifically the People’s Bank of China.
However, the e-CNY is operated in partnership with payment service providers, some of whom
may not be official government entities. Tencent and Alipay are good examples of such private
service providers. The Chinese government has claimed that the eCNY will allow anonymity and
has been built to protect personal information. However, it has also admitted that the eCNY system
is designed to save sufficient records for tracing illegal activities such as money laundering and
tax evasion. The PBOC’s technical definition of eCNY describes it as a ‘M0’ i.e., the monetary
base, which is the most liquid type of the money. M0 refers to the total amount of a currency in
general circulation. M0 includes the general public’s ‘cash in hand,’ commercial bank deposits
held in the central bank's reserves, and other assets that are easily convertible into cash. Money
Supply M0 and M1, are also known as narrow money. This is a marked difference from what
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GPCs are. Bitcoin and other free-floating cryptocurrencies are merely digital entries in a
distributed ledger that have perceived market value based on aggregate supply and demand. Even
stablecoins, which are tethered to other currencies, usually strong fiat currencies such as the US
Dollar, are not directly or officially connected to the currencies they’re tethered to.
The PBOC’s choice to define the eCNY as MO has significant implications. In the world
of central banks and monetary economics, M0 is remarkably different from its variants M1 and
M2. The most important feature is that the eCNY, as M0 money, becomes a direct liability of the
PBOC, making it the least risky currency within China, akin to the traditional fiat currency. In
contrast, M1 and M2 types of money attract liability from commercial banks also. By removing
these liabilities, the eCNY becomes more attractive to investors. Another important implication of
the M0 designation is that the digital ‘wallet’ applications that hold eCNY are not treated as bank
accounts, creating a uniquely new system that is much more efficient and manageable. The eCNY
is designed to be delivered to the wallets within electronic devices that are identified based on
phone numbers. As M0 money, the eCNY also does not carry interest. M1 and M2 types carry
interest. GPCs such as Bitcoin, being an entirely new phenomenon, do not fit into any of these
types and are therefore not yet fully embraced by most financial institutions across the world.
The M0 status also ensures that only banks can convert the e-CNY into bank deposits and
vice versa, removing intermediaries such as cryptocurrency exchanges from ever getting involved.
This way, the government can easily monitor and manage the entire system much more efficiently.
In contrast, GPCs can be converted through exchanges, which are a weak link as seen in the case
of Mt. Gox and other similar cautionary tales. The inability to carry interest, and to be mediated
by banks, suggests that the People’s Bank of China wanted to limit the circulation of the eCNY.
This was probably done to ensure that the system can be monitored and managed even when the
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system scales across the world. The eCNY still has features that allow large-scale circulation and
the ability to be deposited a la traditional money, thanks to its two-tiered system. The PBOC is the
controlling entity located on the first tier. The second tier includes large state-owned banks and
online banks that facilitate these actions. Other banks and payment service providers such as
Alipay also play roles in eCNY's operation, especially at the retail level.
The E-CNY is being designed as a retail CBDC that will be issued to the public. This is
remarkably different from some of the wholesale CBDCs being developed in other parts of the
world. Such wholesale CBDCs are meant for use only within the central bank. China’s decision to
create a retail CBDC is in line with the government’s plan to modernize the domestic payment
system. The issuance of e-CNY is aimed primarily at improving the efficiency of the retail payment
system by reducing the cost of retail payment. The PBOC has defined the e-CNY as “the digital
version of fiat currency issued by the PBOC and operated by authorized operators. The e-CNY is
also defined by the PBOC as the digital version of China’s fiat currency. The central bank’s
whitepaper outlines how, throughout history, currencies have evolved from being represented as
objects, metal coins, banknotes, etc. This suggests how adaptive the Chinese government is. The
bank further described the eCNY as “a value-based, quasi-account-based, and account-based
hybrid payment instrument, with legal tender status and loosely-coupled account linkage”. In its
whitepaper, the PBOC has repeatedly highlighted that the e-CNY is the official fiat currency. The
eCNY is designed to perform all three basic functions of money - unit of account, medium of
exchange, and store of value. Most GPCs, in contrast, are not seen as being able to perform all
three functions although technological, legal, and social changes are slowly changing how GPCs
perform these functions. For example, when the Bitcoin network was seen as being too slow to act
as an efficient medium of exchange, a technological change in the form of the lightning network
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was added to increase the speed. Legal changes that recognize some GPCs as legal tenders enable
them to be units of account as seen in the case of El Salvador.
The process of starting a new eCNY account is highly similar to existing processes used
for bank accounts. The user is required to interact with the bank. GPCs such as Bitcoin, in contrast,
were designed to circumvent such institutions. However, only tech savvy individuals are able to
comfortably forego cryptocurrency exchanges, which simplify the process but increase risk by
being vulnerable to hacks and by being unregulated in most parts of the world. An eCNY account
i.e., the digital wallet can be opened only by the institutions in Tier 2. The lowest tier, referred to
as ‘Tier 2.5,’ includes payment service providers, merchants, corporations, and other users. Once
the wallet is created, all tiers will have access to the account and can offer various services.
However, Tier 2.5 has limited access. Entities in the lowest tier can provide payment services but
cannot carry out e-CNY transactions. The eCNY also allows peer-to-peer transfers, akin to GPCs.
However, GPCs operate directly on a transparent, decentralized blockchain ledger while the eCNY
system coordinates with tier 2 or tier 2.5. Similar to the financial systems that manage fiatcurrencies, the eCNY system require Tier 2 institutions (banks) to provide customer service,
protect customer privacy, perform Anti-Money Laundering (AML) measures such as the Know
Your Customer (KYC) protocols, and maintain the infrastructure needed to operate the eCNY at
the retail level.
Overall, the eCNY system is the same as the traditional banking system with the exception
that the digitization of the entire process gives the PBOC unprecedented levels of traceability and
control. This has been the biggest concern related to CBDCs. To address these concerns, the PBOC
has stated that it plans to maintain ‘controllable anonymity’. Yi Xiong, China’s Chief Economist,
has stated that the e-CNY will give its users the choice to hide their identity, but the system will
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provide law enforcement agencies the ability to trace illegal transactions whenever needed. The
anonymity feature within the eCNY system, was designed primarily to protect consumers from
online platforms that could collect user information. Most GPCs, especially Bitcoin, in contrast,
allow users to be pseudonymous and do not cooperate with law enforcement agencies. However,
most cryptocurrency exchanges that trade GPCs are required to cooperate with law enforcement.
In July 2021, the People’s Bank of China released an official document prepared by the
working group that was focusing on the research and development of the eCNY. 435 This is the
most detailed official document on the Chinese CBDC so far. This whitepaper is focused on
research and development aspects. The PBOC’s stated goals in releasing this document were: (1)
to clarify the PBOC’s position on specific issues related to the CBDC, (2) to explain the
background, objectives and visions, design framework and policy considerations for the e-CNY
system, (3) to seek public comments and to deepen communication with stakeholders. The PBOC
further added that its goal is to build an open, inclusive, interoperable, and innovative digital
currency service system that’s built for the era of digital economy. Such openness and friendliness,
taken at face value, is surprising given China’s authoritarian system. It can be argued that this is a
result of the competitive dynamics created by GPCs, which, as an alternative, offer unprecedented
levels of freedom for the user.
The PBOC has made a good case for building the eCNY through its public relations efforts.
The whitepaper highlights how recent technological developments and the new digital economy
require a revamp of the retail payment services. The PBOC’s idea of a modern payment system is
one that’s more convenient, safe, inclusive, and privacy friendly. The whitepaper also noted that
several countries across the world are keeping tabs on the fintech sector in order to digitize their
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fiat currencies the right way. Before GPCs disrupted the scene, governments did not have to worry
about competition or about building the best features because of their monopoly on money. The
CBDC is essentially an attempt by governments to reclaim this monopoly, while gaining new
powers in the process.
The e-CNY system is being designed to provide services to a large population in various
scenarios. The CBDC does not require a bank account for its basic services. The digital wallet is
sufficient to avail these services. This is similar to the ways GPCs operate. The e-CNY system is
also designed to be used on a temporary basis by foreigners visiting China. The PBOC has also
highlighted the differences between the eCNY and other digital payment systems. While the latter
requires bank accounts, the former does not. The eCNY has intrinsic value and can also support
off-line transactions. Unlike GPCs, digital payment systems do not pose a threat to fiat currencies
and are therefore integrated into the eCNY system.
The Chinese government has carefully tracked the rapid rise of cryptocurrencies. The
PBOC has noted in its whitepaper that the main issues with cryptocurrencies are the lack of
intrinsic value, acute price fluctuations, low trading efficiencies, and huge energy consumption,
and the inability to serve as currencies that can be used in everyday activities. The bank also sees
cryptocurrencies as speculative instruments that pose potential risks to financial security and social
stability. The use of cryptocurrencies in money-laundering and other illegal economic activities
have also been highlighted by the bank. The Chinese government has also grasped how
technological changes have led to a transformation in the role of cash within the economy. The
rise of the digital economy in China has been accompanied by a sharp decline in the usage of cash
payments.
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A survey carried out by the PBOC in 2019 suggested that the number and value of
transactions made through mobile payment accounted for 66 percent and 59 percent of the total
respectively. In contrast, the number and value of transactions paid in cash accounted for 23
percent and 16 percent respectively. The number and value of transactions paid by credit and with
debit cards were 7 percent and 23 percent, respectively. The survey also revealed that, among those
surveyed, 46 percent did not use cash in any transaction during the survey period. While this is
very low compared to the United States and some European nations, it’s a remarkable statistic for
China given the size of the population and the fact that most of its population does not have high
levels of income. In parts of China where financial services are not easily available, cash usage
remains common and preferred. The eCNY is being designed to change this so that the costs and
inconveniences of managing cash dissipates.
Cash is not preferred by banks and governments either because of inconveniences or
inefficiencies related to minting, printing, transportation, deposit, withdrawal, identification,
processing, reflow, destruction, counterfeit prevention, etc. The PBOC’s vision of developing a
modern digital payments system for the digital economy includes new retail payment
infrastructures that are safe, inclusive, and adaptive. By highlighting safety, the CBDC can better
contrast how unsafe GPCs are as an alternative. CBDCs are also a more effective way for
governments to ensure the safety and stability of the financial system because regulatory attempts
to achieve the same goal by requiring transparency from GPCs is not guaranteed. The PBOC has
noted that the Chinese economy is changing its focus from high-speed growth to high-quality
development. The eCNY is seen by the central bank as a technological innovation that’s necessary
to support the economy in making this transition happen.
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The bank has also highlighted the role of the Covid19 pandemic in accelerating digital
transformation in all spheres of life. In line with the political goal of ‘common prosperity,’ the
PBOC has also justified the eCNY as a tool that can support the Chinese economy in serving less
developed and remote areas of the nation. The bank has also noted that the rapid spread of mobile
payment systems has had a positive impact on the economy by enabling more people to participate
more easily than ever before. The eCNY is being designed to integrate with such payment systems.
However, The PBOC plans to issue the digital e-CNY and the physical Renminbi in parallel.
Acknowledging that China has a large population with various ethnic groups and wide differences
in regional development, the central bank has expressed the need to accept that people differ in
their choice of payment habits and security needs. Therefore, the bank plans to issue physical
currencies for “as long as there is demand.”
By highlighting attempts to create an inclusive tool, the CBDC is trying to appeal to those
who might otherwise fall for GPCs that advertise themselves as solutions for the unbanked and
underbanked. If the PBOC is able to launch a well-built CBDC that can scale internationally and
also help the world be more financially inclusive, it would be a major political geopolitical success
for China. Internally, the CBDC can help Xi Jinping achieve ‘common prosperity’ faster.
Internationally, it can make China a stronger superpower. Some countries that adopted the US
dollar instead of their failing domestic currencies have recently added GPCs to their list of
preferred currencies. If the eCNY is successful, it might join or replace the US Dollar and other
cryptocurrencies as legal tender in nations well beyond its sphere of influence. The eCNY could
help China expand its Belt and Road initiative across the world. In other words, Dollarization and
Cryptonization trends could be replaced by ‘Yuanization’.
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The eCNY, despite being advertised as an economic tool meant to improve China’s
economy, is also designed to be used for international payments. This will help China
internationalize the Yuan to a greater extent. The PBOC has, however, highlighted how difficult
it is to manage cross-border payments due to issues such as monetary sovereignty, foreign
exchange policies, and compliance requirements. The central bank sees the internationalization of
Yuan as something that’s dependent primarily on the natural results of free market dynamics since
international demand for a sovereign currency is based on the economic fundamentals of the nation
that manages the currency. The PBOC has also announced that it will align its eCNY efforts with
efforts taken by the G20 and other international organizations to improve cross-border payments.
The bank plans to collaborate with central banks and monetary authorities across the world to set
up exchange arrangements and regulatory cooperation mechanisms on digital fiat currencies in
order to promote interconnectivity and interoperability.
Since the e-CNY is a substitute for M0, it is treated the same way as physical RMB. M0
carries and pays no interest. The M0 nature leads to lower costs because the PBOC does not charge
operators for exchange and circulation services. The operators also do not charge individual clients
for the exchange of e-CNY. The PBOC claims that the e-CNY system is designed to collect less
transaction information than traditional electronic payment, suggesting that the central bank is
trying to appeal to privacy-conscious users who used to prefer cryptocurrencies. The PBOC also
claims that the CBDC system also does not provide information to third parties or other
government agencies unless existing laws and regulations permit such sharing. The bank also
asserts that the internal backend of the system has a tiered authorization system with checks and
balances designed to allow authorized audits while preventing unauthorized actions. In contrast,
most GPCs make it difficult to trace transactions regardless of whether the person is authorized or
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not. However, most cryptocurrency exchanges in the US and Europe work like the eCNY design
and allow authorized audits.
The eCNY system has hybridized features from GPCs and traditional bank accounts. The
eCNY system offers both personal and corporate wallets. The functions of wallets can be
customized based on the users’ needs. The eCNY system offers both software and hardware
wallets. A software wallet provides services through mobile applications while a hardware wallet
uses security chips. There are two types depending on the level of authorization - parent wallets
and sub-wallets. The wallet holder can set the main wallet as the parent wallet and open several
sub-wallets under it. Users can set payment limits, conditions, personal privacy protections, and
other functions through sub-wallets. Sub-wallets allow companies and institutions to pool and
distribute funds. The eCNY system is designed to allow smart contracts and other programmable
features. During one of the pilot tests, the eCNY system experimented with money that has an
expiration date i.e., the amount gets reduced from the wallet if left unused. CBDCs can also be
tailored to specific purposes, unlike traditional cash and bank deposits. For example, if the
government is issuing relief meant for essential food items, that amount cannot be programmed to
be invalid if it’s spent on non-essential items such as alcoholic drinks.
There are widespread concerns that such an authoritarian system might force countries and
companies to give up their privacy and highly valuable data in order to do business with or in
China. It can be argued that such concerns are overblown because most nations have strict rules
that govern their financial systems and have plenty of oversight over transactions. The research
and development of e-CNY has been aligned with the country’s existing legal framework. The
PBOC is authorized by the Law of the People’s Bank of China to issue RMB and supervise its
circulation. In order to allow the digital version of the money, a new law was released to clarify
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both physical and digital forms of the legal tender are allowed. However, given the plethora of
possibilities that the digital form has to offer, the PBOC has expressed the need for tailor-made
regulatory measures and for e-CNY to ensure its status as a fiat currency while also allowing for
innovative developments that can improve the economy. This logic suggests that a similar
approach may be needed for cryptocurrencies in countries where they’re not banned.
Compliance with existing laws and regulations that apply to traditional fiat money, which
is one of the key factors in the regulation of cryptocurrencies, is baked into the design of the eCNY.
This further validates the importance of this factor. The PBOC has clarified that the institutional
design of the e-CNY system strictly complies with existing regulations that relate to the Renminbi.
This includes regulations related to anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT), foreign exchange, and data and privacy protection. The PBOC has made it
a priority to prevent the misuse of e-CNY in illegal and criminal activities such as tele-fraud,
Internet gambling, money laundering, and tax evasion. The e-CNY system also supports
interoperability with traditional electronic payment systems. The flow of information within the eCNY system is easily accessible in order to support feedback loops and planning efforts. The
eCNY system allows authorized entities to carry out anti-money laundering (AML) actions such
as customer due diligence, maintaining data on customers’ identity and transactions, and reporting
transactions that are suspicious or large transactions.
In response to concerns that the CBDCs might trigger financial disintermediation, weaken
monetary policy, or exacerbate bank runs, the PBOC has asserted that the eCNY’s design will only
enhance monetary policy and financial stability. The PBOC has claimed that the eCNY system is
designed to ease the crowding-out of bank deposits and prevent arbitrage. The bank has also
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claimed that it has established a framework that involves big data analysis, risk monitoring and
early warning. This framework is designed to enhance the way the eCNY system will be managed.
The PBOC has admitted that the impacts of a digital fiat currency on the economy cannot
be assessed because it’s entirely new. The bank has therefore taken cautious steps through pilot
tests within small regions to learn how the system can be improved. Large commercial banks,
telecom operators and Internet companies were selected to collaborate on this project. The bank
has approached this with a long-term vision and has taken an evolutionary approach in its
development. The PBOC and partners developed and improved the e-CNY system through three
phases: development and testing, internal verification, and managed external pilot. The PBOC has
launched e-CNY pilots in Shenzhen, Suzhou, Xiong’an, and Chengdu, Shanghai, Hainan,
Changsha, Xi’an, Qingdao and Dalian. The selection of pilot locations is based on several factors
including relevant goals and strategies at the national, regional, and local levels. The pilot runs
were designed to test the system’s functionalities, stability, risk levels, and user-friendliness. Based
on several pilots, the PBOC has developed three main functions of e-CNY: exchange and
circulation management, interoperability, and wallet ecosystem. Features such as smart contracts
were used to make the e-CNY programmable. The pilots also helped the PBOC test several
scenarios.
The PBOC has taken efforts to engage with its counterparts across the world through the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which promotes global monetary and financial stability
through international cooperation. PBOC is a member of the Multiple CBDC Bridge (m-CBDC
Bridge), led by the BIS Innovation Hub (BISIH). The PBOC has also established direct ties with
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. It’s possible that the eCNY system could one day take over
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the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s financial system, which uses the Hong Kong
dollar as the legal tender.
China’s government is designing the eCNY system such that it can gain a better
understanding of monetary transactions within the country in order to achieve economic goals such
as increased effectiveness in monetary policy implementation and political goals such as common
prosperity. In the process, the government is also ensuring increased tax revenues by preventing
money laundering and improving security by preventing the financing of crime and illegal
activities. By superimposing the eCNY system over existing payment systems such as Alipay, the
government will gain the power and control accumulated by the technology firms that built and
scaled these payment systems. The Ant Group’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat Pay - the two
largest payment systems within China - have recently faced antitrust probes. Soon, these giants,
along with smaller peers and several banks, will become part of the second tier within the mighty
eCNY system. The PBOC has stated that it aims to deepen its analysis of the e-CNY’s impact on
monetary policy, financial system and financial stability in order to improve the continued research
and development of the system and the larger ecosystem.
The creation of the eCNY, the first functional CBDC, started with clear ideas on the toplevel design and functions. In contrast, the first GPC - Bitcoin - was born as an idea that was
released as an open whitepaper on the internet. Development and testing of the eCNY and related
systems were carried out by the PBOC through pilot programs in parts of China that were deemed
to be representative of the overall national population. In contrast, Bitcoin evolved naturally.
However, GPCs that followed, especially those backed by large companies with vast resources,
took approaches similar to eCNY. Facebook’s failed Libra project and some stablecoins such as
Tether are examples of GPCs that took a highly structured approach in their design. The PBOC
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reported that its pilot projects were carried out in a “steady, safe, managed, innovative, and
practical manner”. This responsible approach, which is expected from a governmental entity, is at
odds with the usual approach taken by young technology startups working on cryptocurrencies and
related ideas. Such startups are usually led and operated by young individuals who prefer speed.
Facebook, despite being a large publicly traded company, is still notorious for retaining its startup
culture. Until 2014, Facebook’s internal motto was ‘move fast and break things.’ This marked
difference in the way the two sides - governments and private sector - are designing and developing
the products will have a major impact on the regulatory game.
The eCNY has survived its birth and is now scaling up across China. The system has been
applied in over a million scenarios, which includes a wide range of contexts such as utility
payments, catering services, transportation, shopping, and government services. More than 20
million personal wallets and over 3 million corporate wallets have been opened within the system.
There have been over 70 million transactions, totaling over 30 billion Yuan.436 The system is
slowly being rolled out to everyone in China. During the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the eCNY
was successfully used to make payments through smartphone apps, physical payment cards, and
wristbands. The PBOC announced that, during the Olympics, over 2 million Yuan was transferred
everyday through the eCNY system. 437
The eCNY’s success suggests that carefully designed and properly implemented CBDCs
are the best regulatory response governments across the world can realistically carry out given that
decentralized GPCs are impossible to eliminate. However, it may not be easy for democracies to
launch a CBDC like the eCNY due to privacy concerns and political backlash. For example,
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features like the eCNY’s ‘managed anonymity’ will not be allowed in the United States or Europe.
The success of CBDCs will depend on a large array of factors, most of which affect the success of
GPCs and other crypto assets as well. These factors include political will, economic impacts,
societal acceptance, technological features, legal implications, and environmental repercussions.
Unlike its counterparts in the United States and the European Union, the Chinese
government did not focus on forcing cryptocurrencies and related entities such as exchanges to be
more transparent in their operations. Although the Chinese government had a heavy focus on AML
aspects just like its American and European counterparts, it did not do so in its usual heavy-handed
way. Neither did China impose its existing laws on the new phenomenon by redefining legal
definitions, unlike its Western peers. There also hasn’t been much emphasis on tax evasion. The
highly sophisticated CBDC, is the primary reason for all this. The Chinese CBDC was designed
to ensure tax revenues, transparency in operations, state sovereignty, global competitiveness, and
compliance with existing laws and systems that apply to traditional forms of money. It was also
designed to prevent money laundering and misuse by bad actors such as terrorists and criminals.
However, the most significant feature is that it gives the Chinese government unprecedented power
by allowing it to dictate every action that involves the CBDC. The Chinese CBDC is expected to
transform the nature of money within China and wherever it is used. The CBDC will be the only
legal tender and is being built to look and feel like global private currencies. For example, the
CDBC will be stored in cell phones through wallet software just like Bitcoin and other GPCs.
The future of money will be digital. Even before the idea of a CBDC came about,
governments across the world have been trying to cut down on their use of cash in order to have a
more efficient monetary system. Thanks to the rapid proliferation of technology, especially
affordable smartphones, many nations across the world have managed to reduce the use of cash.
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In most cases, private technology companies have capitalized on this opportunity to build large
payment system networks. In some cases, governments have managed to create such systems on
their own. For example, the Indian central bank’s Unified Payment system (UPI) helped the
developing nation go from zero to 800 million monthly digital payment transactions in less than
three years.438 In China, Alipay and Tencent, two private technology firms led this arena. However,
these companies thrived only because they had the support of the Chinese government,
highlighting the importance for strong public-private cooperation in order to achieve both speed
and stability.
Alipay is owned by Alibaba, the ‘Amazon of China,’ which thrived only because the
Chinese government favored Alibaba over Amazon through its policies. Similarly, WeChat Pay is
owned by Tencent, the ‘Facebook of China,’ which was made possible only because of the Chinese
government’s ban on Facebook. Although both companies have always been under the thumb of
the Chinese government and their payment systems have been subordinated to the eCNY, they
continue to operate and grow both within China and across the world, contributing indirectly to
the growth of the eCNY. These companies have the capability to build and grow a large network
of digital payment systems across Asia and other parts of the world,439 helping the Chinese
government consolidate economic power within its belt and road initiative (BRI) region. Such
partnerships, where the government is the undisputed boss, are not possible in the United States or
Europe. When Facebook tried to launch its own cryptocurrency, 440 the US government
successfully fought the idea to its death. Facebook’s Libra and the US digital dollar could not join
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forces to create an American version of the eCNY that builds on Facebook's worldwide social
network. This highlights the political and economic differences between China and the West,
especially the United States. However, in both places, political factors have trumped economic
factors as evidenced by the death of the Libra project in the United States and the subordination of
Tencent and Alipay in China.
It is important to recognize China's response to the cryptocurrency phenomenon goes
beyond the regulatory move to ban them and the launch of an alternative in the form of a CBDC.
The Chinese government has made efforts to become the undisputed leader in blockchain
technology and its applications. The eCNY’s smart contract feature is one good example. The
private sector in China is, once again, is at the forefront. Chinese technology companies lead the
list of most innovative companies in the blockchain sector.441 Alipay’s parent company, Ant
Financial, is a good example.442 Ant Financial is on top of the list of companies that own the
highest number of blockchain-related patents. At one point, the company owned over 10% of all
blockchain patents.443 Such technological advantages are at the heart of China’s successful
regulatory response to cryptocurrencies because the eCNY would not have happened if not for the
partnership with such tech giants and their advanced proprietary technologies. Ant Financial and
WeChat have both the technological know-how444 and the scale to become undisputed world
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leaders in payment systems. If this happens, the eCNY would indirectly become the most dominant
financial system.
The successful launch of the eCNY is no surprise. China has been the leader in mobile
payments for many years and has dwarfed the United States. Even in 2017, over $15 trillion worth
of mobile payments were made in China, more than forty times the amount processed in the US.445
Now, China has the first-mover advantage in the CBDC race. The evolution of the eCNY teaches
several valuable lessons. In the language of game theory, CBDCs represent a Nash equilibrium
that’s acceptable to both the government and the private sector. CBDCs are the future of money
because the future will be more digital and at least a simple majority of the public will prefer the
stability offered by governments over turbulent innovations offered by the private sector. They are
the middle ground between risky yet convenient private digital currencies that are built on an
innovative technology such as blockchain and reliable government-backed fiat money that uses
old technologies such as printing and minting. A survey by the Bank for International Settlements
among its members i.e., central banks from across the world, indicated that 86% of the respondents
are actively researching digital currencies.446 European Central Bank’s President Christine
Lagarde has planned for a digital euro by 2025. 447 In the United States, President Joseph Biden
issued an executive order 448 to study the option of a digital dollar.
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In contrast to the cooperative games in the United States and Europe, China ended up
banning cryptocurrencies. Although the government’s narrative on the reason for this ban cites
aforementioned factors such as financial instability, money laundering, and fraud, there are also
other reasons that are more important and obvious, but not officially acknowledged. The driving
force behind the ban is that the government was working on the launch of the digital version of the
Yuan. This Central Bank Digital Currency had been in the making since 2014. Other reasons
include the problem of capital flight and the need to shut down mechanisms that take away
economic control from the highly centralized government This culture of sovereignty, in part, led
to the creation of the CDBC. The final but most important factor is China’s desire to, one day,
replace the dollar as the most dominant currency in the world by controlling the great power
competition.
The eCNY system can have widespread geopolitical implications because it can also be
used as an alternative to the US-dominated SWIFT system to circumvent sanctions. After Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine in 2022, America and its allies imposed heavy sanctions to cripple the Russian
economy. But, with China’s support, Russia managed to continue trading coal and oil by accepting
payments in Yuan.449 Economic sanctions, which have been a key component of America’s grand
strategy since World War II, can become pointless if the eCNY becomes ubiquitous. This would
deal a death blow to America’s ability to counter terrorism, transnational crimes, and other illegal
activities as well.
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Cryptocurrencies have led to a new technological arms race for global domination 450 in
which China now has a strong first mover advantage.451 China has declared its intent to become
the most dominant player in the blockchain sector by 2025. To this end, it has planned to create an
‘advanced blockchain industrial system’ and create a network that embraces leading developers in
the field.452 Blockchain technology can be a powerful tool in China’s ‘weaponized
interdependence’ approach to geopolitical dominance. This approach refers to China’s track record
creating ‘debt traps’ by offering loans and infrastructure development projects to underdeveloped
and undeveloped parts of the world in exchange for strategic value, which can take several forms
such as geographical access and natural resources. In many cases, China has seized ports and other
infrastructure for failure to repay these debts.453 Global blockchains that support monetary systems
and other data services, including those run by Chinese companies like Alipay, can give China
unparalleled access on an everyday basis. This approach can be used in developed parts of the
world as well. Several Western nations have embraced Chinese payment systems 454 although the
US invoked National Security concerns to block Alipay.455
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China’s response to cryptocurrencies has been driven by its geopolitical ambition. The case
of China v. GPCs is clearly a game of conflict. Although the eCNY system is labeled as a tool for
reducing economic inequality within China, it’s primarily a tool in the great power competition
with the United States. China has successfully used its currency as a strategic tool for a long
time.456 The eCNY can now offer China new ways. For example, the system can be used as a tool
for creating weaponized interdependence because the CBDC system can be tweaked to offer not
just payment services, but also smart contracts and other record-keeping services that
underdeveloped countries usually lack. By offering such digital infrastructure, China can access
highly valuable economic data alongside unprecedented control. By encouraging ‘Yuanization’ in
lieu of dollarization and cryptonization 457 in the developing world, China’s eCNY can swiftly gain
global dominance over the US dollar. This would affect not only the US dollar’s long-standing
position as the world’s de facto reserve currency458 but also America’s hegemonic status. China
can potentially overpower the world scene without firing a single shot through skillfully
weaponizing the eCNY, just like the Medici family did. After all, as Sun Tzu said, “To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out to explore one specific research question: What are the factors that
affect the regulation of global private currencies? Based on an extensive review of literature from
international political economy and closely related fields such as economics, the dissertation
discussed the several factors that have been established as being independent variables in the
context of monetary policy and regulatory approaches involving money and currencies. Followed
by an in-depth explanation of what money is, the dissertation also painted a detailed portrait of
what global private currencies (GPCs) are. After explaining how cryptocurrencies work, how they
started, and how they evolved over the span of a decade, previous chapters highlighted regulatory
concerns. Based on the literature and history of money and GPCs, hypotheses were developed in
response to the research question.
It was hypothesized that every major factor that affected the regulation of traditional money
- anti-money-laundering (AML) laws, compliance with systems built for fiat currencies,
transparency in operations, culture of sovereignty, and great power competition - was relevant to
the regulation of GPCS. The one regulatory factor that affects traditional money but not GPCs is
counterfeiting. This is because of the immutable nature of blockchain technology, which solves
the problem of double spending and prevents counterfeiting. However, cryptocurrencies have
created new problems like enabling of ransomwares. This has led to concerns about consumers
and infrastructure. The nature of blockchain technology also brought up a concern that was not
found in the context of traditional paper money and its digital operations: high demands for
electricity and the resulting environmental impacts. A comparative study involving three cases the United States, European Union, and China - proved every hypothesis and established that the
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five factors are indeed relevant regulation of GPCs. These factors account for almost all major
regulatory responses related to GPCs but are not exhaustive. More research is needed to further
knowledge on this evolving phenomenon.
Based on the literature review and the histories of money and GPCs, it was also clear that
there are six broad dimensions that are relevant to money - political, economic, social,
technological, legal, and environmental (PESTLE). Using concepts from game theory, the
dissertation also laid out three sets of frameworks. These simplified frameworks capture both the
big-picture dynamics and the grassroots-level details that affect those dynamics. These
frameworks are designed to help academics, analysts, and policymakers deliberate various
scenarios. For example, a scenario that is similar to a ‘conflict’ game such as ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
can be changed into a ‘cooperation’ game, where the Nash equilibrium is acceptable to both sides,
by bringing about certain changes in payoffs, which usually reflect grassroots-level changes in
political stances, economic policy, social norms, technological standards, legal provision, and
environmental constraints. The game theory framework was also used to characterize strategic
interactions between governments and GPCs on a spectrum between cooperation and conflict. This
approach was used the analyze the cases of United States, European Union, and China. These case
studies established that five key factors condition regulatory responses to GPCs. However,
although every factor was relevant in each case study, the factors do not carry equal weights.
The first factor - compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) laws - is primarily related
to the government’s responsibilities in the areas of security, and the need to ensure tax revenues.
AML laws help governments prevent terrorist activity by clamping down financial and monetary
transactions by bad actors. AML laws also help governments ensure tax revenues, which are
crucial for funding the state. GPCs, due to the ability to perform transactions that are difficult to
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trace, can be used by bad actors to fund terrorism and other criminal activities. GPCs can also be
used by white-collared criminals to avoid taxes, depriving the government of funds. GPCs and
GPC exchanges that comply with these laws (e.g., Coinbase) have been seen favorably by
lawmakers and regulatory agencies. Conversely, GPCs that attempt to disrupt this order are
cracked down by governments.
The second factor - compliance with systems built for fiat currencies - is primarily related
to the government’s responsibility to maintain a stable economy. Fiat currencies are the legal
tender within each nation i.e., the government’s permitted unit of money that’s used in all lawful
exchanges. Governments have previously allowed tokens and other mechanisms that are used
within privately-owned settings such as casinos and videogames but only if they’re ultimately tied
to the legal tender. In the case of GPCs, a subset known as stablecoins include digital currencies
whose values are tethered to the legal tender. Such stablecoins have been seen much more
favorably by governments while the rest are seen as threats to economic stability and governmental
control over the economy.
The third factor - transparency in operations - is unique to GPCs because of the way the
underlying blockchain technology operates. GPCs can be anonymous, pseudonymous, or fully
transparent, depending on the way they are designed. Most governments have been cooperative
with GPCs and exchanges that promise to cooperate. An example of cooperation in the context of
operational transparency is the provision of a ‘backdoor’ to access user information during
investigations. GPCs that have high levels of transparency by design have been allowed to operate
more freely compared to those with opaque features. GPCs such as Monero, which fall under the
‘privacy coins’ category, have received increased security from regulators. Facebook’s Libra was
killed because Swiss secrecy laws would have prevented regulators from gaining access.
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The fourth factor - culture of sovereignty - is a major force in regions where the State and
its artifacts are held in high regard by its citizens. Since the State has had a monopoly over money
for most of human history, large sections of the population are still not comfortable with the idea
of money being separated from the State.
The fifth factor - great power competition - is the driving force behind the responses seen
in China. This factor is also relevant in the context of the United States as seen in discussions on
the digital dollar. Economic warfare through currencies has been an integral part of every
superpower’s global strategy for dominance across history.
The dissertation also demonstrated how these five factors have political, economic, social,
technological, legal, and environmental (PESTLE) dimensions. The first factor – compliance with
anti-money laundering (AML) laws – has political, social, economic, and technological aspects.
The second factor – compliance with systems built for fiat currencies (i.e., legal tender) – has
economic and legal aspects. The third factor – transparency in operations – has all six aspects. The
fourth factor – culture of sovereignty – has political, social, and legal aspects. The fifth factor –
great power competition – has political and social aspects. The PESTLE framework is more than
a tool that helps us organize factors. It helps us understand the interconnected nature of these
factors. The framework, when used as a tool for inquiry, is helpful in eliciting more details and
new factors. This is important because the five factors do not explain every regulatory action.
Given the rapidly evolving nature of the phenomenon, it is difficult to ascertain every factor. It’s
also important to note that the five factors identified in this dissertation are relevant only within
the context of the PESTLE settings and other conditions that exist in each nation. For example, in
the United States, cultural and political values such as individual liberties will ensure that the
digital dollar does not resemble the eCNY. Other settings such as the type of government and
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economy are also relevant. For example, it can be argued that democratic states that have liberal
tendencies and a free-market economy seem to be interested in legalizing and integrating GPCs
(i.e., a cooperation game) while authoritarian states that want more control over their economies
and societies have taken measures to restrict or ban GPCs (i.e., a ‘conflict’ game.).
GPCs may seem new and revolutionary but they’re merely the latest version of an age-old
phenomenon. Private currencies have existed for centuries, in various forms. However, the
blockchain is seen as a revolutionary invention not just for currencies but also for other
applications such as energy, transportation, and record-keeping. Blockchain technology is said to
be in its infancy, just like the internet once was. Several scholars have compared the current era to
the dot-com bubble era, suggesting that blockchain, like the internet, will survive and transform
the world later even if some of the companies and applications do not survive. The rise of GPCs
has unexpectedly led to the creation of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), a more efficient
and more potent form of state-backed money that can further strengthen governments and their
control over monetary systems. Every major nation is working on its own version of the CBDC to
mitigate the effects of GPCs within its economy. While CBDCs might offer some of the same
features as GPCs, they cannot offer the ideological comfort that many derive from owning and
using private currencies. CBDCs also cannot act as a hedge against inflation the way some believe
GPCs can. While GPCs have the potential to transform finance the way internet transformed
media, it’s more likely that digital fiat currencies will dominate while GPCs continue to co-exist.
When future generations use the cliché about money making the world go around, they will be
referring to money in the forms of CBDCs and GPCs.

215
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abi-Habb, Maria. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times.
June 25, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lankaport.html.
Adkisson, Jay. “The Cryptocurrency Paradox And Why Crypto Is Failing.” Forbes.
November 28, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/11/28/thecryptocurrency-paradox-and-why-crypto-is-failing/?sh=458c2afa7c9d.
Agenzia Entrate. "Risoluzione Ministeriale 72/E del 2 settembre 2016, Interpello ai sensi
dell’art. 11, legge 27 luglio 2000, n. 212, Trattamento Fiscale Applicabile alle Societa
che Svolgono Attivita di Servizi Relativi a Monete Virtuali [Ministerial Resolution
72/E of September 2, 2016, Rule Issued According to Art. 11 of Law No. 212 of July
27, 2000, Fiscal Treatment Applicable to Companies that Develop Service Activities
Related to Virtual Currencies]." September 2, 2016. https://perma.cc/9EAZ-LS79.
Ahmad Naheem, Mohammed. "Regulating Virtual Currencies–the Challenges of Applying
Fiat Currency Laws to Digital Technology Services." Journal of Financial
Crime (2018).
Alabama Legislature. "HB 177". (2020).
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/SearchableInstruments/2020RS/PrintFi
les/HB177-int.pdf.
Alabama Legislature. "HB 215". (2017).
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/SearchableInstruments/2017RS/PrintFi
les/HB215-enr.pdf.

216
Alabama Legislature. "HB 318". (2020).
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/SearchableInstruments/2020RS/PrintFi
les/HB318-int.pdf.
Alabama Legislature. "HB 372". (2021).
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/SearchableInstruments/2021RS/PrintFi
les/HB372-int.pdf.
Alaska Legislature. "The House Labor And Commerce Committee. HB 0271". (2016).
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/29/Bills/HB0271B.PDF.
Alaska Legislature. "The Senate Rules Committee. SB 0152A". (2016).
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/29/Bills/SB0152A.PDF.
Alexandre, Ana. “Chinese Internet Court Employs AI and Blockchain to Render Judgement.”
Coin Telegraph. April 25, 2019. https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinese-internetcourt-employs-ai-and-blockchain-to-render-judgement.
Alibasa, Benedict. “Facebook Set to Reveal Own Cryptocurrency in June, Report Says.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/06/06/facebook-set-to-reveal-owncryptocurrency-in-june-report-says/.
Alldridge, Peter. "Money Laundering and Globalization." Journal of law and society 35, no.
4 (2008): 437- 463
Allison, Graham. "The Thucydides trap." Foreign Policy 9 (June 9, 2017).
Arizona Legislature. "Income tax; Virtual Currency." SB1145. (2018).
https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/53leg/2R/bills/SB1145P.pdf.

217
Arkansas Legislature. "HB1888." (2021).
https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/FTPDocument?path=%2FBills%2F2021R%2FPu
blic%2FHB1888.pdf.
Arkansas Legislature. "SB150." (2021).
https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Acts/FTPDocument?path=%2FACTS%2F2021R%2FP
ublic%2F&file=532.pdf&ddBienniumSession=2021%2F2021R.
Armstrong, Brian. “David Marcus, Head of Messenger at Facebook, Will Be Joining
Coinbase’s Board,” The Coinbase Blog. December 13, 2017.
https://blog.coinbase.com/david-marcus-head-of-messenger-at-facebook-will-bejoining-coinbases-board-2675d5c9c967.
Armstrong, Brian. “David Marcus, Head of Messenger at Facebook, Will Be Joining
Coinbase’s Board.” The Coinbase Blog. Last modified December 13, 2017.
https://blog.coinbase.com/david-marcus-head-of-messenger-at-facebook-will-bejoining-coinbases-board-2675d5c9c967.
Assemblée Nationale [National Assembly]. "Mission d’information sur les monnaies
virtuelles [Information Mission on Cryptocurrencies]." March 19, 2018,
https://perma.cc/JNU5-4MRG.
Baker, Paddy. “Australians Won't Use Libra, Believes Central Bank.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/australians-wont-use-Librabelieves-central-bank.
Baker, Paddy. “Facebook's Social Media Platforms May Give Libra Unfair Advantage, Says
ECB's Lagarde.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.

218
https://www.coindesk.com/facebooks-social-media-platforms-may-give-Libra-unfairadvantage-says-ecbs-lagarde.
Baker, Paddy. “Mastercard Left Libra Association Over Regulatory and Viability Concerns,
Says CEO.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/mastercard-left-Libra-association-on-regulatory-andviability-concerns-says-ceo.
Baker, Paddy. “Switzerland Softens Tone on Libra After Ex-President Says Project 'Failed'.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/switzerland-softens-tone-on-Libra-after-ex-president-saysproject-failed.
Banco De Portugal. "Moedas Virtuais." https://perma.cc/YR5Q-9DWV.
Bank of Lithuania. "Bank of Lithuania Announces Its Position on Virtual Currencies and
ICO." October 11, 2017. https://perma.cc/B7C8-CPMN.
Bank of Lithuania. "Position of the Bank of Lithuania on Virtual Currencies and Initial Coin
Offering." October 10, 2017. https://perma.cc/V85N-PG47.
Bank of Slovenia. "Financial Stability Board Warning". September 10, 2017.
https://perma.cc/GLK6-XB9X.
Bank of Slovenia. "Financial Stability Board Warning". September 10, 2017.
https://perma.cc/GLK6-XB9X.
Bank of Slovenia. "Questions and Answers on Virtual Currencies". January 18, 2018.
https://perma.cc/C3XV-HR2A.
Bank of Slovenia. "Questions and Answers on Virtual Currencies". January 18, 2018.
https://perma.cc/C3XV-HR2A.

219
Bank of Spain, "Comunicado Conjunto de la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(CNMV) y Banco de España [Joint Press Statement by CNMV and Banco de España
on “Cryptocurrencies” and “Initial Coin Offerings” (ICOs)]." February 8, 2018.
https://perma.cc/K5J4-WJM4.
Banque de France. Focus no. 10. "Les dangers liés au développement des monnaies
virtuelles: l’exemple du Bitcoin [The Dangers of the Development of Virtual
Currencies: The Bitcoin Example]." December 5, 2013. https://perma.cc/K93LHLAC.
Barrett, Scott. “Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making.”
N.p.: OUP Oxford. (2003).
Baydakova, Anna. “Diem Co-Creator Says Original Plan for Stablecoin Was 'Naive'.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/diem-cocreator-says-original-plan-for-stablecoin-was-naive.
Baydakova, Anna. “Facebook Blockchain Job Openings Top 20 Amid Staffing Spree.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/03/08/facebook-blockchain-job-openingstop-20-amid-staffing-spree/.
BBC. “North Korea Hackers Stole $400m of Cryptocurrency in 2021.” January 14, 2022.
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-59990477.
Bharathan, Vipin. “Fed Partners With MIT Based Digital Currency Initiative To Explore
Central Bank Digital Currency.” Forbes. August 30, 2020.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/vipinbharathan/2020/08/30/fed-partners-with-mit-

220
based-digital-currency-initiative-to-explore-central-bank-digitalcurrency/?sh=1928fa363fa1.
Biggs, John. “Facebook Registers Secretive 'Libra' Cryptocurrency Firm in Switzerland.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/05/17/facebook-registers-secretive-Libracryptocurrency-firm-in-switzerland/.
Biggs, John. “US Watchdog Groups Call for Congress to Put a Freeze on Facebook's Libra.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/uswatchdog-groups-call-for-congress-to-put-a-freeze-on-facebooks-Libra.
Bollen, Rhys. "The legal status of online currencies: are Bitcoins the future?." Journal of
Banking and Finance Law and Practice (2013).
Bomberger, William A., and Gail E. Makinen. “Seigniorage, legal tender, and the demand
notes of 1861.” Economic Inquiry 48, no. 4 (2010)
Bostick, Romaine, Taylor Riggs, and Caroline Hyde. “Miami Mayor Seeks Wider Crypto
Use After Taking Pay in Bitcoin.” Bloomberg, December 4, 2021.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-03/miami-mayor-seeks-widercrypto-use-after-taking-pay-inBitcoin#:~:text=Miami%20Mayor%20Francis%20Suarez%2C%20who,of%20crypto
currency%20across%20the%20city.
Brakeville, Sloane, and Bhargav Perepa. “Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distributed
Ledgers.” IBM Developer. Last modified May 31, 2019.
https://developer.ibm.com/tutorials/cl-blockchain-basics-intro-bluemix-trs/.

221
Brett, Jason. “Congress Has Introduced 18 Bills On Crypto And Blockchain In 2021.”
Forbes. August 22, 2022.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2021/08/22/congress-has-introduced-18-newbills-on-crypto-and-blockchain-in-2021/?sh=4e0ca099263b.
Brett, Jason. “In 2019-2020, Congress Introduced 40 Crypto And Blockchain Bills.” Forbes.
October 17, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/10/17/in-2019-2020congress-introduced-40-crypto-and-blockchain-bills/?sh=4b632eec6213.
Brett, Jason. “U.S. House Passes Bill To Create First Crypto Task Force On Digital Assets.”
Forbes. April 22, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2021/04/22/ushouse-passes-bill-to-create-first-crypto-task-force-on-digitalassets/?sh=11d5a0b26612.
Broz, Lawrence. “The Domestic Politics of International Monetary Order: The Gold
Standard.” (2002).
Bruns, Bryan Randolph. "Names for games: locating 2× 2 games." Games 6, no. 4 (2015):
Bulgarian National Bank. "Press Release, National Bank of Bulgaria, European Supervisors
Warn Consumers About the Risks of Buying Virtual Currencies." February 14,
2018.https://perma.cc/Z3S7-KCMM..
Bundesministerium Für Finanzen. "Steuerliche Behandlung von Kryptowährungen (virtuelle
Währungen)/Tax Treatment of Cryptocurrencies (Virtual Currencies)."
http://perma.cc/BU4Z-3BFY.
California Legislative Information. "AB-1489 Virtual Currency Businesses: Regulation".
(2019).

222
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB148
9.
Camacho, Antonio Ruiz. “Meta's Crypto Project Diem to Shut down after Pushback from
Regulators.” CNET. February 1, 2022. https://www.cnet.com/personalfinance/crypto/metas-crypto-project-diem-to-shut-down-after-pushback-fromregulators/.
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance. "Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption
Index". Accessed June 6, 2022. https://ccaf.io/cbeci/index
Campbell, Charlie. “How China’s Digital Currency Could Challenge the Almighty Dollar.”
Time. August 11, 2021. https://time.com/6084146/china-digital-rmb-currency/.
Canepa, Francesco. “ECB's Draghi Says Not His Job to Regulate Bitcoin.” Reuters. Last
modified February 13, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currenciesecb/ecbs-draghi-says-not-his-job-to-regulate-Bitcoin-idUSKCN1FX1PW.
Cang, Alfred, Heng Xie, Amanda Wang, and Zheping Huang. “China Intensifies Hunt for
Cryptocurrency Miners in Hiding.” Bloomberg. September 16, 2021.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-16/china-said-to-intensify-huntfor-cryptocurrency-miners-in-hiding.
Carruthers, Bruce G. "The Social Meaning of Credit, Value, And Finance." Money Talks:
Explaining How Money Really Works.
Carruthers, Bruce G., and Sarah Babb. "The Color Of Money and The Nature of Value:
Greenbacks and Gold In Postbellum America." American Journal of Sociology 101,
no. 6 (1996): 1556-1591.

223
Castillo, Michael Del. “Blockchain 50: Billion Dollar Babies.” Forbes. April 16, 2019.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/04/16/blockchain-50-billiondollar-babies/?sh=26b488f857cc#1d4d32957ccb.
Cavalcanti, Ricardo and Ed Nosal. "Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism
Design." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43 (2011): 625-636.
CB Insights. “Blockchain Trends In Review.” July 17, 2019.
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/blockchain-trends-opportunities/.
Central Bank of Cyprus. "Attention to the Risks Associated with Virtual Currencies." Press
Release. February 7, 2014, https://perma.cc/3AP9-9DKC.
Central Bank of Cyprus. "Attention to the Risks Associated with Virtual Currencies." Press
Release. February 7, 2014. https://perma.cc/3AP9-9DKC.
Central Bank of Ireland. "EBA Warning and Opinion on Virtual Currencies."
https://perma.cc/2ZCW-8SZ9.
CFTC. “Release Number 8139-20.” March 24, 2020.
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8139-20
Christopher, Catherine Martin. Whack-A-Mole: Why prosecuting digital currency exchanges
won't stop online money laundering. Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 18 (2014)
Clark, Mitchell. “What We Know about China’s Cryptocurrency Crackdown.” The Verge.
June 23, 2021. https://www.theverge.com/2021/6/23/22544367/china-cryptocrackdown-Bitcoin-mining-sichuan-ban-hydro-cryptocurrency-trading.
Coello, Emilio Rivero. “Are Cryptocurrencies Useful for Remittances?” Coin Center.
January 6, 2020. https://www.coincenter.org/are-cryptocurrencies-useful-forremittances/.

224
Cohen, Benjamin J. "The triad and the unholy trinity: problems of international monetary
cooperation." In International Political Economy, pp. 255-266. Routledge, 2002.
Coinbase Launches Retail Bitcoin Service in Singapore, Canada. Reuters. Last modified
September 3, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-Bitcoin-coinbaseidUSL1N1182G420150902
Colorado Legislature. "SB19-088". (2019).
http://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2019A/bills/sl/2019a_sl_110.pdf
Connecticut Legislature. "HB 5001". (2018). https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/TOB/h/2018HB05001-R00-HB.htm.
Connecticut Legislature. "HB 6802". (2015). https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/TOB/H/2015HB06802-R00-HB.htm.
Connecticut Legislature. "SB 0513". (2018). https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/FC/2018SB00513-R000553-FC.htm.
Council Of District of Columbia. “B23-0225”. Legislative Information Management System.
2019. http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/42191/B23-0225-Introduction.pdf.
Council Of District of Columbia. “B23-0654”. Legislative Information Management System.
2018. http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/39542/B22-0654-Introduction.pdf
CSSF. "Avertissement sur les monnaies virtuelles [Warning About Cryptocurrencies]."
March 14, 2018. https://perma.cc/7B3F-QLKY.
Cuen, Leigh. “Concerns Over Facebook Data Use Derailed at Least 3 Crypto Partnerships.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/concernsover-facebook-data-use-derailed-at-least-3-crypto-partnerships.

225
Dale, Brady. “Coinbase: DeFi Could Hurt Us and US Regulations Make It Hard to Fight
Back.” Coindesk. Last modified September 14, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/business/2021/02/25/coinbase-defi-could-hurt-us-and-usregulations-make-it-hard-to-fight-back/.
Dale, Brady. “Libra Association's Crypto Members Remain Unfazed by Regulatory
Backlash.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/08/27/Libra-associations-crypto-membersremain-unfazed-by-regulatory-backlash/.
Dale, Brady. “Libra Scales Back Global Currency Ambitions in Concession to Regulators.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/Librascales-back-global-currency-ambitions-in-concession-to-regulators.
Dale, Brady. “MIT's Christian Catalini Said to Be Working on Facebook's Cryptocurrency.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/05/03/mits-christian-catalini-said-to-beworking-on-facebooks-cryptocurrency/.
Dam, Kenneth W. "The Legal Tender Cases." The Supreme Court Review (1981): 367-412.
De, Nikhilesh. “4 US Lawmakers Join Call to Freeze Facebook's Libra Project.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/4-us-lawmakers-joincall-to-freeze-facebooks-Libra-project.
De, Nikhilesh. “Congress Drew a Fine Line Between Libra and Crypto – That's a First.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/congressdrew-a-fine-line-between-Libra-and-crypto-thats-a-first.

226
De, Nikhilesh. “Facebook Has Yet to Answer US Lawmakers' Questions About Libra
Crypto.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-has-yet-to-answer-us-lawmakers-questionsabout-Libra-crypto.
De, Nikhilesh. “Facebook to Senators: Libra Crypto Will Respect Privacy.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-to-senatorsLibra-cryptocurrency-will-respect-consumer-privacy.
De, Nikhilesh. “Facebook-Led Libra Forms Governing Council After Big-Name
Departures.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-led-Libra-forms-governing-council-after-bigname-departures.
De, Nikhilesh. “Facebook's David Marcus: Libra Crypto Users Won't Have to Trust Us.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebooksdavid-marcus-Libra-crypto-users-wont-have-to-trust-us.
De, Nikhilesh. “Facebook's Libra Should Be Regulated Like a Security, Says Former CFTC
Chair.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/07/16/facebooks-Libra-should-be-regulatedlike-a-security-says-former-cftc-chair/.
De, Nikhilesh. “Facebook’s Libra Just Got Its First Major Supporter in Congress.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebooks-Libra-justgot-its-first-major-supporter-in-congress.
De, Nikhilesh. “Fed Chair Says Libra 'Cannot Go Forward' Until Facebook Addresses
Concerns.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.

227
https://www.coindesk.com/fed-chair-says-Libra-cannot-go-forward-until-facebookaddresses-concerns.
De, Nikhilesh. “Former CFTC Officials Ramp Up Push for Digital Dollar With Accenture
Partnership.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/former-cftc-officials-ramp-up-push-for-digital-dollarwith-accenture-partnership.
De, Nikhilesh. “Halt Libra? US Lawmakers Call for Hearings on Facebook's Crypto.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/halt-Libraus-lawmakers-call-for-hearings-on-facebooks-crypto.
De, Nikhilesh. “However Long It Takes': Zuckerberg Vows to Win Over Libra Regulators.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/07/25/however-long-it-takes-zuckerbergvows-to-win-over-Libra-regulators/.
De, Nikhilesh. “Libra Rebrands to 'Diem' in Anticipation of 2021 Launch.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/Libra-diem-rebrand.
De, Nikhilesh. “PayPal Withdraws From Facebook-Led Libra Crypto Project.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/paypal-withdrawsfrom-facebook-led-Libra-crypto-project.
De, Nikhilesh. “Report: Uber, PayPal, Visa to Back Facebook's GlobalCoin
Cryptocurrency.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/report-uber-paypal-visa-to-back-facebooks-globalcoincryptocurrency.

228
De, Nikhilesh. “Second US Congressional Hearing Is Scheduled on Facebook's Libra
Crypto.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/second-us-congressional-hearing-is-scheduled-onfacebooks-Libra-crypto.
De, Nikhilesh. “UK Central Bank Chief Sees Digital Currency Displacing US Dollar as
Global Reserve.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/bank-of-england-governor-calls-for-digital-currencyreplacement-to-the-dollar.
De, Nikhilesh. “US Lawmakers Ask Fed to Consider Developing 'National Digital
Currency'.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/us-congressmen-ask-fed-to-consider-developing-nationaldigital-currency.
De, Nikhilesh. “US President Donald Trump Says He's 'Not a Fan' of Bitcoin.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/07/12/us-president-donald-trump-says-hesnot-a-fan-of-Bitcoin/.
De, Nikhilesh. “US Senators Seek Information on Facebook's 'Libra' Crypto Project.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/ussenators-seek-information-on-facebooks-Libra-crypto-project .
De, Nikhilesh. “US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Is 'Not Comfortable' With Facebook's
Libra.” Coindesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/ustreasury-secretary-mnuchin-is-not-comfortable-with-facebooks-Libra.

229
De, Nikhilesh. “Vodafone Is the Latest Big Company to Quit Facebook-Founded Libra
Association.” Coindesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/vodafone-is-the-latest-big-company-to-quit-facebookfounded-Libra-association.
De, Nikhilesh. “Zuckerberg to Tell Congress: Libra Can Fix 'Failing' Financial System.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/10/22/zuckerberg-to-tell-congress-Libracan-fix-failing-financial-system/.
De, Nikhilesh, and Brady Dale. “Visa, Mastercard, EBay, Stripe Follow PayPal in Quitting
Facebook's Libra Project.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/10/11/visa-mastercard-ebay-stripe-followpaypal-in-quitting-facebooks-Libra-project/.
De, Nikhilesh, and Marc Hochstein. “Zuckerberg: Facebook Would Quit Libra If the
Association Launched Prematurely.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/zuckerberg-facebook-would-quit-Libra-if-associationlaunched-prematurely.
De, Nikhilesh, and Stan Higgins. “Senate Banking Committee Schedules July Hearing on
Facebook's Libra Crypto.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/senate-banking-committee-schedules-july-hearing-onfacebooks-Libra-crypto.
DeCanio, Stephen & Fremstad, Anders. "Game Theory and Climate Diplomacy
Background." Ecological Economics - 85 (2011).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.04.016.

230
Delaware Legislature. SB103. (2021).
https://legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GenerateHtmlDocument?legislationId=585
57&legislationTypeId=1&docTypeId=2&legislationName=SB103.
DePrince, Albert E., and William F. Ford. "The Privatization of Currency and Seigniorage."
Business Economics 32, no.1 (1997): 25-32.
Detrixe, John. “China’s Ant Financial, Thwarted in the US, Is Expanding Rapidly in
Europe.” Quartz. March 15, 2019. https://qz.com/1570052/ant-financials-alipay-isexpanding-rapidly-outside-of-china/.
Deutsche Bank. “Digital Yuan: What Is It and How Does It Work?”. July 14, 2021.
https://www.db.com/news/detail/20210714-digital-Yuan-what-is-it-and-how-does-itwork.
Deutsche Bundesbank Eurosystem. "Joint Deutsche Bundesbank and Deutsche Börse
Blockchain Prototype." Nov. 28, 2016. http://perma.cc/GD77-79FN.
DiCamillo, Nate. “Coinbase Listing: The Journey From Y Combinator to Nasdaq”.
Coindesk. Last modified September 14, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/04/13/coinbase-listing-the-journey-from-ycombinator-to-nasdaq/
DNB. "Position Paper By De Nederlandsche Bank. Roundtable Cryptocurrencies/Ico’s."
January 22, 2018. http://perma.cc/6C3N-GF4B.
Dowd, Kevin. "Is banking a natural monopoly?." Kyklos 45 No. 3 (1992).
Dubow, Jay A., and Anthony B. Creamer. "Fair Value Accounting: Reinforcing
Organizational Transparency and Accountability." Bus. L. Today (2013): 1.

231
Eichengreen, Barry. "Hegemonic Stability Theory and Economic Analysis: Reflections on
Financial Instability and the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort" (1996).
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working
Papers, no. C96-080, (1996), https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c96080.
Ekman, Alice. “China's Blockchain And Cryptocurrency Ambitions.” European Union
Institute For Security Studies. July 13, 2021.
https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-blockchain-and-cryptocurrency-ambitions.
Engen, John. “There Is No Disputing That China Is Ahead of the Rest of the World in
Mobile Payments. What Insight Does It Offer U.S. Bankers?” American Banker. n.d.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-chinas-mobile-payments-revolutionmatters-for-us-bankers.
Engen, John. “There Is No Disputing That China Is Ahead of the Rest of the World in
Mobile Payments. What Insight Does It Offer U.S. Bankers?” American Banker. n.d.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-chinas-mobile-payments-revolutionmatters-for-us-bankers.
European Banking Authority. “EBA Opinion on ‘Virtual Currencies”. January 4, 2014.
https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/657547/81
409b94-4222-45d7-ba3b-7deb5863ab57/EBA-Op-201408%20Opinion%20on%20Virtual%20Currencies.pdf?retry=1.
European Banking Authority. “Warning to Consumers on Virtual Currencies”. December 12,
2013.
https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/598344/b9

232
9b0dd0-f253-47ee-82a5c547e408948c/EBA%20Warning%20on%20Virtual%20Currencies.pdf?retry=1.
European Commission. “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions.” March 8, 2018.
http://perma.cc/F7NP-YPCP.
European Commission. “Financial Services – EU Regulatory Framework for Crypto-Assets”.
December 19, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-yoursay/initiatives/12089-Financial-services-EU-regulatory-framework-for-cryptoassets_en.
European Commission. “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the
Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing and
Amending Directive 2009/101/EC.” July 5, 2016. http://perma.cc/D4NP-V5UA.
European Union. “Official EU Currency.” n.d. https://european-union.europa.eu/institutionslaw-budget/euro/official-eu-currency_en.
European Union Law. "Bundesministerium der Finanzen [BMF] [Federal Ministry of
Finance], BMF-Schreiben. Umsatzsteuerliche Behandlung von Bitcoin und anderen
sog. virtuellen Währungen; EuGH-Urteil vom 22. Oktober 2015, C-264/14, Hedqvist
[BMF-Letter. VAT Treatment of Bitcoin and Other So-Called Virtual Currencies;
ECJ Decision of October, 2015, C-264/14, Hedqvist] (BMF Letter)." European Union
Law, Feb. 27, 2018. http://perma.cc/7Q6Q-MM9V.

233
Faris, James. “Miami, Home to the Bitcoin 2022 Conference, Has Quickly Become the
Center of the Crypto Universe. Leaders from FTX and BlockTower Capital Share
Why They're Flocking to South Florida — and Why Other Crypto Fanatics Should
Follow Suit.” Business Insider. April 6, 2022.
https://www.businessinsider.com/miami-crypto-capital-miamicoin-francis-suarezBitcoin-ftx-blocktower-capital-2022-2?IR=T.
Fefer, Rachel F. “Blockchain and International Trade.” Congressional Research Service. Last
modified June 25, 2019. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10810.pdf.
Feng, Coco, and Masha Borak. “China Plans to Accelerate Blockchain Development and
Adoption in Push to Become a World Leader in the Technology by 2025.” South
China Morning Post. June 9, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/tech/techtrends/article/3136515/china-plans-accelerate-blockchain-development-and-adoptionpush.
Financial Stability Council. "9th Session of the Financial Stability Council." Press Release.
December 18, 2017. https://perma.cc/29MV-2XP2.
Finlands Bank. "Bitcoin Involves Risk." January 14, 2014. https://perma.cc/T634-EMZM.
Fischer, Stanley. "Friedman versus hayek on private money: Review essay." Journal of
Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3) (1986): 433-439.
Florida Senate. "SB 1379". (2017).
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/1379/BillText/er/PDF.
Florida Senate. "SB 1626". (2017).
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/1626/BillText/c1/PDF.

234
Foster, Tom. “5 Strategies for Getting Mark Cuban to Invest in You.” Inc. May 2022.
https://www.inc.com/magazine/202205/tom-foster/mark-cuban-cold-email-mentorinvestor.html.
Foxley, William. “Bank of England Sets Out Rules for Libra Launch in the UK.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/bank-of-england-setsout-rules-for-Libra-launch-in-the-uk.
Foxley, William. “Coinbase-Led Group Aims to Help Crypto Firms Avoid Securities
Violations.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/09/30/coinbase-led-group-aims-to-helpcrypto-firms-avoid-securities-violations/.
Foxley, William. “France's Le Maire Attacks Facebook's 'Political' Ambitions With Libra.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/frances-lemaire-attacks-facebooks-political-ambitions-with-Libra.
Foxley, William. “German Finance Minister Supports Digital Euro, But 'Very Critical' of
Libra.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/german-finance-minister-supports-digital-euro-but-verycritical-of-Libra.
Foxley, William. “Libra Is 'Catalytic Event' for Central Banks, Says Head of Sweden's
Riksbank.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/Libra-is-catalytic-event-for-central-banks-says-head-ofswedens-riksbank.

235
Foxley, William. “US Lawmakers Call on Payment Giants to Exit 'Chilling' Libra Project.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/uslawmakers-call-on-payment-giants-to-exit-chilling-Libra-project.
Foxley, William. “Vulnerability Fixed in Facebook Contract Language for Libra
Cryptocurrency.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/vulnerability-fixed-in-facebook-contract-language-forLibra-cryptocurrency.
Frankenfield, Jake. “Cryptocurrency.” Investopedia. Last modified January 11, 2022.
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp.
Frieden, Jeffry A. "Exchange rate politics: Contemporary lessons from American history."
Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 81-103.
Gaming Bill cl. 2(1). "C228.” 2018,https://perma.cc/NV7F-VCD5.
Gartenberg, Chaim. “Facebook Reportedly Plans to Launch Its Own Cryptocurrency.” The
Verge. May 11, 2018. https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/11/17344318/facebookcryptocurrency-token-blockchain-report-david-marcus.
German Bundesbank. “Bitcoin Is Not a Virtual Currency.” February 20, 2018.
http://perma.cc/K8EKVZJM.
Gilpin, Robert. "Global political economy." In Global Political Economy. Princeton
university press, 2011.
Glasner, David. "How 'Natural' Is the Government Monopoly Over Money." (June 1, 2000).
Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2778253
Godbole, Omkar. “China Says Banks Must Block Crypto Transactions; Market Falls.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021.

236
https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/06/21/china-says-banks-must-block-cryptotransactions-market-falls/.
Goforth, David., Robinson, David. The topology of the 2x2 games : a new periodic table.
United Kingdom: Routledge, 2005.
Gordon, Richard K. "Rethinking Preventive Measures For Money Laundering and
Terrorism." (2010).
Government of Malta. "Press Release by the Parliamentary Secretariat for Financial
Services." November 29, 2017, https://perma.cc/FW37-K2WX.
Hambrick, Donald C. “Environmental Scanning and Organizational Strategy.” Strategic
Management Journal 3, no. 2 (1982): 159–74.
Hatmaker, Taylor. “Coinbase Ordered to Give the IRS Data on Users Trading More than
$20,000.” TechCrunch. November 30, 2017.
https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/29/coinbase-internal-revenue-service-taxation/.
Hausmann, Ricardo. "Should there be five currencies or one hundred and five?." Foreign
Policy (1999): 65-79.
Hawaii State Legislature. "HB 70". (2019).
https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2019/bills/HB70_.htm.
Hawaii State Legislature. "SB 1364". (2019).
https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2019/bills/SB1364_.htm.
Hawaii State Legislature. "SB 2129". (2018).
https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2018/bills/SB2129_.htm.
Hawaii State Legislature. "SB 2594" (2020).
https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2020/bills/SB2594_.htm.

237
Hayek, Friedrich August. Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined. Ludwig von
Mises Institute. (2009).
Heath, Alex. “Facebook Makes First Blockchain Acquisition With Chainspace.” Cheddar
News. February 5, 2019. https://cheddar.com/media/facebook-blockchain-acquisitionchainspace.
Heath, Alex. “Zuckerberg’s Dream of Launching a Cryptocurrency Is Officially Over.” The
Verge. January 31, 2022. https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/31/22911426/meta-diemcryptocurrency-confirms-sale
Helleiner, Eric. "The making of national money." In The Making of National Money. Cornell
University Press. (2018).
Hinterseer, Kris. "Criminal Finance:The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a
Comparative Legal Context." Netherlands: Springer Netherlands (2002).
Hochstein, Marc. “Bitcoin Noticeably Absent From Senate Hearing on Facebook's Libra.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/07/16/Bitcoin-noticeably-absent-fromsenate-hearing-on-facebooks-Libra/.
Hochstein, Marc. “Facebook Hires Two of Coinbase's Former Compliance Managers.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/05/14/facebook-hires-two-of-coinbasesformer-compliance-managers/.
Hochstein, Marc. “Lawmakers Amp Up Pressure on Facebook to Halt Libra Cryptocurrency
Development.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.

238
https://www.coindesk.com/lawmakers-amp-up-pressure-on-facebook-to-halt-Libracryptocurrency-development.
Hochstein, Marc. “US Lawmaker Calls Libra's Revamp Insufficient.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/us-lawmaker-calls-Librasrevamp-insufficient.
Holub, Mark & Johnson, Jackie. (2018). "Bitcoin Research Across Disciplines". The
Information Society 34. https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2017.1414094.
Huang, Eustance. “China’s Digital Yuan Could Challenge the Dollar in International Trade
This Decade, Fintech Expert Predicts.” CNBC. March 15, 2022.
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/15/can-chinas-digital-Yuan-reduce-the-dollars-usein-international-trade.html.
Idaho Legislature. "SB 1325". (2018). https://legislature.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sessioninfo/2018/legislation/S1325.pdf.
Illinois General Assembly. "HB 0854". (2021).
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/102/HB/PDF/10200HB0854lv.pdf.
Illinois General Assembly. "HB 3989". (2016).
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/99/HB/PDF/09900HB3989lv.pdf.
Illinois General Assembly. "HB 5335". (2018).
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/100/HB/PDF/10000HB5335lv.pdf
Indiana General Assembly. "HB 1683". (2019).
http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2019/bills/house/1683.
Indiana General Assembly. "Resolution 9". (2019).
http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2019/resolutions/senate/simple/9.

239
Iowa State Legislature. "HF 240". (n.d.).
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LGI/88/HF240.pdf.
Iowa State Legislature. "HF 2489". (n.d.).
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LGI/87/HF2489.pdf.
Iowa State Legislature. "SF 2079". (n.d.).
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LGI/88/SF2079.pdf.
Iowa State Legislature. "SF 2383". (n.d.).
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LGR/87/SF2383.pdf
Irish Tax and Customs. "Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on the Sale, Gift or Exchange of an
Asset." Nov. 21, 2017 https://perma.cc/3B4L-LW7N.
IRS. “Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions.” 2014.
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/frequently-asked-questionson-virtual-currency-transactions.
IRS. “Internal Revenue Bulletin (No. 2014 -16).” April 14, 2014.
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-16.pdf.
Jacobsen, Stine. "Danish Central Bank Head Issues Stark Warning on “Deadly” Bitcoin."
Reuters. December 18, 2017. https://perma.cc/QSM3-QGJZ.
Jobanputra, Jalak. “The Central Bank Business Model Is Under Attack.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/the-central-bank-businessmodel-is-under-attack.
John, Alun, Samuel Shen, and Tom Wilson. “China's Top Regulators Ban Crypto Trading
and Mining, Sending Bitcoin Tumbling.” Reuters. Last modified September 24, 2021.

240
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-central-bank-vows-crackdowncryptocurrency-trading-2021-09-24/.
Johnson, Bobbie. “China Cracks down on Virtual Economy.” The Guardian. June 30, 2009.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2009/jun/30/games-internet.
Jones, Marc. “Over $315,000 in Digital Yuan Used Every Day at Olympics, PBOC Official
Says.” Reuters. Last modified February 16, 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/technology/around-300-mln-digital-Yuan-used-every-dayolympics-pboc-official-says-2022-02-15/.
Judson, Ruth and Richard Porte. "Estimating the Volume of Counterfeit US Currency in
Circulation Worldwide: Data and extrapolation." In Financial Institutions and
Markets (2010): 241-268.
Kentucky General Assembly. "HB 230". (2021).
https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/21rs/hb230.html.
Kentucky General Assembly. "SB 134". (2021).
https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/21rs/sb134.html.
Kentucky General Assembly. "SB 177". (2021).
https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/21rs/sb177.html.
Kharpal, Arjun. “China Is Pushing for Broader Use of Its Digital Currency.” CNBC. January
10, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/11/china-digital-Yuan-pboc-to-expand-ecny-use-but-challenges-remain.html.
Kharpal, Arjun. “Cryptocurrency Market Value Tops $2 Trillion for the First Time as
Ethereum Hits Record High.” CNBC. April 6, 2021.

241
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/06/cryptocurrency-market-cap-tops-2-trillion-for-thefirst-time.html.
Kharpal, Arjun. “Report Finds $50 Billion of Cryptocurrency Moved out of China Hinting at
Capital Flight against Beijing Rules.” CNBC. Last modified August 22, 2020.
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/21/china-users-move-50-billion-of-cryptocurrencyout-of-country-hinting-at-capital-flight.html.
Khatri, Yogita. “Facebook in Talks to Build Ecosystem for Planned Stablecoin: WSJ.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/05/03/facebook-in-talks-to-buildecosystem-for-planned-stablecoin-wsj/.
King, Robert G. "On the economics of private money." Journal of Monetary Economics 12,
no. 1 (1983).
Klein, Aaron. “China's Digital Payment Revolution.” Brookings. April 2020.
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_china_digital_payments_klein.pdf.
Kreitner, Roy. (2012). "Legal History of Money." Annual Review of Law and Social Science
8 (2012): 415-431. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102811-173902.
Kuhn, Daniel. “Fed Chairman Jerome Powell Compares Bitcoin to Gold.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/fed-chairman-jeromepowell-compares-Bitcoin-to-gold.
Kuhn, Daniel. “Rep. Waters Says Congress Will Continue Review of Facebook's Libra.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/rep-waterssays-congress-will-continue-review-of-facebooks-Libra-crypto.

242
Kuhn, Daniel. “The Overton Window Opens for a Digital Dollar.” CoinDesk. Last modified
September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/the-overton-window-opens-for-adigital-dollar.
L’Essentiel. "L’État garde un oeil sur la monnaie virtuelle [The Government Keeps an Eye
on Cryptocurrencies]." June 26, 2017. https://perma.cc/U2DS-ZUGJ.
Latvijas Vēstnesis. "Amendments to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing." No. 222 (6049). November 8, 2017. https://perma.cc/8GEVDSF2.
Laux, Christian and Christian Leuz. "Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial
Crisis?". Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 1 (2010). 93-118.
Lawder, David, and Howard Schneider. “U.S. Regulators Signal Stronger Risk, Tax
Oversight for Cryptocurrencies.” Reuters. Last modified May 21, 2021.
https://www.reuters.com/technology/fed-citing-crypto-risk-open-digital-currencydebate-this-summer-2021-05-20/.
Le Point. "Un ancien de la Banque de France chargé d'une mission sur le Bitcoin [Former
Banque de France Official Tasked with a Mission on Bitcoin]." January 15,
2018.https://perma.cc/R6CD-GCV9..
Levi, Stuart D, and Alex B Lipton, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. “An
Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Potential and Inherent Limitations.”
Harvard Law School Forum On Corporate Governance. May 26, 2018.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-andtheir-potential-and-inherent-limitations/.

243
Li, Jane. “China Is Combating Crypto with a Push for the Digital Yuan.” Quartz. Last
modified December 22, 2021. https://qz.com/2065913/chinas-answer-to-crypto-isthe-digital-Yuan/.
Liao, Rita. “China's National Blockchain Network Embraces Global Developers.”
TechCrunch. February 4, 2021. https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/03/bsn-chinanational-blockchain/.
Liao, Shannon. “Coinbase Tells 13,000 Users Their Data Will Be Sent to the IRS Soon.” The
Verge. February 26, 2018. https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/26/17055264/coinbasecryptocurrency-tax-irs-compliance-court-order.
Liao, Shannon. “Facebook Is Creating a Mysterious Blockchain Division.” The Verge. May
8, 2018. https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/8/17332894/facebook-blockchain-groupemployee-reshuffle-restructure-david-marcus-kevin-weil.
Liao, Shannon. “The Marshall Islands Replaces the US Dollar with Its Own
Cryptocurrency.” The Verge. May 23, 2018.
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/23/17384608/marshall-islands-cryptocurrency-usdollar-usd-currency.
Locke, Taylor. “The Coinbase Co-Founders Met on Reddit and Launched the Company out
of a Two-Bedroom Apartment When ‘a Bitcoin Was Worth $6.’” CNBC. April 14,
2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/14/coinbase-co-founders-launched-when-aBitcoin-btc-was-worth-6.html.
Lomas, Natasha. “As Chinese Investors Pile Into Bitcoin, China’s Oldest Exchange, BTC
China, Raises $5M From Lightspeed.” TechCrunch. November 18, 2013.
https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/18/btc-china-series-a/.

244
London School Of Economics. “The US, China and the Global Race to Dominate Blockchain
and Crypto Technologies.”. February 22, 2022.
https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/events/2022/02/us-china-blockchain-cryptotechnologies/us-china-blockchain-crypto-technologies.
Louisiana State Legislature. "HB 701". (2020).
http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1182592.
Louisiana State Legislature. "HR no.33". (2021).
http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1216298.
Ludwig, Sean. “Y Combinator-Backed Coinbase Now Selling over $1M Bitcoins per
Month.” Venture Beat. February 8, 2013.
https://venturebeat.com/2013/02/08/coinbase-Bitcoin/.
Lyons, Kim. “China’s Central Bank Bans Cryptocurrency Transactions to Avoid ‘Risks.’”
The Verge. Last modified September 24, 2021.
https://www.theverge.com/2021/9/24/22691472/china-central-bank-cryptocurrencyillegal-Bitcoin.
Macheel, Tanaya. “Senate Banking Committee Presses Crypto Experts on Systemic Risk at
Hearing.” CNBC. July 27, 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/27/senate-bankingcommittee-presses-crypto-experts-on-systemic-risk-at-hearing.html.
Magliocca, Gerard N. "A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the Legal
Tender Cases." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 119.
Maine Legislature. "HP 1082". (2021).
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP1082&item=1&snu
m=130.

245
Maine Legislature. "HP 1204". (2021).
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP1204&item=1&snu
m=130
Makarov, Igor, and Antoinette Schoar. “Blockchain Analysis Of The Bitcoin Market Working Paper 29396.” National Bureau Of Economic Research. October 2021.
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29396/w29396.pdf.
Malta Gaming Authority, "A White Paper To Future Proof Malta’s Gaming Legal
Framework." July 2017. https://perma.cc/25QQ-8YZV.
Mandeng, Ousmène Jacques. "Cryptocurrencies, Monetary Stability and Regulation."
Germany's Nineteenth Century Private Banks of Issue (2018).
Marria, Vishal. “What A Cashless Society Could Mean For The Future.” Forbes. December
21, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/vishalmarria/2018/12/21/what-a-cashlesssociety-could-mean-for-the-future/?sh=13c608943263.
Maryland General Assembly. "HB 1634". (2018).
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2018RS/chapters_noln/Ch_731_hb1634E.pdf
Maryland General Assembly. "SB 754". (2020).
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2020RS/bills/sb/sb0754F.pdf
Matthews, Chris. “Coinbase Proposes Crypto-Focused Financial Regulator to Replace SEC
for Oversight of Digital Assets.” Market Watch. Last modified October 16, 2021.
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/coinbase-proposes-crypto-focused-financialregulator-to-replace-sec-for-oversight-of-digital-assets-11634235099.

246
McSweeney, Michael. “Coinbase Wants to Sell Blockchain Analysis Software to the IRS and
DEA a Year after Its Neutrino Acquisition.” The Block, January 5, 2020.
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/67551/coinbase-irs-dea-analytics-neutrino.
Methodological Guideline of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic No.
MF/10386/2018-721 for the Procedure of Taxing Virtual Currency," 2018,
https://perma.cc/C897-ZS9T.
Meyer, Richard. “Libra Crypto Is 'Undoubtedly' a Wakeup Call for Central Banks, Says ECB
Exec.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/Libra-crypto-is-undoubtedly-a-wakeup-call-for-centralbanks-says-ecb-exec.
Michaels, Dave. “Coinbase to Pay $6.5 Million to Settle CFTC Investigation Over Trading.”
Wall Street Journal. March 19, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/coinbase-to-pay6-5-million-to-settle-cftc-investigation-over-trading-11616192411.
Michigan Legislature. "HB 4103". (2019). http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20192020/publicact/pdf/2019-PA-0175.pdf.
Michigan Legislature. "HB 4105". (2019). http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20192020/publicact/pdf/2019-PA-0173.pdf.
Michigan Legislature. "HB 4107". (2019). http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20192020/publicact/pdf/2019-PA-0171.pdf.
Middlebrook, Stephen T., and Sarah Jane Hughes. "Substitutes for legal tender: Lessons from
History for the Regulation of Virtual Currencies." In Research Handbook on
Electronic Commerce Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, Indiana Legal Studies Research
Paper, no. 316 (2016).

247
Ministry of Finances. "Tax Consequences of Trading in Cryptocurrencies for Individual
Income Tax, Value-Added Tax and Tax on Civil Law Transactions." April 4, 2018.
https://perma.cc/37N9-TS6C.
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China. "PBOC,
CAC, MIIT, SAIC, CBRC, CSRC, and CIRC, Announcement on Preventing
Financial Risks from Initial Coin Offerings." September 4, 2017 (in Mandarin).
https://perma.cc/N88N-5CV5.
Minnesota Legislature. "HF 2538". (2019).
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php?number=HF2538&type=bill&version=1&s
ession=ls91&session_year=2019&session_number=0
Missouri House Of Representatives. "HB 1159". (2021).
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills191/hlrbillspdf/2266H.01I.pdf.
Missouri House Of Representatives. "HB 1247". (2021).
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills191/hlrbillspdf/2267H.01I.pdf.
Missouri House Of Representatives. "HB 1277". (2021).
https://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills211/hlrbillspdf/2532H.01I.pdf.
Mitchener, Kris James, Masato Shizume, and Marc D. Weidenmier. "Why did countries
adopt the gold standard? Lessons from Japan." The Journal of Economic History 70,
no. 1 (2010): 27-56.
Montana State Legislature. "HB 0584". (2019).
https://leg.mt.gov/bills/2019/billpdf/HB0584.pdf.
Montana State Legislature. "HB 0630". (2019).
https://leg.mt.gov/bills/2019/billpdf/HB0630.pdf

248
Morse, Andrew. “End of the Day for Meta's Diem Cryptocurrency: What You Need to
Know.” CNET, February 2, 2022. https://www.cnet.com/personalfinance/crypto/end-of-the-day-for-metas-diem-cryptocurrency-what-you-need- toknow/
Mulligan, Cathy. “Blockchain and Sustainable Growth.” United Nations. December 2018.
https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/blockchain-and-sustainable-growth.
Murtaught, Dan, and Qian Chen. “Russia Coal and Oil Paid for in Yuan Starts Heading to
China.” Bloomberg. Last modified April 7, 2022.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-07/russian-coal-and-oil-paid-forin-Yuan-to-start-flowing-to-china#xj4y7vzkg.
Nakamoto, Satoshi. "Bitcoin whitepaper." URL: https://Bitcoin. org/Bitcoin. pdf-(: 17.07.
2019) (2008).
Nandakumar, Girish Sreevatsan, and Jose Padilla. “A Game-Transformation-Based
Framework to Understand Initial Conditions and Outcomes in the Context of CyberEnabled Influence Operations (Cios).” Social, Cultural, and Behavioral Modeling
(2020): 288–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61255-9_28.
Natelson, Robert G. "Paper money and the original understanding of the coinage clause."
Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 31 (2008): 1017.
National Bank of Romania. "Commentary on Virtual Currency Schemes." March 11, 2015.
https://perma.cc/S8T2-DGRG.
National Bank of Romania. "The Position of the National Bank of Romania in Relation to the
Virtual Currencies." February 6, 2018. https://perma.cc/G9T9-CF3K.

249
National Bank of Slovakia. "Národná Banka Slovenska’s Warning to the Public on Bitcoin."
November 26, 2013. https://perma.cc/9A5B-3PCR.
Nebraska Legislature. "LB 648". (2021).
https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/107/PDF/Intro/LB648.pdf.
Nebraska Legislature. "LB 691". (2018).
https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/105/PDF/Intro/LB691.pdf.
Nebraska Legislature. "LB 987". (2018).
https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/105/PDF/Intro/LB987.pdf.
Nelson, Danny. “Fed Governor Brainard Identifies Libra Threat, Says Regulatory Hurdles
Abound.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/fed-governor-brainard-identifies-Libra-threat-saysregulatory-hurdles-abound.
Nelson, Danny. “Institutional Libra Backers Are Getting Cold Feet.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/institutional-Libra-backersare-getting-cold-feet.
Nevada Legislature . SB 44". (2019).
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/5963/Text
Nevada Legislature. "SB 39". (2020).
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/81st2021/Bill/7215/Overview.
New Jersey Legislature. "A 1392". (2020).
https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2020/A1500/1392_I1.HTM.
New Jersey Legislature. "A 2155". (2020).
https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2020/A2500/2155_I1.HTM.

250
New Jersey Legislature. "A 3817". (2018).
https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2018/A4000/3817_I1.HTM.
New Jersey Legislature. "A 4208". (2019).
https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2018/S4500/4208_I1.HTM
New York State Assembly. "A 03336". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A03336&term=2021.
New York State Assembly. "A 03747". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=a3747.
New York State Assembly. "A 03860". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=a3860.
New York State Assembly. "A 03906". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=a3906.
New York State Assembly. "A 06486". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=s6486.
New York State Assembly. "S 05044". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=s5044.
New York State Assembly. "S 06584". (2021).
https://www.assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=s6584.
Nicholson, Brid. "A Nation of Counterfeiters." Canadian Journal of History 44, no. 1 (2009):
142-144.
North Carolina Legislature. "HB 286". (2015).
https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/Bills/House/PDF/H289v3.pdf.

251
North Carolina Legislature. "HB 86". (2017).
https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2017/Bills/House/PDF/H86v4.pdf.
North Carolina Legislature. "SB 688". (2021).
https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2021/Bills/Senate/PDF/S688v1.pdf.
Nussbaum, Arthur. "Basic monetary conceptions in law." Michigan Law Review 35, no. 6
(1937).
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. "Sind virtuelle Währungen wie Bitcoin eine Alternative zu
klassischen Währungen wie dem Euro?" [Are Virtual Currencies Like Bitcoin an
Alternative to Traditional Currencies Like the Euro?]. http://perma.cc/AN2L-WHS5.
Ofoeda, Isaac, Elikplimi K. Agbloyor, Joshua Y. Abor, and Kofi A. Osei. "Anti Money
Laundering Regulations And Financial Sector Development." International Journal of
Finance & Economics (2020). https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2360
Oklahoma Legislature. "SB 1666". (2020). http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/201920%20INT/SB/SB1666%20INT.PDF.
Oklahoma Legislature. "SB 1667". (2020). http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/201920%20INT/SB/SB1667%20INT.PDF.
Oliver, John. “Cryptocurrencies”. Last Week Tonight With John Oliver. March 11, 2018.
25:20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6iDZspbRMg&feature=youtu.be
Orcutt, Mike. “An Attempted Heist at Coinbase Was Scary Good, Even Though It Failed.”
MIT Technology Review. August 8, 2019.
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/08/08/133823/an-attempted-heist-atcoinbase-was-scary-good-even-though-it-failed/.

252
Orcutt, Mike. “China’s Ubiquitous Digital Payments Processor Loves the Blockchain.” MIT
Technology Review. May 3, 2019.
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/03/135487/chinas-ubiquitous-digitalpayments-processor-loves-the-blockchain/.
Palmer, Daniel. “Central Banks to Question Facebook-Led Libra Over Financial Risks.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/globalcentral-banks-to-question-facebook-led-Libra-over-financial-risks.
Palmer, Daniel. “ECB's Benoit Coeure to Lead Central Banking Digital Currency Initiative.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/ecbsbenoit-coeure-to-lead-central-banking-digital-currency-initiative.
Palmer, Daniel. “ECB's Mersch Warns Over 'Treacherous Promises' of Facebook Libra.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/ecbsmersch-warns-over-treacherous-promises-of-facebook-Libra.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook Libra Already Facing an EU Antitrust Probe: Report.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libraalready-facing-an-eu-antitrust-probe-report.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook Libra Backers Are Not Official Partners Yet, Says Visa CEO.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebookLibra-backers-are-not-official-partners-yet-says-visa-ceo.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook Libra Brings 'Risks and Opportunities': Swiss Watchdog Chief.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebookLibra-brings-risks-and-opportunities-swiss-watchdog-chief.

253
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook Libra Might Never Launch, Company Concedes in SEC
Disclosure.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libra-might-not-ever-launch-concedes-firm.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook Libra Threat Could Spur Work on China's National Digital
Currency: PBoC Official.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libra-threat-could-spur-work-on-chinasnational-digital-currency-pboc-official.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook Libra, Other Cryptos Must Comply With US Rules: Treasury
Official.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libra-other-cryptos-must-comply-with-us-rulestreasury-official.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook-Led Libra Could Be Boon to UN, Says Crypto Project's Chief.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebookled-Libra-could-be-boon-to-un-says-crypto-projects-chief.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook's 'GlobalCoin' Crypto Will Be Tied to Multiple Currencies:
Exec.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebooks-globalcoin-crypto-will-be-tied-to-multiplecurrencies-exec.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook's 'GlobalCoin' Crypto Will Be Tied to Multiple Currencies:
Exec.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/06/07/facebooks-globalcoin-crypto-will-betied-to-multiple-currencies-exec/.

254
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook's David Marcus Responds to Critics Over Libra 'Threat'.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/facebooksdavid-marcus-responds-to-critics-over-Libra-threat.
Palmer, Daniel. “Facebook's Libra Pushes Back at Claims Project Is Threat to Financial
Stability.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-Libra-pushes-back-at-claims-project-is-threatto-financial-stability.
Palmer, Daniel. “France Says It Will Block Facebook Libra in Europe.” Coindesk. Last
modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/france-says-it-will-blockfacebook-Libra-in-europe-report.
Palmer, Daniel. “G7 Forming Task Force in Response to Facebook's Libra Cryptocurrency.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/g7forming-task-force-in-response-facebooks-Libra-cryptocurrency.
Palmer, Daniel. “Global Regulators Warn on Privacy Risks of Facebook's Libra.” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/global-regulatorswarn-on-privacy-risks-of-facebooks-Libra.
Palmer, Daniel. “Japan's Central Bank Chief Calls for International Effort on Libra
Regulation.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/japans-central-bank-chief-calls-for-international-effort-onLibra-regulation.
Palmer, Daniel. “Libra Could Drop 'Basket' and Issue Individual Fiat Stablecoins.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/Libracould-drop-basket-and-issue-individual-fiat-stablecoins.

255
Palmer, Daniel. “Libra Lacks Clarity on 'Opaque' Currency Basket, Says Fed Reserve
Governor.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/Libra-lacks-clarity-on-opaque-currency-basket-says-fedreserve-governor.
Palmer, Daniel. “Libra Taps Another Former FinCEN Official as General Counsel.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/Librafacebook-former-fincen-official-hire-general-counsel.
Palmer, Daniel. “Mnuchin 'Fine' With Libra Launch, But Crypto Project Must 'Fully' Comply
With AML Rules.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/mnuchin-fine-with-Libra-launch-but-crypto-project-mustfully-comply-with-aml-rules.
Palmer, Daniel. “People in US Trust Bitcoin More Than Facebook's Libra: Report.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/reportpeople-in-us-trust-Bitcoin-more-than-facebooks-Libra.
Palmer, Daniel. “Singapore's Central Bank Wants More Information on Facebook's Libra
Crypto.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/06/27/singapores-central-bank-wants-moreinformation-on-facebooks-Libra-crypto/.
Palmer, Daniel. “Tensions Rising at Facebook Libra as Backers Consider Quitting: Report.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/tensionsrising-at-facebook-Libra-as-backers-consider-quitting-report.

256
Palmer, Daniel. “US Secretary of State Says Crypto Should Be Regulated Like SWIFT.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/ussecretary-of-state-says-crypto-should-be-regulated-like-swift-transactions.
Pan, David. “China's Crypto Czar: Facebook-Led Libra 'Might Be Unstoppable.’” CoinDesk.
Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/09/19/chinas-crypto-czar-facebook-ledLibra-might-be-unstoppable/.
Pan, David. “Facebook's Marcus Says China Wins With Digital Renminbi If US Nixes
Libra.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/facebooks-marcus-says-china-wins-with-digital-renminbiif-u-s-nixes-Libra.
Parliamentary Secretariat for Financial Services. "Malta: A Leader in Dlt Regulation."
(2018). https://perma.cc/29US-4V9D.
PBOC, CAC, MIIT, SAIC, CBRC, CSRC, and CIRC. Announcement on Preventing
Financial Risks from Initial Coin Offerings. (Sept. 4, 2017). (In Mandarin).
https://perma.cc/N88N-5CV5.
Pennsylvania General Assembly. "Act 129 Money Transmission Business Licensing Law Omnibus Amendments". (2016).
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2016&sessInd=0&a
ct=129.
Pennsylvania General Assembly. “SB 401”. (2021).
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF
&sessYr=2021&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=0401&pn=0348.

257
Popper, Nathaniel, and Mike Issac. “Facebook and Telegram Are Hoping to Succeed Where
Bitcoin Failed.” The New York Times. February 28, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/technology/cryptocurrency-facebooktelegram.html.
Price Water House Coopers. "Global Cryptocurrency Boom: Latvian Tax Treatment (1)."
January 25, 2018. https://perma.cc/5JG2-88RF.
Primack, Dan. “Coinbase Valued above $100 Billion, Ahead of Direct Listing.” Axios.
February 20, 2021. https://www.axios.com/2021/02/19/coinbase-valued-100-billiondirect-listing.
Rappeport, Alan. “Infrastructure Deal Puts Cryptocurrencies in Washington’s Cross Hairs.”
The New York Times. Last modified August 2, 2021.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/30/us/politics/infrastructure-dealcryptocurrency.html.
Reden, Sitta Von. "Money in Classical Antiquity". Cambridge University Press. (2010).
Reuters. "Berlin et Paris veulent mobiliser le G20 sur les cryptomonnaies [Berlin and Paris
Want to Mobilize the G20 on Cryptocurrencies]." February 9, 2018.
https://perma.cc/RF3M-ZVZM.
Reuters. “Bulgaria Central Bank Warns Consumers of Cryptocurrency Risks.” February 14,
2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/crypto-currency-bulgaria/bulgaria-centralbank-warns-consumers-ofcryptocurrency-risks-idUSL8N1Q45KW.
Reuters. “Coinbase Launches Retail Bitcoin Service in Singapore, Canada.” Last modified
September 3, 2015.https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-Bitcoin-coinbaseidUSL1N1182G420150902..

258
Riigi Teataja [Official Gazette]. "Rahapesu Ja Terrorismi Rahastamise Tõkestamise Seadus
[Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act]." November 17, 2017.
https://perma.cc/TFF7-Z9FU.
Rizzo, Pete. “Coinbase Expands Bitcoin Buying Service to Australia.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 11, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2016/07/26/coinbase-expands-Bitcoin-buyingservice-to-australia/.
Rizzo, Pete. “Coinbase's US Bitcoin Exchange Opens Doors to Traders.” CoinDesk. Last
modified September 14, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2015/01/26/coinbases-us-Bitcoin-exchangeopens-doors-to-traders/.
Robinson, Neil. "August 1998 and The Development of Russia's Post-communist Political
Economy." Review of international political economy 16, no. 3 (2009): 433-455.
Rodriguez, Salvador. “Meet Morgan Beller, the 26-Year-Old Woman behind Facebook’s
Plan to Make Its Own Currency,” CNBC. July 20, 2019.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/20/facebook-Libra-partly-created-by-femaleengineer-morgan-beller.html.
Rosenberg, Elizabeth, and Edoardo Saravalle. “Congress Should Kickstart the Response to
Virtual Currencies.” The Hill. April 25, 2018.
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/384817-congress-should-kickstart-the-responseto-virtual-currencies/.
Roumeliotis, Greg. “U.S. Blocks MoneyGram Sale to China’s Ant Financial on National
Security Concerns.” Reuters. January 2, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-

259
moneygram-intl-m-a-ant-financial/u-s-blocks-moneygram-sale-to-chinas-antfinancial-on-national-security-concerns-idUSKBN1ER1R7.
Ruggie, John Gerard. "Globalization and the embedded liberalism compromise: the end of an
era?." (1997).
Sadok, Hicham, and Mohammed El Hadi El Maknouzi. "The Regulation of Virtual
Currencies in Comparative Perspective: New Private Money Or Niche Technological
Innovation?." Journal of Money Laundering Control (2020).
Schneider, Friedrich, and Ursula Windischbauer. "Money Laundering: Some Facts."
European Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 3 (2008): 387-404.
Schneider, Friedrich, and Ursula Windischbauer. Money laundering: some facts. European
Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 3 (2008):
Schneider, Friedrich. "The Financial Proceeds of Transnational Organized Crime All Over
the World." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 1 (2013): 714-727.
SEC. “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets.” April 13, 2019.
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets.
Selgin, George. "Currency Privatization as a Substitute for Currency Boards and
Dollarization." Cato Journal 25, issue 1 (2005): 141
Sénat de Belgique [Senate of Belgium]. "Question écrite n° 5-8723 de Martine Taelman du
16 avril 2013 au ministre des Finances [Written Question No. 5-8723 of Martine
Taelman of 16 April 2013 to the Minister of Finance]." July 31, 2013.
https://perma.cc/3YK4-M2WY.
Seward, Zack, and Nikhilesh De. “Facebook Unveils Libra Cryptocurrency, Targeting 1.7
Billion Unbanked.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.

260
https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-launches-subsidiary-to-support-new-Libracrypto.
Shalal, Andrea, and Katanga Johnson. “Biden Orders Government to Study Digital Dollar,
Other Cryptocurrency Risks.” Reuters. March 10, 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/biden-orders-government-study-digitaldollar-other-cryptocurrency-risks-2022-03-09/.
Shalal, Andrea. “Sen. Warren Warns of Cryptocurrency Risks, Presses SEC on Oversight
Authority.” Reuters. Last modified July 9, 2021.
https://www.reuters.com/technology/sen-warren-warns-cryptocurrency-risks-pressessec-oversight-authority-2021-07-08/.
Shambaugh, Jay C. "An experiment with multiple currencies: The American monetary
system from 1838–60." Explorations in Economic History 43, no. 4 (2006): 609-645.
Sharman, Jason Campbell. “Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money
Laundering in Developing States.” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 635656.
Shin, Laura. “Why Cryptocurrencies Could Push The Dollar From World Reserve Currency
Status.” Forbes. November 7, 2017.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/11/07/why-cryptocurrencies-couldpush-the-dollar-from-world-reserve-currency-status/#89747376a9ed.
Shumba, Camomile. “ECB’s Lagarde Supports Acceleration of Digital Euro Work.”
CoinDesk. Last updated March 10, 2022.
https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/03/10/ecbs-lagarde-supports-acceleration-ofdigital-euro-work/.

261
Sinclair, Sebastian. “Coinbase Taps Morgan Stanley Lawyer to Head Enterprise
Compliance.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/04/01/coinbase-taps-morgan-stanleylawyer-to-head-enterprise-compliance/.
Sinclair, Sebastian. “Libra Plans Dollar-Pegged Stablecoin Launch in January 2021: Report.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 14, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/11/27/Libra-plans-dollar-pegged-stablecoinlaunch-in-january-2021-report/
Singh, Manish. “Mobile Payments Firms in India Are Now Scrambling to Make Money.”
TechCrunch. April 2, 2020. https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/01/upi-india-growthstartups-business-model/.
SKAT. "Bitcoin mining og tilrådighedsstillelse af datakapacitet - moms og godtgørelse af
elafgifter [Bitcoin Mining and Supply of Data Capacity – VAT and Payment of
Electricity Fees]." June 27, 2017. https://perma.cc/N772-UTZQ.
SKAT. "Gevinst og tab ved afståelse af Bitcoins [Profit and Loss of Realized Bitcoins]."
SKM2018.104.SR, Case No. 17-1369067. February 27, 2018.https://perma.cc/PT9EBZ3R.
Sklerov, Matthew. "Solving the dilemma of state responses to cyberattacks: A justification
for the use of active defenses against states who neglect their duty to prevent."
Military law review 201 (2009): 1-85.
Smoak, Katherine. "The Weight Of Necessity: Counterfit Coins in the British Atlantic
World, Circa 1760-1800." William & Mary Quarterly 74, no. 3 (2017): 467-502.

262
South Carolina General Assembly. "H 3495". (2021).
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess124_2021-2022/bills/3495.htm.
South Carolina General Assembly. "H 3529". (2021).
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess124_2021-2022/bills/3529.htm.
South Carolina General Assembly. "H 4351". (2019).
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess123_2019-2020/bills/4351.htm.
Sparkes, Matthew. “Bitcoin Versus Central Banks.” New Scientist 251, no. 3352 (September
18, 2021): 16. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(21)01635-3.
Stokes, Robert. "Virtual money laundering: the case of Bitcoin and the Linden dollar."
Information & Communications Technology Law 21, no. 3 (2012).
Summers, Lawrence. "On the Economics of Private Money" by Robert G. King, Journal of
Monetary Economics 12, issue 1 (1983): 159-162.
Sumner, Scott. “Privatizing the Mint.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25, no. 1
(1993): 13–29
Sun, Mengqi. “Coinbase Transactions Under Review by U.S. Sanctions Enforcer.” Wall
Street Journal. March 3, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/coinbase-transactionsunder-review-by-u-s-sanctions-enforcer-11614803086.
Takáts, Előd. A theory of “Crying Wolf: The economics of money laundering enforcement.
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 27, no. 1 (2011)
Tang, Frank. “Facebook’s Libra Forcing China to Step up Plans for Its Own Cryptocurrency,
Says Central Bank Official.” South China Morning Post. July 8, 2019.
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3017716/facebooks-Libraforcing-china-step-plans-its-own.

263
Teo, Candice. “From Diamonds to Recycling: How Blockchain Can Drive Responsible and
Ethical Businesses.” World Economic Forum. June 22, 2018.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/diamonds-recycling-blockchaintechnology-responsible-ethical-businesses/.
Texas Legislature Online. "HB 981". (2019).
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/pdf/HB00981I.pdf#navpanes=0.
Texas Legislature Online. "SB 736". (2021).
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/billtext/pdf/SB00736I.pdf#navpanes=0.
Texas Legislature Online. "SJR 55". (2021).
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/billtext/pdf/SJ00055I.pdf#navpanes=0.
The Financial Action Task Force.“FATF Report to G20 on So-Called Stablecoins.” June
2020. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/report-g20-socalled-stablecoins-june-2020.html.
The People's Bank Of China, July 2021. “Progress on Research and Development of E-CNY
in China”.
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4157443/4293696/20210716145846918
71.pdf.
The White House. “FACT SHEET: President Biden to Sign Executive Order on Ensuring
Responsible Development of Digital Assets.” March 9, 2022.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/09/factsheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-on-ensuring-responsible-innovation-indigital-assets/.

264
Tsingou, Eleni. "New Governors on The Block: The Rise of Anti-money Laundering
Professionals." Crime, Law and Social Change 69, no. 2 (2018): 191-205.
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [House of Representatives of the States General]. "Brief
van de Minister van Financiën Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der StatenGeneraal [Letter of the Minister of Finance to the Chairman of the House of
Representatives]." March 8, 2018, http://perma.cc/2J54-H8QC.
U.S Congressman French Hill. Two US Congressmen Ask The Fed To Create A National
Digital Currency. October 4, 2019.
https://hill.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6136.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Agriculture. Cryptocurrencies: Oversight Of New
Assets In Digital Age: Hearing Before The Committee On Agriculture. 115th Cong.,
2nd sess., July 18, 2018. https://www.congress.gov/115/chrg/CHRG115hhrg30893/CHRG-115hhrg30893.pdf.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Energy and Commerce | Senate - Commerce, Science,
and Transportation. Consumer Safety Technology Act, HR 8128, 116th Cong., 2nd
sess., introduced in House August 28, 2020,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr8128
U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Financial Services, Agriculture. Crypto-Currency Act
of 2020. HR 6154. 116th Cong., 2nd sess. Introduced in House March 09, 2020.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6154?r=4&s=1.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Financial Services, Agriculture. Eliminate Barriers to
5 Innovation Act of 2021. HR 1602. 117th Cong., 1st sess. Introduced in House

265
March 08, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr1602/BILLS117hr1602ih.pdf.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee On Foreign Relations. A bill to require a study on the
national security implications of the People's Republic of China's efforts to create an
official digital currency. S 2543. 117th Cong., 1st sess. Introduced in Senate July 29,
2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2543/text.
United States Senate Committee On Banking Housing And Urban Affairs. “At Hearing,
Warren Delivers Remarks on Digital Currency.” June 9, 2021.
https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/majority/at-hearing-warren-deliversremarks-on-digital-currency.
Vaubel, Roland. The Government's Money Monopoly: Externalities or Natural Monopoly?.
Kyklos. 37. (1984). 27-58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1984.tb00739.x.
Vermont General Assembly. "1913. Blockchain Enabling". May 3, 2018.
https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/12/081/01913.
Wan, Allen K, Li Liu, Jun Luo, Eric Lam, Justina Lee, and Joanna Ossinger. “China Widens
Ban on Crypto Transactions; Bitcoin Tumbles.” Bloomberg. Last modified
September 24, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-24/chinadeems-all-crypto-related-transactions-illegal-in-crackdown?sref=ExbtjcSG.
Washington State Legislature. "SB 5246". (2017).
https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5264.pdf.
Washington State Legislature. "SB 5426". (2021).
https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/202122/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5426.pdf?q=20210322140539.

266
Washington State Legislature. “SB 5264”. 2017.
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5264.pdf.
Weber, Warren E. “The Efficiency of Private E-money-like Systems: The US Experience
with State Bank Notes." Bank of Canada Working Paper, no. 14-15 (2015).
Weeks-Brown, Ronda. “Cleaning Up: Countries Are Advancing Efforts to Stop Criminals
from Laundering Their Trillions.” Finance & Development 55. No. 4 (December
2018): 44–45.
Williams, Marcela M., and Richard G. Anderson. "Handicapping Currency Design:
Counterfeit Deterrence and Visual Accessibility in the United States and Abroad."
Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis 89, no. 5 (2007).
Winick, Erin. “Tencent and Alibaba’s Mobile Payment War Shows How Far China Is Ahead
of the US.” MIT Technology Review. June 15, 2018.
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/06/15/142297/tencent-and-alibabas-mobilepayment-war-shows-how-far-china-is-ahead-of-the-us/.
Wolverson, Roya. “Is China a Currency Manipulator?” Council On Foreign Relations. April
14, 2010. https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/china-currency-manipulator.
Woolsey, W. William. "Full privatization of currency in a nearly conventional money and
banking system." Cato Journal. 11 (1991): 73.
Wyplosz, Charles. "EMU: Why and how it might happen." Journal of Economic
Perspectives 11, no. 4 (1997): 3-21.
Xuejing, Ma. “'Third Distribution' System to Common Prosperity.” China Daily. September
24, 2021.
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/24/WS614d15c5a310cdd39bc6b282.html.

267
Yaga, Dylan, Peter Mell, Nik Roby, and Karen Scarfone. “Blockchain Technology
Overview.” National Institutes of Standard and Technology. October 2018.
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/nist.ir.8202.pdf.
Yao, Kevin. “Explainer: What Is China's 'Common Prosperity' Drive and Why Does It
Matter?” Reuters. Last modified September 2, 2021.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/what-is-chinas-common-prosperity-drive-whydoes-it-matter-2021-09-02/.
Yeager, Leland B. "Privatizing Money." Cato Journal 30, no. 3 (2010): 417
Yleisradio Oy. "Patrik Skön, Skatteförvaltningen: Bitcoin ger miljoner i skatteintäkter [Tax
Authority: Bitcoin Results in Millions in Tax Revenue]. September 24, 2017.
https://perma.cc/2VSH-ZQ3V.
Yu, Xie. “China to Stamp out Cryptocurrency Trading Completely with Ban on Foreign
Platforms.” South China Morning Post. Last modified February 7, 2018.
https://perma.cc/42H4-F2AW.
Zagaris, Bruce. "The merging of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financial
enforcement regimes after September 11, 2001." Berkeley J. Int'l L. 22 (2004): 123.
Zákony Pro Lidi. "Law No. 368/2016 Coll., Sbirka Zakonu No. 147/2016." November 14,
2016, https://perma.cc/MFX9-42H2.
Zdanowicz, John S. "Trade-based Money Laundering And Terrorist Financing." Review Of
Law & Economics 5, no. 2 (2009): 855-878.
Zhao, Wolfie. “Bank of England Governor Says Facebook's Libra Crypto Will Be
Scrutinized.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.

268
https://www.coindesk.com/facebooks-Libra-could-meet-highest-standards-inregulation-boe-governor.
Zhao, Wolfie. “Facebook Holds Talks With CFTC Over GlobalCoin Cryptocurrency:
Report.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/06/03/facebook-holds-talks-with-cftc-overglobalcoin-cryptocurrency-report/.
Zhao, Wolfie. “Facebook to Roll Out 'GlobalCoin' Cryptocurrency in 2020: Report.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/05/24/facebook-to-roll-out-globalcoincryptocurrency-in-2020-report/.
Zhao, Wolfie. “Facebook's David Marcus to Lead New Blockchain Research Unit.”
CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2018/05/08/facebooks-david-marcus-to-leadnew-blockchain-research-unit/.
Zhao, Wolfie. “Switzerland Meetings Didn't Clear US Lawmaker's Doubts on Facebook's
Libra.” CoinDesk. Last modified September 13, 2021.
https://www.coindesk.com/switzerland-meetings-didnt-clear-us-lawmakers-doubtson-facebooks-Libra.
Zmudzinski, Adrian. “Chinese Internet Court Uses Blockchain to Protect Online Writer’s
Intellectual Property.” Coin Telegraph. December 8, 2018.
https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinese-internet-court-uses-blockchain-to-protectonline-writers-intellectual-property.

269
Żuławiński, Michał. Morawiecki: "We Will Ban Cryptocurrencies or Regulate Them. ‘We
Do Not Want Another Amber Gold’." Bankier.Pl (Jan. 25, 2018).
https://perma.cc/6UWU-AKBQ

270
VITA

Girish Sreevatsan Nandakumar
Graduate Program in International Studies
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529

Girish’s eclectic background includes a bachelor’s degree in biotechnology, a master’s
degree in business administration, and a doctorate degree in international studies. In his doctoral
studies, he majored in international political economy and development, and minored in modeling
and simulation. During this time, he worked at the Virginia Modeling Analysis and Simulation
Center (VMASC), an interdisciplinary research center. He has presented his research at forums
such as the International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling &
Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation (SBP-BRiMS). Girish
previously served as a Fellow at the Donovan Group, a think tank within the United States Special
Operations Command (US SOCOM), where he focused on strategic futures at the intersection of
technology and security. Specifically, he focused at the intersection on geopolitics and the future
of money. He has published whitepapers on related topics for the Center for Global Security
Research (CGSR) at the Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL), and for the Pentagon’s
Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program. Girish has also served as a Fellow at the NATO
Innovation Hub. During this time, he founded the Disruptive Technology Experiment (DTEX)
initiative and the Academic Alliance initiative. Girish also recently completed the Stanford LEAD
professional certificate, a year-long executive education program in innovation leadership.

